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This dissertation examines the effects of public policies that mandate 
disclosures or education for consumers making decisions in credit and other financial 
markets. 
The first chapter reviews the literature, finding two roles for disclosures: 
facilitating searches among product alternatives and highlighting risks. Research 
suggests disclosures do impact consumer choices, and that consumer responses to 
disclosed information will vary by the format of disclosure, as well as the consumer’s 
current mood and financial literacy level. There are many studies on financial literacy 
education, but because consumers with the strongest base of information are also the 
most likely to be educated, results are not conclusive. 
The second chapter evaluates state disclosure laws for high-cost mortgage 
refinance loans using 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. Estimates obtained 
using a variety of econometric techniques, including a sequential response model, 
suggest that state laws requiring signed disclosures highlighting the risk of “losing 
your home” result in loan applicants being 3 to 6 percent more likely to reject a loan 
offer from a lender.  
The third chapter reports three lab experiments on how mood or affect 
influences a consumer’s use of disclosures. Unlike control group participants, as well 
as those in whom anxiety was induced, participants in whom a positive affect was 
 induced were more likely to notice missing information in a credit card disclosure. 
These results suggest even simplified disclosure formats need to include all relevant 
information in order to be effective for consumers in nonpositive moods. 
The final chapter is a longitudinal field study in which mandatory financial 
education was randomly assigned to 127 low-income clients in a subsidized housing 
program. Estimates using difference-in-differences methods show $540 in additional 
savings, a 25 percent increase in self-reported financial knowledge, and a 21-point 
increase in credit scores for educated clients after one year. These findings suggest the 
importance of appropriately designed field studies and demonstrate that mandated 
financial education can influence consumer behavior. 
These chapters provide insights into how public policies can influence 
consumer decisions in credit markets. This work also provides a platform for new 
directions of inquiry into consumer decision making in financial markets. 
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1INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines the effects of public policies that mandate 
disclosures or education for consumers making financial decisions. It is divided into 
four distinct chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the literature of 
consumers’ use of disclosures in financial and other markets. The second chapter 
evaluates state disclosure laws for high-cost mortgage refinance loans. The third 
chapter reports on the results of laboratory experiments of mood, or affect, and 
consumers’ use of credit card application disclosures. The final chapter is a 
longitudinal field study in which mandatory financial education was randomly 
assigned to low-income clients in a subsidized housing program. Overall, these studies 
provide evidence that governmental policies mandating that consumers receive 
disclosure information have an effect on consumer decisions. Likewise, financial 
literacy education, which also influences disclosure use, has an effect on financial 
behavior. To the extent that a goal of consumer polices is to encourage consumers to 
more carefully evaluate the risks of mortgage loan offers or the terms of credit card 
offers, these results suggest that disclosure and financial literacy education may be 
effective strategies. 
The first chapter provides an overview of disclosure polices for credit markets, 
with a focus on credit cards and high-cost mortgages. This chapter summarizes the 
roles for disclosures in credit markets, including disclosures designed to help 
consumers search before applying for a credit card and disclosures designed to help 
naïve consumers evaluate the risks of a mortgage refinance loan before accepting an 
offer from a lender. This chapter provides a brief overview of the mechanisms 
involved in communicating product disclosures, including how consumers may 
process disclosed information. This chapter also summarizes previous studies 
2evaluating consumer disclosure policies and provides a review of the literature related 
to improving the ability of consumers to make financial decisions through financial 
literacy education. Overall, the existing literature supports the need for further 
evidence of the effects of mandatory disclosures, including the extent to which 
warning-type disclosures affect consumers in the mortgage market, how a consumer’s 
mood may alter the processing of credit card disclosure information, and the effects of 
mandatory financial education. 
The second chapter presents an applied empirical study of consumer rejections 
of approved high-cost mortgage loan offers using 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act data. This chapter finds that state laws requiring signed disclosures of the risk of 
“losing your home” result in more loan applicants rejecting a refinance loan offer from 
a lender. In general, a loan application covered by signed disclosure laws, controlling 
for applicant, lender, and market factors, results in a 3- to 6-point increase in the rate 
of applicants rejecting high-cost loans. An additional effect of these disclosure laws is 
that applicants and borrowers subject to signed disclosures appear to modestly reduce 
the amount they borrow relative to their income. Although state laws might impact 
application behavior and lender denials of applications, strong evidence of such effects 
does not exist. 
The third chapter presents the results of a series of three lab experiments using 
college undergraduates to review credit card disclosures. Credit cards are one of the 
most common forms of credit offered to consumers and one in which information is 
highly standardized through mandated disclosures at or before the time of application. 
Credit card disclosures are highly relevant for college students since most people will 
apply for their first credit card while in college. Overall, participants do pay attention 
to the information in mandated disclosures when evaluating credit card offers. Unlike 
participants in whom anxiety was induced or controls, participants in whom positive 
3affect was induced were more likely to notice information omitted or missing from a 
disclosure. Participants in whom positive affect was induced were also more likely to 
seek more items of information than were controls. This is consistent with positive 
affect’s association with dually broad and flexible thinking, and provides evidence 
against positive affect leading to careless thinking, as suggested by some theorists. 
These results suggest that credit disclosure policies should include all relevant 
information if a goal is more complete use of information by consumers across a range 
of moods. 
The final chapter presents a field study evaluating the impact of a financial 
literacy education program provided to clients in a subsidized housing program. The 
financial status and attitudes of 127 clients were tracked for 12 months, including 60 
in a treatment group assigned to financial education and 67 in a control group. Based 
on simple difference-in-differences comparisons as well as propensity score weighted 
difference-in-differences estimators, the program is associated with $540 in additional 
savings, a 25 percent increase in positive self-reports of financial knowledge, and a 21 
point increase in credit scores. The clients in this study were single mothers with 
incomes under $20,000 at the start of the study, nearly all of whom had poor credit 
histories. These results suggest that the program had an effect on the financial status of 
clients within one year, even among a highly distressed population. If a policy goal is 
to improve the financial knowledge, savings, and credit of similar groups of 
consumers, targeted education on financial topics may be a successful approach. 
As a whole, the studies presented in these chapters suggest that public polices 
that mandate information for consumers in financial markets may influence consumer 
behavior. To the extent that policymakers want consumers to incorporate the risk of 
losing their home in making decisions about high-cost mortgage loans, signed 
disclosures may serve a useful role. If a goal is to facilitate information processing of 
4consumers across moods, it is better to include all relevant information in credit card 
disclosures than to provide only general information and leave the consumer to search 
for details elsewhere. Mandating targeted education to consumers with low incomes 
and poor credit may support at least short-term improvements in savings and credit 
behavior and is likely to enhance the use of disclosures for financial products. Further 
research on consumer use of information in financial markets is warranted, 
particularly given recent problems in consumer credit markets and the lack of 
substantive recent research in this area. These studies provide a platform for new 
directions of inquiry in this area. 
5CHAPTER 1: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Mandated Information in Credit Markets 
Many products in financial markets involve information disclosures aimed at 
consumers. Securities and Exchange Commission regulations require firms to provide 
standardized information to investors on a regular basis, as well as a prospectus to 
potential investors (Fischel & Grossman, 1984). These documents include details on 
the firm’s financial performance and data useful for analyzing the value of the 
investment, including potential risks. Banking regulations require disclosures for 
savings and other products, including the terms of deposits, the structure of interest 
payments, and account fees (Elliehausen & Lowrey, 1997). But some of the oldest and 
also most widely used consumer disclosures across any market are focused on the 
provision of consumer credit (Durkin & Elliehausen, 1999). Passed in 1968, the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA) was one of the first consumer information policies in the U.S. 
The law’s legislative sponsor was Senator Paul H. Douglas, an economist and a 
proponent of providing consumers with information in the marketplace. One example 
of mandated information under TILA can be observed in each of the more than 8 
billion credit card applications that are mailed to households in the U.S. each year 
(Hagerty, 2008). Every credit card application includes the so-called “Schumer Box,” 
named after the New York congressman who led the effort to create standardized 
credit card information disclosures in a 1988 amendment to TILA. This special 
disclosure provides a one-page matrix with the most relevant fees, terms, and 
conditions of each credit card offer. Mortgages are also covered under TILA, although 
the complexity of mortgage terms results in requirements for a variety of written 
disclosure forms. High-cost loans have special disclosures required under the Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. HOEPA disclosures also 
6include the statement (in capital letters): “YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME, AND 
ANY MONEY YOU HAVE PUT INTO IT, IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.” 
One argument supporting mandatory disclosures in credit markets is that the 
more information consumers have available, the better they can make fully informed 
decisions (Rudd, 1983). There is a practical limit to how much information is useful 
for decision making, however (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; for a recent review, see 
Mitchell, Walsh, & Yamin, 2005; also Scammon, 1977). Policymakers and regulators 
are forced to make choices regarding the form of written disclosures required for 
various types of credit products. To make these choices, decision makers need to 
understand why consumers may need disclosures, how various forms of disclosure 
might be used by consumers in making actual decisions, and whether current 
disclosures appear to be effective at reaching policy goals in practice. This section 
provides an overview of the rationale for disclosures, the mechanisms explaining how 
consumers may use disclosures, and a scan of past studies examining the impact of 
various types of disclosures in nonfinancial markets. Because one key factor is 
consumer financial knowledge, this chapter also reviews the literature related to 
financial literacy education. 
2. Roles of Information Disclosures in Credit Markets 
There several roles for disclosures in consumer decision making in credit 
markets. One role of disclosure is to lower the costs of finding and processing 
information across product alternatives prior to purchase. In credit markets, 
disclosures will include details on the terms and conditions of a loan, including the 
interest rates and fees. One of the initial contributions of the TILA was the 
development of a standardized annual percentage rate (APR). APR is intended to 
7summarize the costs of a loan into an effective interest rate, accounting for one-time 
fees and payments over the life of the loan. By law, APR is defined using the same 
formula across lenders, making it easier for consumers to compare lenders and loan 
options. As Stigler (1961) suggested in his influential paper on the economics of 
information, searching for any product incurs costs for the consumer. Consumers will 
not seek to learn every detail about a product and its alternatives but instead will 
search for more information up to the point at which the cost of acquiring each 
additional item of information equals the expected benefit in terms of a lower price. 
All markets have imperfectly informed consumers, and markets in which information 
is costly may result in consumers searching for less information, all else being equal. 
Disclosures can help lower the costs of acquiring and processing information, 
resulting in more searching by consumers among alternative options. In credit markets 
this ideally results in consumers examining more credit card product choices and then 
selecting products that most closely match their needs at a particular cost.  
Disclosures are particularly important for conveying information about product 
features that consumers have difficulty evaluating in advance. Nelson (1970) defines 
products as being search goods—products that can be fully examined prior to 
purchase—or experience goods, which can be evaluated only through use. Simple loan 
products might be classic search goods where consumers can examine loan terms 
across lenders and select the one with the terms that best match their needs. Longer-
term credit products such as a revolving credit card, however, might entail aspects of 
experience goods. For example, consumers cannot know how payment issues are 
managed until they begin using the card. Mandating disclosure of information 
provides consumers with information about aspects of the card that they could 
otherwise discover only by using the product. 
8Disclosures of the terms and costs of credit, as required by TILA, may not 
actually serve to enhance search outside of the credit card market, however. A review 
of the role of disclosures by economists at the Federal Reserve concedes there is little 
evidence that TILA has led to an increase in the number of loan options consumers 
consider overall (Durkin & Elliehausen, 1999). In part these authors point to the 
structure of disclosures for most loan products—since the creation of the law, lenders 
have made the case that accurate terms and conditions cannot be provided to 
consumers before they apply for a loan. The Schumer Box is a notable exception, but 
for most loan products disclosures are provided after the consumer has applied for a 
loan. Credit card disclosures facilitate consumer search by standardizing the APR and 
the format of the disclosure form, helping consumers compare one credit card offer 
with another before applying for a card (Durkin, 2002). But for other loan types, 
consumers engage in search before making an loan application, then receive TILA 
disclosures after application, or at or just before signing the final loan contract. 
Because the process of preparing an application incurs costs (opportunity costs of time 
and monetary costs), searching based on information disclosed after application may 
not be economically efficient or provide consumers information that can be used 
effectively in decision making. There is evidence that TILA has resulted in 
standardized advertising of APR by lenders and has improved the understanding of 
credit terms by consumers (Day, 1976; Day & Brandt, 1974; see also, Durkin, 2002). 
Lenders often do voluntarily present information from the TILA disclosure as 
consumers search for loans, although this is not mandated, and frequently terms will 
change from the time of application to the time of the closing of the loan contract. 
Another role for disclosures in credit markets is related not to searching among 
products but rather to delivering information consumers use to evaluate a loan product 
relative to not taking any loan. The disclosure might provide information the consumer 
9uses to decide to exit the market for an entire class of loans rather than search for 
another product in the same market. This type of disclosure typically takes the form of 
a warning about a potential risk or hazard. Viscusi (1993) provides an extensive 
discussion of laws designed to warn consumers about the cancer risks of a variety of 
food, drug, cosmetic, and medical products. He describes the function of these 
disclosures as influencing the consumer’s perception of health risks related to these 
products, which in turn reduces the consumer’s expected utility from purchase. 
Viscusi treats hazard or warning-type disclosures in one of two forms. One form 
influences the purchase decision by providing information at or before the consumer 
commits to a product. The other form warns consumers to take precautions after 
purchasing but before using the product. For example, the disclosure might warn the 
consumer to wear eye protection before using a pesticide. The consumer may view 
this warning prior to purchase and decide not to purchase because of it, but the 
primary purpose of this disclosure is to encourage the consumer to take precautions. 
There are few examples in financial or credit markets of products that might require 
consumer precautions in use, however. The more relevant example of disclosures are 
those that provide information about the risks of a credit product before a consumer 
becomes indebted by signing the loan contract. These disclosures might lead the 
consumer to change his or her perception of the probability and/or severity of a 
negative outcome if he or she were to take on a particular type of loan product. The 
language included in the HOEPA disclosure “YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME” is 
one example of such a disclosure, designed to warn the consumer prior to signing the 
mortgage loan contract of the severity of failing to abide by the terms of the loan. 
These disclosures are provided within 3 days of the loan being signed, which could be 
several weeks after the initial application was made, but with enough time for a 
consumer to decide to exit the market for this type of loan. Of course all mortgages 
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carry the risk of foreclosure. The lender has an objective estimate of a borrower’s 
probability of foreclosure; the borrower has a subjective estimate. In theory, the 
disclosure provides information that causes the consumer to re-evaluate the subjective 
risk of losing his or her home by accepting a particular mortgage loan. After 
incorporating new information highlighting the catastrophic risks of foreclosure, the 
consumer’s expected utility of a potential loan would be lower than prior to disclosure. 
The expected net marginal benefits of the loan may then be zero or negative, causing 
the consumer to abandon this transaction and perhaps exit the market for this class of 
loan products. 
3. Rationales for Policies Mandating Information Disclosures 
Although disclosure may influence consumer behavior, the rationale for 
governmental intervention mandating disclosures is a topic of many papers in law and 
economics. Beales, Craswell, and Salop (1981) provide one of the more thorough 
reviews of the economic aspects of information disclosure and the role of public 
policy. Fundamentally, they cite the failure of information markets, specifically the 
public good properties of information. As with other public goods, information useful 
for consumers will not be produced or disseminated at socially optimal levels. Sellers 
will disseminate only that information that gives their product an edge. No one firm 
has the incentive to offer information that will benefit competing brands. Likewise, no 
one firm has the incentive to issue negative information about competitors that might 
implicate its own brand. Without mandates, consumers will not have as much 
information upon which to make decisions. 
While there is a significant literature examining when disclosure might be best 
left unregulated (see Grossman, 1981; Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, for early examples), 
because of several unique features of this market it is unlikely lenders will voluntarily 
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disclose information about credit products in a consistent manner in the absence of 
regulations. Fishman and Hagerty (2003) suggest that mandatory disclosures are most 
important in markets where a large portion of consumers find products hard to 
understand. This is likely the case for credit markets. Numerous studies show that 
consumers are poor at analyzing loan terms and interest rate calculations (see Mandell, 
1973; 2004a, for one author’s research over several decades). Of course, disclosures 
can be calibrated to the knowledge levels of the consumers for which a particular 
product is intended. For example, investors in hedge funds receive few mandatory 
disclosures, because it is assumed that this investor class is more sophisticated and that 
almost all will be well-informed. Meanwhile, mutual funds attract more uninformed 
investors and therefore require more extensive disclosures. Fishman and Hagerty 
suggest that an additional benefit of mandatory disclosures is that otherwise-
uninformed consumers may become aware of the need to learn new information and 
may then seek that information from firms. In fact, this was one of the early findings 
of the impact of the TILA (Day, 1976; Durkin & Elliehausen, 1999). If mandating 
disclosures results in consumers becoming more aware of which information is part of 
all credit offers, lenders might begin to compete based on this information, increasing 
the average quality of the market overall. Finally, several papers suggest that 
disclosures should be mandated when consumers find obtaining information about 
products to be costly (Grossman, 1981; Mazis, Staelin, Beales, & Salop, 1981). Credit 
contracts tend to be complicated legal agreements that most untrained consumers may 
find confusing or unreadable. The time required to analyze such agreements, or to find 
counsel to conduct such an analysis, presents significant costs. 
A recent paper by Stango and Zinman (2006) discusses the importance of 
TILA in light of advances in understanding consumer behavior from the psychology 
and economics perspectives. The authors use findings from behavioral economics 
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regarding a common and persistent bias in consumer decision making, the 
underestimation of the long-term costs of credit payments. The authors find that 
consumers substantially underestimate the costs of credit when presented with only a 
payment stream (for example “$400 per month”) versus an annual percentage rate 
(8%). In the absence of standardized measures of the costs of credit, lenders can 
exploit price discrimination by taking advantage of how well the consumer can 
convert a payment stream into an effective interest rate. The authors conclude that 
mandatory APR disclosures such as those included in TILA are an important public 
policy given this systematic bias in consumer decision making. 
Camerer and colleagues in a law review article suggest that disclosures in 
credit markets are a form of “asymmetric paternalism” in policymaking (Camerer, 
Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). Asymmetric paternalist 
policies are intended to generate gains for consumers who need protection while 
having little effect on other consumers. The authors focus on examples from 
behavioral economics in which consumers may fail to behave as the fully informed 
rational agents assumed in many economic models. The authors focus on two roles for 
disclosures in this asymmetric paternalist framework. First, the disclosure addresses 
uninformed or naïve consumers, who may not be as capable of making an informed 
choice. The authors suggest the 37-word HOEPA disclosure reminding prospective 
borrowers they could lose their home “exemplifies asymmetric paternalism: it imposes 
little cost on the financial institution to reproduce a form disclosure document. The 
informed consumer will already be aware of the consequences of defaulting on a 
mortgage, so she will not be helped by the regulation, but neither will she be adversely 
affected. For the naive consumer, the disclosure can be enormously beneficial, moving 
her one step closer to educated consumer status” (p. 1233). The authors argue that the 
costs of disclosure are minimal, because financial institutions amortize the fixed costs 
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of setting up (largely automated) disclosure systems over many loans and years. The 
second role of HOEPA disclosures suggested by these authors is related to the fact that 
these disclosures are delivered in advance and remind loan applicants they have a right 
to reject their loan offer. Consumers receive HOEPA disclosures 3 days before the 
loan closing and can void the mortgage contract up to 3 days after signing. Allowing 
consumers to review the information in the disclosure and to re-evaluate their 
decisions away from the “heat” of the initial application, when the lender likely 
emphasizes the benefits of the loan including, potentially, the “cash out” of home 
equity in the case of a refinance loan, addresses so-called projection biases. Because 
people overweight the short-term benefits of going through with the loan and are 
“indulging their current state of mind,” providing a cooling-off period allows 
consumers to exert more self-control. The authors caution that the effects of warning-
type disclosures may be mitigated by another phenomenon from behavioral 
economics, the tendency of consumers to remain wedded to a particular decision even 
in light of new information. To the degree that people exhibit a bias in favor of the 
status quo, they will refrain from reversing a decision even when reminded of the 
potentially catastrophic risks or when given time to exert self-control. 
Requiring disclosures with negative information may serve to overcome a 
problem of asymmetric information in the marketplace. Akerlof’s (1970) paper on the 
market for “lemons” in the used car market shows how adverse selection can result in 
consumers assuming all products in the market are of poor quality in the absence of 
other information. There are welfare gains from mandating minimum standards of 
product disclosures to prevent the dishonest sellers from undermining honest sellers. 
Disclosures reduce the consumer’s level of uncertainty regarding the otherwise-
unknown quality of a firm or product. HOEPA and some state-level high-cost loan 
laws require written disclosures for loan terms such as a balloon payment (when the 
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entire balance is due before the loan is fully amortized), a prepayment penalty (when a 
large fee is levied if the borrower tries to refinance or pay off the loan), or yield spread 
premiums (in which a loan broker charges a higher rate for the loan than the lender 
does and retains the margin). In theory, consumers may be more willing to enter 
markets where these practices are prevalent if they know that these terms are 
mandated to be included in the disclosure statement rather than obscured in legal 
documents. By facilitating stronger trust of offers, the market can be operate more 
efficiently in the presence of mandated disclosures (e.g., Diamond, 1985). 
4. Mechanisms of Disclosure: Consumer Information Processing 
The work of Simon (1978) and many others shows that consumers behave as 
though operating under limited cognitive abilities, resulting in behavior that is 
boundedly rational rather than purely rational. These cognitive limitations affect how 
consumers use disclosure information. There is an extensive literature on how labels 
and warnings should be optimally designed for a variety of contexts (e.g., Edworthy & 
Adams, 1996; Wogalter, Brelsford, Desaulniers, & Laughery, 1991; Wogalter, Dejoy, 
& Laughery, 1999; Wogalter & Vigilante Jr, 2003). These studies are largely 
conducted in lab experiments or on a small scale in particular environments, often in 
health care or among workers in environments with potential injuries (Viscusi, Magat, 
& Huber, 1987a). In general, product warnings are designed to cause alarm or to 
provide information. Many consumer and industrial products include alert-type 
warnings in the form of icons or particular shapes and colors, generally regarding 
health and safety risks. Written disclosures require greater comprehension by the user 
and generally have lower compliance levels (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). Although 
this research is relevant to label and warning design generally, in credit markets 
disclosures are generally written and intended to provide information rather than to 
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trigger alarm. The one exception is the HOEPA disclosure; while it focuses more on 
disclosing information than on causing alarm, prescribing the use of capital letters in 
the HOEPA disclosure (and disclosures required by states) is consistent with the 
findings from product warning labels designed to attract consumer attention and 
comprehension.  
Russo and colleagues (Russo, Staelin, Nolan, Russell, & Metcalf, 1986) show 
that manipulating the format and content of package displays can have significant 
effects on how consumers use information. An information matrix reduces the 
cognitive effort consumers require to analyze information. This suggests that 
disclosures designed with such a format may help consumers to use provided 
information—which underscores the model of the Schumer Box for credit card 
applications. The format of credit card disclosure may have the potential to be used for 
other consumer credit products. Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) recently presented a 
study of proposed mortgage disclosure reforms showing that in lab studies consumers 
applying for a loan from a mortgage broker were better able to use written disclosures 
when they were presented in simplified formats. 
Alba and Hutchinson (1987) conducted an extensive review of experiments in 
marketing and psychology related to consumer experience levels and the use of 
information in the context of product choices. The authors summarize the literature 
and suggest that the more familiar a consumer is with a product or product category, 
the more quickly he or she can analyze information with little cognitive effort. The 
implication for credit markets is that the disclosed information may be relied on most 
intensely by novice consumers and ignored by experienced consumers, which is 
consistent with the asymmetric paternalist concept discussed previously. The authors 
also suggest that novices will place more importance on summary-level information, 
while experienced consumers may be better able to make inferences based on partial 
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information (see also Bei & Widdows, 1999). Disclosures therefore may help novice 
consumers categorize information, allowing them to more quickly process and 
compare product details.  
5. Mechanisms of Disclosure: Influencing Risk Perceptions 
The literature examining the use of hazard or risk disclosures relies largely on 
the subjective utility model (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). Conceptually, disclosures 
influence how a consumer perceives the risk of a product, and that perception in turn 
influences consumer behavior by changing the utility calculation related to alternative 
actions (for an example, see Viscusi & Magat, 1987). Because people tend to be poor 
at estimating subjective probabilities of the risk of a negative outcome, the more 
detailed and quantitative a disclosure is about a potential risk, the more a consumer 
will respond to it (Magat, Viscusi, & Huber, 1988). The direction of consumer 
perceptions can vary, however. In many cases consumers will overestimate low-
probability risks and underestimate high-probability risks, a tendency linked to 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Even with this problem, consumers 
also are likely to overestimate their ability relative to the average consumer to avoid a 
risk, regardless of how risky they view an event on average (Magat, Viscusi, & Huber, 
1987). 
There is a vast literature in psychology and economics regarding how people 
perceive risks (e.g., Arrow, 1982; Fischhoff, 2002; Lopes, 1994; Weber & Milliman, 
1997). One of the most influential works on risk perception is by psychologist Paul 
Slovic (1987). Rather than an expected-value decision theory framework based on the 
probability of an event and the severity of the outcome of the event if it occurs, Slovic 
suggested that risk perceptions are a function of several dimensions, including 
“dread.” The dread dimension is related to the event’s controllability, as well as to the 
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extent to which the mere potential of a negative event triggers feelings of worry. The 
dread dimension focuses in particular on the potential for a catastrophic outcome 
related to an event, nearly irrespective of the probability of its occurrence. Using 
Slovic’s framework, one recent study in the financial context shows that a financial 
disclosure that includes information on the potential for a catastrophic loss has one of 
the strongest effects on changing risk perceptions of investment options (Koonce, 
McAnally, & Mercer, 2005). The risk of “losing your home” in the HOEPA disclosure 
may be a good example of a catastrophic risk in the mind of a consumer. One survey 
of stressful life events places losing a home to foreclosure as a very stressful event, 
included in the top 10 most stressful events and listed even ahead of a divorce 
(Hobson, Kamen, Szostek, Nethercut, Tiedmann, & Wojnarowicz, 1998). 
6. Mechanisms of Disclosure: Variations by Mood 
Consumers using credit disclosures might find themselves in a variety of 
emotional states. For example, an applicant for a credit card may be in a positive mood 
because the card issuer is offering a 10% discount on a major purchase, a tactic 
common in many retail settings. Meanwhile, a consumer for a home equity loan may 
be experiencing financial distress and feeling anxious about being able to meet his or 
her financial obligations. 
Many studies demonstrate that a person’s mood, even mild transient moods, 
can have a significant impact on how he or she thinks and processes information. Isen 
and Daubman (1984) suggest that positive affect aids cognition because people are 
better able to group information and to then broaden or narrow their analysis as 
needed. Positive material is more accessible and encompasses a greater proportion of 
an individual’s memory than neutral or negative material (Cramer, 1968). Positive 
affect can cue and therefore connect to a more diverse set of cognitive material 
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compared to a neutral mood (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). This theory 
suggests that by aiding the categorization of information, positive affect leads to the 
creation of broader classes when analyzing information and improved flexibility in 
thinking (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Kahn & 
Isen, 1993). Another theory is that affect is an input to cognition, the so-called mood 
as information hypothesis. This theory suggests that choices are made by using “how 
do I feel about it?” as a heuristic (Clore, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). According to 
this theory, affect itself has informational value that individuals use to make a 
decision, perhaps leading to superficial thinking. One often-cited study (Bless, 
Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996), however, found no impairment of 
cognitive processing for subjects induced into positive affect who were asked to 
perform two information-intensive tasks simultaneously and in fact demonstrated 
better performance. Bless and colleagues explain these results by suggesting that 
subjects in whom positive affect was induced are better able to employ heuristics to 
complete tasks, although the nature and form of such heuristics remains unclear. The 
weight of the evidence suggests that positive affect should enhance consumer use of 
disclosures, although how mood and the consumer’s experience, or the format of the 
disclosure, interact have not been studied. 
The mood-as-information framework would predict that anxious moods will 
signal the need for vigilance and result in paying more attention to detailed 
information. Studies on attention focus find that subjects in whom anxious affect was 
induced think more locally and are less able to make connections across more global 
ideas than are controls (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Isen, 
Daubman, and Nowicki, however, included fear—which is a related emotion—as an 
affect induction using film clips in one experiment but did not find any impairment of 
creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Another study 
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concludes that subjects induced into anxiety are biased toward low-risk and low-
reward options (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). A study by Reich and Zautra (2002) 
suggests mild stress or anxiety may enhance information-processing capacity, “with 
the person able to draw fine distinctions and able to process many dimensions of 
judgment simultaneously” (p. 210). Thus the literature regarding how anxiety might 
impact consumer use of disclosures remains unclear. 
Another possible prediction of how a consumer’s mood will affect disclosure 
use is that consumers will process positive information when in a positive mood and 
negative information when in a negative mood. This theory is based on the idea that 
people will attempt to preserve their mood by ignoring information incongruent to 
their current mood (Derryberry & Tucker, 1994). One example is a study finding that 
people in whom positive affect was induced recall more positive traits of a product 
than do controls (Yeung & Wyer Jr, 2004). One study of product warning labels that 
included mood manipulations suggests that subjects in whom positive affect were 
induced are less likely to process information presented in a format that could ruin 
their positive mood (Zuckerman & Chaiken, 1998). The authors conclude that labels 
for subjects in positive affect might better be worded “for your safety” as opposed to 
“danger.” The idea that subjects pay attention only to information that is congruent to 
their affect is tempered by findings of other studies, however (Adaval, 2001; Isen, 
2001; Isen & Patrick, 1983). 
It is important to note that affect or mood in the context of most of these 
studies is being explored as most consumers might typically experience them—mild, 
transitory feelings. Other studies have examined people with mood disorders, people 
feeling intense emotions such as anger and fear, or people driven by biological drives 
such as sex or hunger (for a discussion, see Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004). 
These situations are different from the most likely situations in which consumers use 
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disclosures in credit markets. Although policymakers may care about consumers in 
these more extreme circumstances, it is far more likely in the context of consumer 
financial decisions that milder forms of affect are most relevant. 
7. Evaluating Disclosure Policies 
There are few studies of the effects of disclosure on consumers in financial 
markets. Studies of securities disclosures in financial markets focus mainly on firm or 
capital market effects rather than on consumer choice, finding modest effects (Ferrell, 
2007; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Mahoney, 1995). Studies conducted after the enactment 
of TILA, which mandated standardized disclosures for consumer credit products in the 
late 1960s, found that providing information improved the average borrower’s 
accuracy and understanding of loan terms but did not evaluate changes in credit 
decisions or behavior (Brandt, Day, & Deutscher, 1975; Day, 1976; Day & Brandt, 
1974). One study of the effect of TILA disclosures for credit cards finds that 
consumers in a survey self-report using the disclosures and finding them helpful 
(Durkin, 2002). In the same survey, consumers report that the TILA disclosure helps 
them feel more confident in their credit card choices. The author concludes that 
“evaluating the direct effects of disclosure legislation like Truth in Lending on either 
consumer behavior or the functioning of the credit marketplace is never a simple 
matter because there are always competing explanations” (p. 213).  
A review by economists from the Federal Trade Commission described 
research on mortgage disclosures as “largely nonexistent and in its infancy at best” 
(Froeb, Hosken, & Pappalardo, 2004). A commonly held view is summarized by 
Hogarth and Hilgert (2002, p. 123), who suggest that mortgage disclosures are part of 
a “blizzard of papers that need to be signed at application and closing, and their 
effectiveness is questionable.” Despite the lack of findings regarding mortgage 
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disclosures, the warning-label literature provides some insights. Viscusi, Magat, and 
Huber (1987b) performed a field experiment with risk warnings on products, finding 
that consumers do react to information on labels, especially if warnings are specific 
and the potential harm is serious. One study on consumer food purchases supports the 
idea that labels focused on negative consequences presented in an arousing format 
result in consumers being more likely to reject a product (Moorman, 1990).  
A number of studies show that mandating information through labels 
influences consumer behavior, both through a direct role of providing information and 
by encouraging firms to compete on disclosed attributes. Ippolito and Mathios (1990) 
studied the cereal market, finding that as regulations were changed to allow firms to 
advertise the health content of their cereals, consumer consumption of healthier 
cereals increased. Mathios (2000) studied regulations of mandatory disclosures of fat 
content for salad dressing, finding that market shares of high-fat dressings dropped 
while low-fat dressings gained under mandatory disclosure rules. A similar FDA-
funded study examined the effects of nutrition-label information, finding modest 
effects on consumers buying healthier products overall (Levy, Mathews, Stephenson, 
Tenney, & Schucker, 1988). One study of hygiene quality disclosures displayed in 
restaurant windows shows that consumers did respond and switch to better-rated 
restaurants (Jin & Leslie, 2003). The authors conclude that while consumers 
responded to the mandated disclosures, restaurant owners also improved the average 
hygiene level, resulting in a reduction in food-borne illness overall. There are also 
studies of the pharmaceutical market in response to FDA-mandated health-risk 
warning labels for side effects, although typically these warnings are issued in 
response to such severe problems with a drug that consumers may react more to media 
attention and physician advice than to the label (e.g., Kurdyak, Juurlink, & Mamdani, 
2007; Rosack, 2005). 
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8. Improving Consumers’ Use of Information: Financial Literacy Education 
Clearly, the issuing of disclosures is a common public policy. Mandating 
disclosures for credit products has the potential to overcome information problems in 
credit markets and to facilitate more-efficient markets. However, numerous studies 
and papers question how well consumers can use disclosures given generally low 
levels of financial literacy. Mandating APR may help standardize credit terms, but if 
consumers have no benchmark against which to compare an APR, or even a sense of 
what a larger or smaller APR might mean for their payments, then the TILA disclosure 
may not have much impact on consumer behavior.  
Consumer financial literacy is an enormous topic and one that has been 
discussed at all levels of government in the U.S. and in international contexts for over 
a decade. One early article by Beales and colleagues (Mazis, Staelin, Beales, & Salop, 
1981) on information problems in consumer markets devoted a small section to 
consumer education. The authors suggested three roles for consumer education in 
general. First, education can be useful in updating consumers as technology progresses 
and new information becomes available about a product or product class. Second, 
education can be targeted to specific populations or markets most affected by an 
information deficit. Third, education can efficiently convey information that applies to 
an entire class of products—information no one firm will have the incentive to 
disclose. 
Several studies have documented the extent to which consumers in the U.S. 
and other countries fail to demonstrate financial literacy, numeracy, or both (for a 
review, see Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). Financial knowledge measures tend to be 
highest for more-educated consumers and weakest for lower-income consumers 
(Agnew & Szykman, 2005; Bernheim, 1998; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006; Mandell, 
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2004b). A particular area of weakness tends to be understanding interest and interest 
rates (Moore, 2003). 
Campbell (2006) provides an excellent overview of consumer behavior in 
financial markets, concluding that consumers generally behave as predicted by rational 
economic theory but occasionally will deviate from predictions, behavior that he 
labels consumer mistakes. He focuses on mortgage refinance decisions, finding that 
consumers with less education are among the least likely to refinance when the terms 
of their loan could be most improved. Bucks and Pence (2006) show that low-income 
mortgage borrowers are most likely to underestimate how much the interest rate on 
their loan could change relative to their actual contract. Minority borrowers are 30 
percent more likely and low-income borrowers 28 percent more likely to not know 
their interest rate. Similar effects are shown for less-educated borrowers. Low-income 
consumers with less than a college degree are among the least accurate or informed 
about the terms of their mortgage. Agnew and Szykman (2005), in a study of 
investment knowledge and hypothetical retirement plan choices, find that consumers 
with lower levels of financial knowledge were less likely to use provided information 
and showed more signs of information overload. These studies suggest that some 
groups of consumers—lower-income, lesser-educated, and racial minorities—may 
systematically exhibit lower levels of financial literacy. This is likely to result in 
differing financial behavior and reduced use of disclosure information. 
9. Evidence of the Effects of Financial Education 
Hogarth (2006) provides a review of financial education efforts, noting their 
rapid increase at the state, federal, and local levels in recent years. A study of state 
mandates for financial education in high schools by Tennyson and Nguyen using a 
survey of financial knowledge among high school seniors finds an impact of state 
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mandates on financial knowledge levels among students (Tennyson & Nguyen, 2001). 
A separate study helps make the link between increased financial knowledge and 
improved financial behavior in states with school-based financial education. 
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) studied the relationship between state mandates 
for high school curriculum and adult savings patterns and net worth. The authors find 
that students in states where mandates increased the likelihood they were exposed to 
financial education had higher savings rates and a larger net worth than students 
exposed to less (or no) mandated financial education. 
One problem in financial literacy research is determining a measure of 
knowledge. Many studies rely on self-reported knowledge scales (“how confident are 
you in your knowledge of…”). At least one study shows that most people overestimate 
their knowledge relative to what they actually know. Based on a comparison of 
answers to a self-reported scale and scores on an actual test of investment knowledge, 
Agnew and Szykman (2005) find low correlations, especially for people without a 
college education. Studies relying on self-reported data can lead to ambiguous results. 
A more significant problem with existing studies of financial literacy programs 
are selection effects (Meier & Sprenger, 2007). Unobserved characteristics drive 
more-motivated clients or more-patient individuals to seek out financial education or 
counseling and also to succeed financially. Hogarth (2006) summarizes 25 papers that 
evaluate financial education. Of these, only two studies use forms of a quasi-
experimental technique to evaluate financial education, both in the workplace setting. 
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) use changes in state high school curricula to 
predict retirement savings, finding a positive effect for states with increasing 
mandates. Duflo and Saez (2003) implemented a randomized experiment for a 
retirement planning seminar, finding marginally positive results of the offer of 
education on enrollment in a savings plan. A series of studies with college students 
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that randomly assigned an offer of credit card education and credit management 
training was hampered by low response rates and strong selection effects among 
responders (Gartner & Todd, 2005). One study used length of exposure to education as 
an evaluation technique for examining low-income clients in a matched savings 
program, a portion of whom also received financial education (Schreiner, Clancy, & 
Sherraden, 2002). The study found that each additional hour of education improved 
savings behavior up to about 8 hours of coursework. Other studies use nonrandomized 
control groups or self-reported knowledge and behaviors (or both). There currently are 
no field experiments of financial education among low-income consumers using 
random assignment and behavioral measure of outcomes. 
10. Public Financial Literacy Education Campaigns 
In 2007, the five primary bank regulatory agencies (OCC, FDIC, FRB, OTS, 
and NCUA) published an accessible educational pamphlet for consumers, entitled 
“Interest Only Mortgage Payments and Payment Option ARMS—Are They for 
You?”1 The brochure defines terms, such as negative amortization, in layman’s 
language. It also includes a worksheet to guide consumers through an evaluation of a 
mortgage product. This is an example of passive consumer education. It is not required 
for any type of product but is generally available to help consumers become more 
informed when searching for a loan. Another example is the Financial Literacy and 
Education Commission, established in the 2004 Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions 
(FACT) Act. A collaborative of 20 federal agencies, the commission has created a 
consumer hotline (888-my-money) and website (mymoney.gov) to provide 
information on financial topics. Some evidence from Sweden described by Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2007) suggests that the efforts of a major national information campaign 
                                                 
1 http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?JNR=1&Doc=8WZDEM4.xm 
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about a new retirement program yielded strong enrollment, but after the information 
campaign was reduced, enrollments dropped. While such efforts may be 
complementary, they are better characterized as general public awareness education 
rather than personal financial literacy education. 
11. Conclusion 
In April 2007 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held a conference on the 
implications of behavioral economics for consumer protection and disclosure.2 At the 
end of the conference, experts from various perspectives discussed information 
disclosure policies, and the consensus among this group was that more empirical 
laboratory and field work is needed to understand the role of disclosures for 
consumers in financial markets. Recently, staff of the FTC recommended a 
comprehensive effort to improve federal mortgage disclosures (Clark, 2008). More 
than one-third of states have additional mortgage disclosure requirements, including 
simplified levels of information, specifically valenced wording, and required formats 
and timing. The experiences of these states present quasi-experiments that may prove 
useful for assessing potential changes in mortgage disclosures. 
The credit card market is different from the mortgage market in many ways. 
Consumers have more experience with credit cards, the negative financial risks of 
credit cards are smaller in magnitude, the costs of search are relatively low, and the 
mandated disclosures are simpler than those required for mortgages. But the role of 
disclosures for consumer in the credit card market has its own unique features. The 
consumer’s initial decision to apply for a new card is likely to be a function of his or 
her experience with credit cards, as well as his or her emotional state. Credit card 
issuers routinely attempt to induce consumers into a positive mood with “free gifts.” 
                                                 
2 see: http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/agenda.shtm  
27
Meanwhile, cash-strapped consumers might seek credit cards during periods of 
anxiety about financial matters. These conditions may result in differing use of 
disclosures. 
It is clear that financial literacy also matters with regard to how various types 
of consumers may be able to use and process information mandated through 
information policies. Education mandates for consumers may complement consumer 
disclosure policies. The evidence on the current level of knowledge of consumers, 
especially lower-income consumers, consumers from minority racial groups, and 
consumers without a college education, suggests major deficiencies in how well 
consumers understand critical financial topics such as interest rates. The problem is 
linked to a lack of knowledge of basic terms and systems, as well as to poor levels of 
numeracy. It is unclear whether financial literacy education in itself leads to better use 
of the information included in mandated disclosures or even leads to improved 
financial behavior. The weight of the evidence suggests that increasing financial 
literacy is strongly correlated with improved financial behavior, but the design of 
existing studies does not provide conclusive evidence. Further studies using a 
randomized approach are much needed if we are to better understand the effects of 
financial literacy education. 
Some argue that consumer information policies are not sufficient to protect 
people from unscrupulous firms in the financial marketplace. The complexity of 
financial products means that consumers will never fully understand the risks and 
costs involved and that financial institutions will always have the upper hand. The 
format of disclosures and intensity of education may not be enough to level the 
playing field for consumers. Under an admittedly extreme form of this view, only 
regulations that place strict liability on the lender, and that effectively prohibit 
practices that could be harmful to the consumer, will provide adequate protection 
28
(Ferguson, 2000; Willis, 2006, 2008). The critique of this view is that regulators, and 
even consumer advocates, may not agree on what types of financial products are “too 
risky” versus “innovative.” Some consumers may be worse off without the existence 
of products that would be unsuitable for other consumers (Collins, Belsky, & Case, 
2005). Information-based policies help consumers better sort themselves into the most 
appropriate types of financial products. Given information that is transparent and 
accessible, as well as sufficient knowledge and skills for processing that information, 
policies such as disclosure and education may help support a more efficient consumer 
financial market and optimally protect most consumers from harm. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME: 
THE EFFECTS OF STATE POLICIES MANDATING SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE RISK DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMER EVALUATIONS OF 
LOAN OFFERS 
1. Introduction 
Home mortgages are one of the largest financial commitments a consumer will 
make in his or her lifetime, and the terms and conditions of a mortgage can be quite 
complex (Gibler & Nelson, 2003; Hogarth & Hilgert, 2002). High-cost cash-out 
refinance mortgages are among the most complicated and risky types of mortgage 
credit. Federal and some state laws require consumers seeking these loans to be 
provided with information disclosures, including language suggesting the loan 
applicant consider his or her choice carefully because “you could lose your home.” 
This warning is unique among consumer disclosures in credit markets in its attempt to 
focus the consumer on the potential risks of taking out a loan. Potentially, otherwise 
uninformed consumers will take this risk into account when evaluating whether to 
accept a mortgage refinance offer from a lender. 
In the last two decades lenders have developed more refined techniques for 
assessing and pricing consumer credit risk. Meanwhile, capital markets have lowered 
the premiums required for higher-risk loan capital, facilitating the development of 
“subprime” home mortgages for borrowers with a history of credit problems such as 
chronic delinquencies, bankruptcy, or unstable or undocumented income (Quercia, 
Stegman, & Davis, 2004). In 2005 alone lenders loaned more than $200 billion in 
subprime refinance mortgages, representing between 15 and 20 percent of all home 
refinance loans made that year. The expansion of subprime lending increased the 
ability of borrowers with poor credit to gain access to the mortgage market (Collins, 
Belsky, & Case, 2005; Gramlich, 2007). Yet consumer advocates frequently ask 
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whether consumers can navigate this segment of the market, especially because the 
risk of default is at least two to three times higher than in conventional mortgage 
markets (GAO, 2004). Media reports of the “crisis” of subprime mortgage 
foreclosures in 2008 have heightened the debate over whether consumers were fully 
informed of the risks of their loans when they accepted the mortgage contract. This 
has spurred some consumer advocates to argue that subprime lending should largely 
be curbed in order to prevent lenders from praying on naïve borrowers. Disclosure 
policies may present one strategy for allowing expanded access to credit while also 
providing uninformed consumers with a mechanism to avoid credit they cannot 
sustain. 
The promise of information disclosures for facilitating improved consumer 
decision making is reflected in a range of public policies. There has been little study of 
the impact of mortgage disclosures, however, and the issue of whether disclosures 
facilitate more efficient markets or drown consumers in a sea of legalese is the subject 
of ongoing debate.1 Federal Reserve Board Governor Randall Kroszner (2007, para 6) 
stated at a 2007 conference on subprime lending that the market is “more efficient, 
when accurate information is available to both consumers and suppliers” while also 
noting that “pages and pages of fine print may provide comprehensive descriptions 
that lawyers love, but consumers find confusing, or, worse, useless.” In 2008 
policymakers were again considering proposals to revise home mortgage disclosure 
regulations (12 CFR Part 26, 2007). Similarly other financial regulators, including 
agencies overseeing consumer credit cards and mutual funds, were reviewing the 
requirements for enhanced disclosures for various other types of financial products. 
This chapter provides evidence that state policies mandating signed disclosures about 
                                                 
1 For a discussion see Belsky and Essene, (2007); Durkin (2007). 
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the risk of high-cost refinance mortgages are associated with consumers being more 
likely to reject a loan offer.  
In 2005, 18 states required enhanced disclosures of the risk of high-cost 
mortgages, in addition to those required by federal laws. Ten of these states required 
consumers to acknowledge receipt of the disclosure with a signature, unlike federal 
law, and 4 required these disclosures for high-cost loans that were not required to have 
disclosures in the federal law. Using 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, the 
analysis presented in this chapter evaluates whether refinance loan applicants in states 
with enhanced risk disclosures are more likely than applicants in states without such 
laws to reject an offer of a loan from a lender. Refinance mortgages are ideal for this 
analysis because these loans are one of the more discretionary segments of the 
mortgage market. Refinance borrowers have reduced time pressures relative to home 
purchase borrowers, who are seeking a loan while also trying to bid to purchase a 
home (Gibler & Nelson, 2003). Refinance borrowers also have at least one prior 
experience with obtaining a mortgage in the past (Lee & Hogarth, 2000). In the high-
cost segment of the market, borrowers are generally not seeking to refinance in order 
to obtain a better interest rate or term (in 2005 interest rates for these loans were 
between 11 and 20 percent, more than double the conventional mortgage interest rate). 
Borrowers seek high-cost refinance loans primarily because they want to convert 
home equity into liquid cash. Doing so increases the consumer’s debt level relative to 
income. Assuming home equity extracted through the refinance is consumed and not 
invested, the borrower also increases his or her leverage ratio of debt to assets. Both of 
these factors increase the risk of default and foreclosure. If disclosures in this market 
are effective, then when consumers sign a disclosure containing “You Could Lose 
Your Home,” they will re-weigh their alternatives and potentially walk away from a 
loan offer. Overall, this analysis suggests that states requiring mortgage applicants to 
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sign a disclosure warning “you could lose your home” result in a greater likelihood 
that consumers will reject an approved high-cost refinance loan offer from a lender. 
While the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act has been used in many studies of 
mortgage lending, this study is the first to use the applicant’s decision to reject a 
lender-approved loan offer to examine state mortgage disclosure laws. One challenge 
with any analysis of state legal regimes is unobserved correlations between the reasons 
the state passed the law and the behavior of interest. In this analysis, loan applications 
covered by state information disclosure laws may have unobserved characteristics that 
also influence the decision to reject or accept an approved loan offer. To account for 
market effects, this study uses census-tract fixed effects, as well as cross-state border-
county grouping fixed effects, to provide comparisons within otherwise similar labor 
and housing markets. This border-county approach is further enhanced by focusing on 
markets without waterways coincident with geographic boundaries as a proxy for 
more cohesive markets, as well as the use of distance weights to emphasize proximity 
to the state border. To test the effects of state laws on lender or loan applicant 
behavior, a sequential response model is also used to simultaneously model 
application, approval, and acceptance processes.  
2. Background 
All loan applicants receive a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure as part of 
the credit application process. In theory, TILA disclosures help consumers by 
lowering the costs of acquiring and processing information about prospective loans, 
resulting in consumers examining more alternatives in the marketplace, a classic 
example of information search (Stigler, 1961). A review of the role of disclosures by 
economists at the Federal Reserve concedes there is little evidence that TILA has 
resulted in an increase in the number of loan options consumers consider overall, 
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however (Durkin & Elliehausen, 1999). These authors point out that TILA disclosures 
are not provided to consumers until after an application for a loan is submitted. 
Because the process of preparing an application entails costs (opportunity costs of 
time and monetary costs), information disclosed after application may be of little use 
to consumers.  
Another role for disclosures is related not to searching among products but 
rather to delivering information consumers can use to evaluate a loan product relative 
to itself. In this role, disclosures provide information that influences the consumer’s 
decision to exit the market entirely, rather than to search for another product in the 
same market. This type of disclosure typically provides a warning about a potential 
risk or hazard. The function of these disclosures is to influence the consumer’s 
subjective perception of risk, which in turn reduces the consumer’s expected value for 
the product being evaluated. This role of disclosure has been extensively reviewed in 
the context of laws designed to warn consumers about the health risks of a variety of 
food, drug, cosmetic, and medical products (e.g., Viscusi, 1993), but not for products 
in consumer credit markets. 
Under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), for “high-
cost” refinance mortgages, defined as having an interest rate at least 8 percentage 
points over a comparable term Treasury security (approximately 12.5% in 2005 for a 
30-year loan), a disclosure form is provided with the following text:  
You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have 
received these disclosures or have signed a loan application. If you obtain this 
loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. YOU COULD LOSE 
YOUR HOME, AND ANY MONEY YOU HAVE PUT INTO IT, IF YOU 
DO NOT MEET YOUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN. 
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HOEPA disclosures are required to be provided at least 3 business days before 
the closing of the mortgage contract, and consumers have up to 3 days after signing 
the mortgage contract to rescind their agreement.2  
As of 2005, 29 states had active legislation for enhanced consumer protection 
regulations for high-cost mortgage borrowers, most modeled on HOEPA regulations, 
as summarized in Appendix Table 2.C.2. State laws have a range of disclosure 
provisions, but 18 states require the “you could lose your home” caution about the risk 
of the loan, and 10 require this warning disclosure to be signed, which differentiates 
these disclosures from federal HOEPA disclosures. Appendix Figure 2.A.1 contains 
the California disclosure as an example of a state form that includes warning-type 
language and a signature by the consumer. Most state statutes prescribe the wording of 
the disclosure document, many augmenting the language of the HOEPA form similar 
to the California example. The average length of the disclosure wording required by 
state laws is 307 words, with a range of 20 to 1,407 words. Several state laws specify 
the typeface and format of the form; other states simply require certain pieces of 
information and a specific phrase for the disclosure.  
Four states had regulations in 2005 requiring written mortgage disclosures for 
non-HOEPA loans. These states effectively lowered the APR threshold, triggering 
HOEPA-type disclosures from 8 points over a comparable-term Treasury. Illinois, 
Michigan, and Washington, DC, lowered the threshold to 6 points, and New Mexico to 
7 points (although this analysis is on high-cost loans, Michigan’s law applies to all 
refinance loans, not just high-cost loans). All of these states, except Michigan, require 
the disclosure to be signed at least 3 days prior to the loan closing. Six states require 
borrowers applying for high-cost loans to receive third-party counseling before 
obtaining a loan. Clearly, obtaining counseling incurs a cost for the loan applicant in 
                                                 
2 Beyond disclosures, HOEPA loans are also prohibited from having certain features, including balloon 
payments, negative amortization, and most prepayment penalties. 
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terms of the time required to find and complete the service, and some borrowers will 
not be willing to incur this cost. Of course, consumers may view the counseling 
requirements as a signal, much like a disclosure form, that this loan has higher risks 
than they might expect. Although counseling requirements may have effects similar to 
those of written risk disclosures, a primary difference is that while signed disclosures 
may require only a small amount of the consumer’s time, counseling requires a more 
significant commitment.3 
2.1. The Application Process for High-Cost Refinance Mortgages 
It is important to understand the process that leads to a consumer receiving a 
loan offer before analyzing the effects of disclosures. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 
application process for a subprime home mortgage refinance loan. Three stages are 
described, from the entrance to the market, to the lender’s evaluation of the 
application, to the mortgage being originated. The branches of interest in this study are 
bolded.  
 
    LENDER   CONSUMER 
ENTRANCE    EVALUATION  EVALUATION 
 
                 Accept Offer 
            Approve loan 
 Submit high-cost loan application           Reject Offer 
             Not approve 
              Accept Offer 
            Approve loan 
Submit non-high-cost application          Reject Offer 
            Not approve 
Do not submit application  
  [ unobserved ] 
Figure 2.1: Home Mortgage Refinance Decision Nodes 
The first phase, labeled ENTRANCE, occurs when the consumer makes an 
application for a home refinance mortgage. The decision to refinance has been 
                                                 
3 Massachusetts offers loan applicants the ability to waive counseling with a signed form; other states 
do not have such procedures. 
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modeled in previous studies as being influenced by changes in home prices, income, 
household type, borrower demographics, as well as the overall interest rate 
environment (Hurst & Stafford, 2004; Pavlov, 2001). The decision to apply with a 
particular lender may be the result of an information search process, including the 
lender’s advertised loan products and products terms, or the borrower may be 
approached directly by a lender with an invitation to submit an application.4 This stage 
involves lenders and loan applicants determining which type of loan product the 
applicant should be evaluated for. Because mortgages are offered by lenders along a 
continuum of interest rates based on the risk of the loan, consumers cannot be sure of 
the loan for which they qualify. Borrowers reveal information about their 
characteristics to the lender in an attempt to establish themselves as appropriate for the 
best possible loan. A consumer might be considered “in the market” prior to making 
an application, but such behavior is unobservable and therefore illustrated with a 
dashed line in the figure. Applicants for non-high-cost refinance loans are a different 
market—many will seek better interest rates or terms and will not be seeking home 
equity. Moreover, most will not receive a disclosure containing risk language. 
The second phase, defined in the illustration as LENDER EVALUATION, is 
the underwriting process used to determine whether a loan application meets the 
minimum threshold requirements for approval. The approve-deny decision is observed 
in HMDA data and has been widely studied to test for racial discrimination by lenders 
(e.g., LaCour-Little, 1999; Ladd, 1998). This phase is completely centered on the 
decision of the lender.  
The final phase is CONSUMER EVALUATION. Borrowers can reject an 
approved loan offer from a lender by simply refusing to sign the loan documents or by 
                                                 
4 See Apgar and Fishbein (2005) for a discussion, as well as the potential for loans being “sold not 
sought,” meaning the lender or broker initiated the application, not the borrower. 
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exercising a right of rescission up to 3 business days after the contract is signed.5 In 
the refinance market a consumer might reject the offer and simply remain out of the 
market, or he or she might repeat the process in search of a better offer. In HMDA 
data, however, repeated applications cannot be observed, only the outcome of each 
application in isolation. This stage has not been directly examined in other studies. A 
study by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) modeled the probability of loan 
applications resulting in originated loans. The authors did not examine the choice to 
accept or reject the loan conditional on the loan being approved by a lender, however. 
It is important to note that state laws mandating disclosure could influence the 
ENTRANCE and EVALUATION stages as well as the applicants’ decisions to accept 
an approved loan offer. Consumers in jurisdictions lacking mortgage disclosures may 
perceive greater risks of receiving a poor loan offer and decide not to enter the 
market—an example of Akerlof’s lemons problem (Akerlof, 1970). Previous studies 
do suggest that state mortgage laws may encourage more or different types of 
borrowers to enter the high-cost mortgage market, although the effects are neither 
strong nor consistent (Harvey & Nigro, 2004; Ho & Pennington-Cross, 2006b; Li & 
Ernst, 2006). One study on lender behavior in states with laws regulating high-cost 
mortgages (Ho & Pennington-Cross, 2006a) finds about a 5-point reduction in the rate 
of lenders denying subprime loan applications in states with stricter lending laws 
(relative to a mean probability of being rejected of 42 percent). Nevertheless, the 
effects of state laws on the ENTRANCE and EVALUATION stages are important 
precursors to consider when analyzing consumer rejections of loan offers.  
                                                 
5 There are several exceptions to the right of rescission. It is only available for home equity or refinance 
loans and only for loans with a new lender (refinancing with the holder of the existing note is exempt).  
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2.2. The Role of Signed Disclosures in the High-Cost Mortgage Market 
The language “YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME” warns the consumer 
prior to signing the contract about the severity of failing to abide by the terms of the 
mortgage. After incorporating new information highlighting the catastrophic risks of 
foreclosure, the consumer’s subjective expected value of a potential loan would be 
lower than prior to disclosure. The expected net marginal benefits of the loan may then 
be zero or negative, causing the consumer to abandon this transaction and perhaps exit 
the market for this class of loan products. 
This analysis seeks to test the hypothesis that state laws mandating signed risk 
disclosures result in consumers with approved high-cost refinance loans being more 
likely to reject a lender’s loan offer. For disclosures to have an effect on a consumer’s 
decision, the information included in the disclosure must result in a change in the 
consumer’s valuation of the costs and benefits of taking out a high-cost refinance loan. 
The benefits (B) are immediate, in the form of the loan proceeds net of costs and fees 
paid at the loan’s closing. The required repayments occur in a defined stream over T 
periods in the future. Assuming no probability of default and a constant discount rate, 
the expected net present value of future payments is P = j(1…T)p(t)/(1+r)t. Allowing 
for an exogenous probability, B, that the consumer will default on the loan, the 
expected net present value of future payments is B(P + C) + (1-B)P. While default, 
especially a default nearer to time t=1, will result in a consumer paying less than the 
full stream of payments, it is assumed that the total cost of default over what would 
have been paid in under a no-default condition is greater than P. This is due to the 
substantial transaction costs related to foreclosure, as well as the costs of future credit 
for a consumer with a history of default, as well as nonfinancial costs.6 For simplicity, 
the cost under default is represented as B(P + C). 
                                                 
6 At least in 2005, the time of data used in this analysis, borrowers are unlikely to expect lenders to 
forgive a portion of the loan balance in the case of default. Historically, loan forgiveness is very rare. 
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While lenders may have an objective probability of default for a loan 
application, the consumer at best maintains a subjective expected probability of 
default, which includes zero or a substantially low probability such that the consumer 
perceives default to be close to zero. Likewise, the lender has an expected loss given a 
default based on the loan application. The consumer, even if the expected probability 
of default is greater than zero, may not associate default with all of the costs of losing 
one’s home, including the loss of the bundle of housing and nonhousing services 
provided by the property, as well as any financial capital invested in that home.  
The disclosure adds information to the consumer’s consideration of the 
probability of default (B) and of the costs of default (C). The consumer will accept the 
loan offer if expected benefits of the loan (B) are greater than the expected costs such 
that, B> (P + BC). Information about the risk of losing one’s home can have an 
influence by increasing the subjective expectation of the probability of default, B, or 
of the subjective expectation of the cost of losing a home in default, C; or even 
possibly both. It is expected that signing a disclosure influences the consumer’s 
expectations and results in an increased probability of rejecting a loan offer, although 
the effects on the consumer’s perceptions of B and C are not each directly observed. 
This model assumes constant discount rates and preferences for risk aversion; 
the disclosure primarily informs subjective expectations of B and/or C. While a role of 
a search-oriented disclosure such as TILA is to facilitate the consumer’s expectations 
regarding the calculation of the stream of payments, P, the disclosures in this analysis 
are differentiated from TILA by focusing on the risk of losing one’s home.  
2.3. Risk Disclosures and Consumer Perceptions of Mortgage Risk 
The literature examining the use of hazard or risk disclosures relies largely on 
the subjective utility model (Edworthy & Adams, 1996). Conceptually, disclosures 
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influence how a consumer perceives the risk of a product, and in turn that perception 
influences consumer behavior by changing the utility calculation related to alternative 
actions (for an example, see Viscusi & Magat, 1987). There is a vast literature in 
psychology and economics regarding how people perceive risks (e.g., Arrow, 1982; 
Fischhoff, 2002; Lopes, 1994; Weber & Milliman, 1997). Some of the most influential 
work on risk perception is by psychologist Paul Slovic and colleagues (Slovic, 1987, 
is one widely cited summary). Slovic presents evidence that suggests risk perceptions 
are a function of multiple dimensions, including “dread.” The dread dimension is 
related to an event’s controllability, as well as to the extent to which the mere potential 
of a negative event triggers feelings of worry. The dread dimension particularly 
focuses on the potential for a catastrophic outcome related to an event, nearly 
irrespective of the probability of occurrence. Using Slovic’s framework, one recent 
study in the financial context shows a financial disclosure that includes information on 
the potential for a catastrophic loss has one of the strongest effects on changing risk 
perceptions of various investment options (Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer, 2005). The 
risk of “losing your home” in the HOEPA disclosure may be a good example of a 
catastrophic risk in the mind of a consumer. One survey of stressful life events places 
losing a home to foreclosure as one of the top 10 most stressful life events, even ahead 
of a divorce (Hobson, Kamen, Szostek, Nethercut, Tiedmann, & Wojnarowicz, 1998).  
Camerer and colleagues (Camerer, Issacharoff, Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & 
Rabin, 2003) suggest that HOEPA disclosures help uninformed or naïve consumers, 
who may not be as capable of making an informed choice as other consumers. The 
authors suggest that the disclosure reminding prospective borrowers they could lose 
their home “exemplifies asymmetric paternalism: it imposes little cost on the financial 
institution to reproduce a disclosure document. The informed consumer will already 
be aware of the consequences of defaulting on a mortgage, so she will not be helped 
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by the regulation, but neither will she be adversely affected. For the naive consumer, 
the disclosure can be enormously beneficial, moving her one step closer to educated 
consumer status” (2003, p. 1233). The authors argue that the costs of disclosure are 
minimal because financial institutions amortize the fixed costs of setting up (largely 
automated) disclosure systems over many loans and years.  
There are also reasons to believe some classes of consumers may 
systematically be uninformed or naïve. Campbell (2006) provides evidence that 
consumers with less education are less likely to refinance when the terms of their loan 
could be most improved. Bucks and Pence (2006) show that minority mortgage 
borrowers are less likely to know the interest rate on their mortgage. These studies 
suggest that some groups of consumers—especially lesser-educated and minority 
applicants—may systematically exhibit lower levels of financial literacy. This is likely 
to result in differing financial behavior and reduced use of disclosure information. 
In addition to the benefits for uniformed consumers, Camerer et al. (2003) also 
suggest that because HOEPA disclosures are delivered 3 days in advance of the loan 
closing and remind loan applicants that they have the right to reject the loan offer, 
consumers can reevaluate their decisions away from the “heat” of the initial 
application. Lenders offering a high-cost refinance loan typically will provide an 
estimate of net proceeds to the borrower—meaning the borrower will soon have a 
check for any balance of loan in excess of the amount needed to pay off the current 
loan. This is money is likely targeted by the consumer for immediate consumption or 
repayment of unsecured consumer debt (Hurst & Stafford, 2004). A large transfer of 
illiquid home equity to expendable funds may trigger consumers to vastly 
underestimate the potential burden a loan will impose on their financial situation in the 
future and to overestimate the value of the conversion of home equity into cash in the 
present. This is a common and well-established phenomenon, described as consumers 
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employing a hyperbolic discount rate in favor of the present (Laibson, 1997). This can 
result in what Camerer et al. cite as a “projection bias” in which consumers 
overweight the short-term benefits of going through with the loan relative to future 
costs. The warning of the HOEPA disclosure combined with the 3-day window to 
reconsider the transaction can help consumers exert more self-control such that the 
benefits of the immediate proceeds of a loan may be reassessed in light of the future 
costs, including the stream of debt payments as well as the potential costs of default. 
While these two effects—informing the naïve consumer and offering time to 
recalibrate expectations of projected and present costs and benefits—are convincing, 
Camerer et al. (2003) also caution that the effects of HOEPA disclosures may be 
mitigated by another behavior phenomenon, status quo bias. Consumers tend to 
remain wedded to a particular decision even in light of new information. To the degree 
that loan applicants exhibit a bias in favor of the status quo, they will refrain from 
reversing a decision even when reminded of the potentially catastrophic risks by the 
disclosure or when given time to exert self-control.  
Both state and federal laws require the same basic language regarding the risk 
of losing one’s home. The most important distinctions in state laws are that a subset of 
states require the risk disclosure to be signed by the loan applicant at least 3 days prior 
to the loan closing and/or that the state law for a signed disclosure applies to loans not 
covered by the federal HOEPA law. The signature focuses attention over and above 
the federal form, or draws attention to the risk for loans without other disclosures of 
the risk of foreclosure.  
2.4. Prior Studies Evaluating Mortgage Disclosures 
There are few empirical papers that test the risk disclosures for consumer 
financial choices. A commonly held view, summarized by Hogarth and Hilgert (2002), 
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suggests that mortgage disclosures are part of a “blizzard of papers that need to be 
signed at application and closing, and their effectiveness is questionable” (p. 18). 
Studies conducted after the enactment of TILA show that the average borrower’s 
accuracy and understanding of loan terms improved, but these studies did not evaluate 
changes in credit decisions or behavior (Brandt, Day, & Deutscher, 1975; Day, 1976; 
Day & Brandt, 1974). Studies of risk disclosures for securities focus mainly on firm or 
capital market effects rather than on consumer choice and generally find only modest 
effects of disclosed information (Ferrell, 2007; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Mahoney, 
1995). One field experiment on warning labels on cleaning products found that 
consumers do react to information on labels, especially if warnings are specific and 
the potential for harm is viewed as being severe (Viscusi, Magat, & Huber, 1987). 
Studies of health risks in pharmaceutical and food markets also find modest effects of 
warnings, although there are often major changes in marketing or effects of media 
attention that may confound the effects of any written disclosure of risks in isolation 
(Altekruse, Street, Fein, & Levy, 1996; Edworthy & Adams, 1996; Wogalter & 
Vigilante Jr, 2003).  
3. Data 
This analysis is conducted with data on refinance loan applications from 2005 
reported to bank regulatory agencies, as well as a database of state laws constructed by 
the author and augmented with research on state lending laws in another study. These 
data sources are described below. 
3.1. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data 
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database is released each year 
by the FFIEC (www.ffiec.gov) to document each loan application recorded by 
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regulated mortgage lenders. The 2005 HMDA data include 13.1 million refinance 
mortgage applications for owner-occupied single family homes in metropolitan areas 
submitted to 7,749 lending institutions. Each record includes the census tract of the 
property being financed, the amount of the loan requested, the applicant’s race and 
gender, the applicant’s income listed in the application, the financial institution 
receiving the application, and other features of the loan. The lender is required to 
record whether the application was denied, withdrawn by the applicant, too incomplete 
to evaluate, approved but rejected by the applicant, or approved and originated as a 
loan. Of 6.6 million lender-approved applications, just over 954,300, or 14.5 percent, 
were rejected by the borrower. HMDA data is recorded for mortgage applications in 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Applications are submitted from 66,000 
census tracts located in 2,294 counties in metropolitan areas. A small number (less 
than 1 percent) of records were dropped from the dataset, including applications for 
preapprovals, applications with missing county and state information, or missing 
income and loan amounts. The means, standard deviations and number of observations 
for variables used in this analysis with these data are displayed in Appendix Table 
2.A.4. A summary of the data by type of loan application as used in this analysis is 
listed in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: 2005 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
Refinance Applications: Record Count 
Total Applications 12,971,610 
  Approved by Lender 6,582,674 
Originated Loan 5,628,372 
  Originated HOEPA Loan 14,903 
Rejected by Applicant 954,302 
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Among loans that were approved and originated, the relative interest rate is 
recorded measured by the annual percentage rate (or APR) compared to the rate on a 
Treasury security of a similar duration. This “spread” is only recorded if the difference 
is at least 3 percentage points (or 300 basis points, abbreviated 300 BPS). If a loan is 
originated with an APR is 12.5 percent and the Treasury rate on the date of the loan 
closing is 4.5 percent, for example, the APR spread recorded in HMDA would be 8.0. 
Meanwhile, a loan with an APR of 6.5 percent would have no APR spread recorded. 
In addition, approved and originated loans include an indicator of whether the loan 
was subject to HOEPA. Information about APR spread and the HOEPA status of an 
application is not confirmed until the loan is actually made; therefore, it is not reported 
in HMDA for lender-approved loan applications rejected by the applicant. HOEPA 
status and APR spread information is available for approved applications accepted by 
the borrower and originated as a mortgage loan. In 2005, out of 5.6 million originated 
loans, only 14,903 were designated as HOEPA loans, representing just one-quarter of 
one percent of loans made. About 85 percent of loans designated as HOEPA loans had 
APR spreads in excess of 8 percentage points (or 800 basis points), which is the 
threshold in the HOEPA law, and all but 6 percent of HOEPA loans were associated 
with APR spreads of at least 3 percentage points (or 300 basis points), a level 
generally considered to be “subprime.” Loans with lower APR spreads most likely 
triggered HOEPA as a result of high fees relative to the loan balance. Loan fees are 
not observed in HMDA data, however; only APR spreads are.  
3.2. State Lending Law Data 
Previous studies have examined state mortgage lending laws from various 
perspectives, but none have specifically evaluated the effects of disclosure provisions. 
For this analysis, the law or statute governing mortgage originations for each state was 
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downloaded from each state’s legislative website. Those states with mortgage lending 
laws were then classified as having any disclosure provisions. The wording and format 
of the disclosure was noted and any recommendations or requirements for counseling 
detailed. Exemptions from state laws were also noted, as well as the loan terms 
triggering the regulation. These features are summarized in Appendix Table 2.C.2. 
Other components of these laws that may affect loan applicants or lenders were also 
noted, including the prohibition of certain loan terms or enforcement provisions. These 
provisions have been well documented in an index of state lending laws created by Ho 
and Pennington-Cross (2006a). The index scores state laws based on a series of 
factors, with state index scores ranging from 0 to 11. The score is based on measures 
of prepayment penalty restrictions (0–4), balloon payment restrictions (0–4), 
counseling requirements (0–1), and restrictions on mandatory arbitration (0–2). If the 
law does not require any restriction or requirement, then zero points are assigned, 
while more restrictions result in more points. Because this index includes counseling 
provisions, this analysis alters the index in states with counseling by subtracting one 
point. This modified version of the index is intended to provide a proxy for the 
strength of regulations affecting loan applications covered by disclosure or counseling 
laws. The index can serve as a control to analyze the effects of state information 
provisions over and above other lending restrictions. 
4. Identification of Applications Covered by State Laws 
A discussed above, HOEPA status and APR spread information is available 
only for loans that are actually approved, accepted, and originated. Thus, to calculate a 
rejection rate among consumers, the denominator has to be estimated: 
Pr(reject | approved offer ) = # offers accepted / total offers 
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Estimates of HOEPA status and APR spread take advantage of the correlations 
of applicant characteristics by neighborhood and lending institution. Loan applications 
by consumers in the same tract to the same lender for the same type of loan are likely 
to be highly similar. Because lenders tend to provide similar products in similar areas, 
this provides a proxy for the APR spread on nonoriginated loans. HOEPA status was 
estimated using a lender fixed effects regression using the 6 million originated 
applications, controlling for applicant and census tract characteristics (see Appendix 
2.B for details). The values from this estimate were then predicted out of sample for 
all loan applications, and the predicted value was substituted for loan applications that 
lacked HOEPA status because the loan was not originated. This produces an estimate 
of 17,715 HOEPA loan applications, including 14,903 originated loans actually 
designated as HOEPA loans and 2,812 loans approved by lenders but rejected by 
applicants estimated to be HOEPA loans. This suggests a 15.9 percent rejection rate, 
similar to the 14.5 rate among non-HOEPA loans. Predicted HOEPA status is used 
only for loan applications that were not originated in this analysis, but as a check of 
the model, each actual HOEPA loan was compared to its predicted value.  
This estimation procedure correctly identified 84 percent of actual HOEPA-
originated loans. The underestimate of HOEPA loans is not correlated across states 
based on a t-test of the difference between predicted and actual values; any bias 
introduced will not vary systematically with the laws being analyzed. This approach 
provides a set of approved loan applications for the denominator of the probability of a 
loan applicant rejecting an approved loan offer. A summary of HOEPA status is 
detailed in Table 2.2 and provided for each state in Appendix Table 2.A.1.  
The APR spread for loan applications was estimated using approved and 
originated loans that do report an APR spread in order to construct tract-lender-loan-
type means. The APR spread was estimated using 66,000 census tracts across two loan 
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types (government insured vs. conventional) and over 7,749 lending institutions. This 
resulted in approximately 3.5 million cell means, which were then merged back into 
each tract-lender-loan-type combination. In cases where no other loans of the same 
type and lender were originated in the same census tract, the overall tract mean was 
used in place of the lender-tract mean for applications missing an APR spread. 
Through this procedure the APR spread of loans that were approved but rejected by 
the borrower were estimated for all refinance loan application records lacking an APR 
spread in the HMDA dataset.7 This approach correctly identified the APR spread 
category for loans with recorded APRs in 81 percent of cases. The tract-lender mean 
APR tended to underestimate the actual APR for loans with an APR recorded.  
Table 2.2: Estimated Number of Applications 
Subject to HOEPA & State Laws 
Application Type N 
All Estimated HOEPA Loans 17,715 
State with Disclosure Law 12,492 
      Covered by Disclosure Law 10,051 
           Covered by Signed Disclosure 4,282 
State with Counseling Law 2,544 
        Covered by Counseling Requirement 2,017 
State with No Law 4,738 
 
The regression approach for determining HOEPA status and for calculating 
tract-lender mean APR spreads relies on the assumption that the distribution of APRs 
for loans that were rejected by the applicant follows a pattern similar to those of 
                                                 
7 Lenders only report the APR on closed loans if that loan has an APR at least 3 percentage points (300 
BPS) greater than a Treasury security of a similar term (typically the 30-year bond or the 10-year note). 
Any closed loan with no APR reported is assumed to have a spread of zero. In reality the APR spread 
on these unreported loans could be any value from 0 to 3, but since federal regulations are triggered 
above an APR spread to Treasury of at least 8 percentage points, and the lowest state law threshold is 6 
points, such an assumption is unlikely to have much effect on this estimation of APR spreads. 
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approved loans that were accepted by the applicant. If there is any APR-based search 
behavior on the part of consumers, they will reject higher APR loan offers but will be 
more likely to accept lower APR loan offers. This suggests it is likely that approved 
loans that were not originated have a higher APR on average than is predicted in this 
analysis. By assuming a similar distribution of interest rates for originated loans and 
approved loan applications rejected by consumers, the APR of rejected loans 
estimated here is likely to be conservative. The final dataset of high-cost loan 
applications includes 166,355 high-cost refinance loans, all estimated to be subject to 
HOEPA or to have interest rates of 10.5 percent or more.  
5. Summary of Empirical Strategy 
Among states with no disclosure or counseling statutes, 14.4 percent of 
refinance loan applications that were approved by lenders were rejected by borrowers. 
In states with warning-type disclosures, 16.4 percent of refinance loan applications 
estimated to be covered under state laws were rejected by applicants. In states with 
signature requirements for warning-type disclosures, 20.2 percent of applications 
estimated to be covered by the law were rejected by applicants. These associations 
between policies and consumer behavior are suggestive. An alternative explanation is 
that the characteristics of lending institutions and loan applicants in the highest-cost 
segment of the mortgage market vary systematically among states with disclosure laws 
and directly influence rejection rates. There is also the potential that disclosure laws 
are related to other lending regulations and to statewide patterns in lender and loan 
applicant behavior that could lead to spurious conclusions. This analysis is designed to 
address each of these potential problems through the use of several estimation 
methods. 
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The consumer’s decision to reject an approved high-cost refinance loan offer 
from a lender is modeled here as a dichotomous choice, as it is observed in the data. A 
consumer accepts the loan if and only if the net benefits from the loan exceed the 
expected discounted present value of the expected costs, including any costs 
associated with default. If the consumer’s net expected benefits from the loan are 
negative, the consumer will reject the loan. This analysis models the probability that a 
consumer rejects the lender’s loan offer as depending on the type of the disclosure 
required by state law, after controlling for other loan applicant, lender, and market 
characteristics. The hypothesis is that disclosure laws result in consumers being more 
likely to perceive the net expected benefits of a high-cost refinance loan offer as being 
negative, all else equal, which is observed in the data as a loan applicant rejecting a 
loan offer. 
5.1. Borrower Rejection Models 
Within each state some loans require disclosures and others do not, with the 
exception of Michigan and Illinois, where all loans in this analysis have a state 
disclosure (sensitivity tests are provided regarding these two states). All HOEPA loans 
have a federal written disclosure of the risk of losing a home regardless of state laws. 
State laws take three forms: (1) adding a warning in addition to the HOEPA 
disclosure, (2) adding a warning in addition to HOEPA disclosures and requiring a 
signature, and (3) adding a signed warning disclosure for non-HOEPA loan 
applications. It is expected that the latter two situations will provide consumers with 
new information or information in an attention-getting format by way of the disclosure 
that federal HOEPA disclosures do not achieve. By including loans covered and not 
covered between and within states, a form of a difference-in-differences estimator can 
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be developed.8 The specification for a borrower’s rejecting an approved offer of a 
high-cost loan from a lender is modeled in Equation 1. 
Eq 1: Backouti = β1 Disclosurei,s + β2 HOEPA dummyi + β3 
Disclosurei,s*HOEPA dummyi + β4 Minority dummyi + β65 
Disclosurei,s*Minority dummyi+ β6 Law indexs + β7-9 X Applicanti + 
β10- β13 L Lenderl + Fixed Effectst,b + εi,s *[Weight] 
State disclosure laws (β1) are dummy variables coded based on the data in 
Appendix Table 2.C.2. Generally, specification includes applications covered by risk 
disclosures, signed disclosures or both, although models of counseling requirements 
are also included to examine the potential role of counseling as a signal of risk. In this 
specification, loan applications are identified as being “covered” based on the 
application’s estimated APR or HOEPA status, taking into account any exemptions 
from disclosures states may provide, as shown in Appendix Table 2.C.2. Because 
there are only 51 jurisdictions in the data and more than half have some variation of 
lending law, laws are generally modeled separately and together. Coefficient β2 is a 
dummy indicating the loan application is estimated to be covered under the federal 
HOEPA disclosure. This allows the behavior of these loan applicants to vary from 
those seeking non-HOEPA high-cost loans. Coefficient β3 is the interaction of loans 
covered by state laws and also by federal HOEPA disclosures. Coefficient β4 is a 
dummy indicator of the race of the applicant based on racial categories reported in 
HMDA, where 1 is equal to any non-white race. Coefficient β5 is the interaction of a 
loan covered under a state law and a minority applicant. To the extent that previous 
studies show minorities behaving as though less informed, this interaction may 
provide evidence about the role of risk disclosures in remedying information deficits 
or naïveté. Coefficient β6 is the index of state mortgage lending laws described 
                                                 
8 The estimate controls for the rate of rejection among noncovered loans in the state with the exception 
of MI and IL, where all loans are covered. As a sensitivity test, loans in these states were coded 
separately as well as excluded from specifications. These approaches did not result in significantly 
different findings, and these states remain in the analysis. 
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previously and is included to control for the strength of state lending laws that may 
accompany state disclosure laws. The matrix of applicant characteristics, X, includes 
the natural log of applicant income, a measure of economic status. It also includes the 
ratio of the applicant’s income to the amount of the loan, a measure of how much debt 
relative to income the applicant seeks. Lower incomes relative to larger amounts of 
debt suggest riskier loans. The dummy indicating whether the amount of a loan 
exceeds $360,000 is included primarily because loans over this amount are exempted 
from some state laws, but also signals borrowers seeking large loans and may be 
related to differing applicant behavior. The matrix of lender characteristics, L, 
includes dummy indicators for the regulator agency as well as the lender’s market 
share of subprime loans in the state. Indicator variables for the regulator of each lender 
are important to include because certain regulators may preempt state disclosure laws.9 
Applications to lenders regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) are coded.  
This specification is estimated using a fixed effects OLS linear probability 
model with robust and clustered standard errors to manage the heteroskedastic errors 
of a binary variable (Green, 2003). A linear probability model is used for several 
reasons. While coefficients are not constrained to 0 and 1, interpretation as marginal 
effects regarding the percent of loan applications rejected by applicants is 
straightforward. Most of the models described in this analysis require an interaction 
between state-law dummies and loan-level dummies. Interactions of dichotomous 
variables in a standard probit model are difficult to interpret and can lead to spurious 
results (Norton, Wang, & Ai, 2004). There is some evidence that recent studies have 
                                                 
9 In 2006 the Supreme Court ruled in Watters vs. Wachovia Bank NA that nationally chartered banks, 
such as those regulated by the OCC, can have certain state laws preempted in favor of national laws. 
The general practice for lenders was to comply with state disclosure laws in 2005 because the costs of 
compliance were low, while the potential for future legal disputes over the loan closing process could 
have become a potential legal liability. 
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underestimated advantages of linear probability models for large datasets and models 
involving interactions, and may often even lead to the misuse of logit and probit 
models (Hoetker, 2007). 
5.2. Fixed Effects 
The first set of models in this analysis uses census-tract fixed effects to account 
for unobserved housing and labor market factors that may influence rejection rates. 
While this helps control a wide range of place-related attributes, this approach still 
results in disparate areas being compared between and across heterogeneous 
jurisdictions. One alternative is to use fixed effects for 49 border county groupings 
that straddle 37 states with and without disclosure laws. State boundaries are not 
correlated with states passing mortgage laws, yet mortgage markets are likely to be 
more similar on either side of the border than loan applications located outside the 
grouping, creating a form of a natural experiment. Border-grouping fixed effects have 
been used in several recent analyses (Dube, Lester, & Reich, 2007; Huang, 2008; 
Pence, 2006). The border-grouping approach has also been widely used with HMDA 
data in the examination of state lending laws (Bostic, Engel, McCoy, Pennington-
Cross, & Wachter, 2008; Ho & Pennington-Cross, 2006a). The approach typically 
identifies groups of contiguous counties within MSAs and creates a fixed effect 
dummy for each grouping. By including these dummies in a specification, a form of 
within-group difference in differences is estimated. Borrowing from Pence (2006), this 
analysis improves on past studies of state lending laws by using distance weights. 
Recognizing the potential for heterogeneity within border pairings, the distance in 
linear miles of each census tract from the state border is calculated based on its 
longitude and latitude. Weighting the location of the loan application by the inverse of 
its distance from the border places more emphasis on closely located areas rather than 
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treating all applications within a contiguous county as having an equal weight.10 A 
further refinement is to limit the border-grouping fixed effects models to only those 
groupings that are not divided by a waterway. Waterways may result in sharper 
distinctions at the border than non-waterway-bounded areas. Of course, defining a 
river or waterway boundary is subject to interpretation (Hoxby, 2007). Border county 
groupings are a rough proxy for the level of homogeneity within a market. Many 
groupings have boundaries that are partially defined by a river and are not defined as 
river-bounded in this analysis. These judgments were made after reviewing maps with 
population density to gauge the extent to which borders appeared to be simultaneous 
with a waterway that divided significant population areas. A list of the county 
groupings within and without water boundaries is provided in Appendix Table 2.A.2 
and Appendix Table 2.A.3. 
5.3. Sequential Responses Model 
The last approach used is to test for the broader market effects of state risk 
disclosures for high-cost refinance mortgages. Because consumer decisions to reject a 
loan offer are contingent on the decision to initially apply for a high-cost loan, and 
then on the lender’s decision to approve the loan, it is possible that the effects of laws 
are reflected throughout the application process. Applicants and lenders may alter their 
behavior regarding how and when to apply and whether to approve a loan application. 
This analysis estimates the outcome of a borrower rejecting an approved loan offer 
using a maximum likelihood sequential response model to simultaneously estimate all 
three stages (apply-approve-reject) of an application. This approach has been used in 
                                                 
10 The latitude and longitude of each census tract and county centroid was downloaded from 
www.census.gov and the distance of each tract from the closest cross-border county calculated using a 
standard formula incorporated into Stata 10’s globdist routine. Distances were also calculated using the 
centroid of the MSA as the comparison, yielding very similar weighted coefficients.  
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previous studies of sequential processes (Danzon & Lillard, 1983; Hu, Lahiri, 
Vaughan, & Wixon, 2001; Murray, 1997).  
Buis (2008) created a routine in Stata (seqlogit) to implement a sequential logit 
estimator. Buis’s model simultaneously estimates the effect of explanatory variables 
on the probability of passing from the first stage (application) to the next (approve-
deny) and then to the final outcome (accept-reject). The final outcome is weighted by 
the log-odds that the application passed each prior transition, taking into account the 
mean variance at each transition and the extremes of the differences in the final 
outcome. The third-stage estimates reflect the weighted impacts of prior stages. The 
sequential probability of applicants rejecting an approved loan offer has four branches: 
1. Not Apply for high-cost loan (vs. apply as in 2, 3, and 4)  
2. Apply for high-cost loan, Loan denied by lender (vs. approved as in 3 and 4)  
3. Apply for high-cost loan, Loan approved by lender, Borrower rejects (vs. 4) 
4. Apply for high-cost loan, Loan approved by lender, Borrower accepts (vs. 3) 
The model has three stages. The first stage is application for a high-cost loan or 
a low-cost loan. The second stage is conditional on an application being made for a 
high-cost loan, whether the loan is approved or not by the lender. The final stage is the 
applicant’s acceptance or rejection of the offer conditional on an application being 
made for a high-cost loan that was approved by the lender, which is a comparison of 
branch 3 and branch 4, above. This is the conditional probability Pr(Accept | approved 
| applied). There is no counterfactual such that Pr(accept | denied | applied). The 
specification for the model is as follows: 
Eq 2: Pr(Backouti)= β1 Laws+ β2 Law indexs + β3-6 Xi + β7-9Li + β10 
county vacancy ratei + εi,s  
The matrix of applicant characteristics, X, includes the natural log of applicant 
income, the ratio of the applicant’s income to the amount of the loan, the natural log of 
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the amount of the loan, and indicators of the loan applicant being a member of a 
minority group or single. The matrix of lender characteristics, L, includes dummy 
indicators for the regulator agency as well as a dummy indicating whether the amount 
of a loan exceeds $360,000. County vacancy rate is used as a proxy for the 
surrounding market condition. 
Note that this model has more different coefficients than previous models. The 
structure of the equation is such that the same variables are used to predict all three 
stages. Some of the variables included in prior models, such as lender subprime 
market share, are endogenous at prior stages. The state-law dummy serves as the 
single indicator of any effect of state laws. Continuous variables are also expressed as 
a difference from the county or census-tract means to approximate a fixed effects 
model for unobserved market-level factors.  
6. Results 
6.1. Fixed Effects Models  
Appendix Table 2.A.5 presents four variations in a specification with the 
dependent variable of a loan applicant rejecting an approved loan offer from a lender. 
These models are run for all high-cost loans (defined as HOEPA loans and/or loans 
with an APR spread of at least 600 basis points). All of these specifications include 
census-tract fixed effects, designed to account for unobserved heterogeneity in local 
labor and housing markets. The coefficients on the variables indicating that 
application is for a loan requiring disclosure show the impact of the state law 
controlling for other variables in the specification. Model 1 includes indicators only 
for any warning-type disclosure (18 states, all of which at a minimum use the language 
“you could lose your home”) and also a subset of the laws that require the applicant to 
sign the disclosure form. This model shows no effects for the disclosure in general but 
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a marginal increase in applicants rejecting approved loan offers of 6.4 percentage 
points for signed disclosures. This effect is concentrated among HOEPA applications, 
as shown in model 2, where the signature dummy alone shows no effect on non-
HOEPA loans but a strong 10.7 percentage-point effect when interacted with HOEPA 
status. The interaction of a signed disclosure with minority borrowers in model 3 is not 
significant but is positive, and introducing that control pushes the main effect of 
signed disclosures to be 3.2 percentage points without reducing the impact on 
applicants for HOEPA loans. Model 4 adds a control for states with counseling laws. 
This weakens the effects of signed disclosures overall, but the effects remain for 
HOEPA loans, albeit at lower levels of statistical significance. Applications with 
counseling requirements appear to also have elevated rates of borrower rejection of 
loan offers in this model. 
As an initial sensitivity test, model 1 is shown in Appendix Table 2.A.6 with 
three variations in the sample. First, the two states discussed earlier where disclosures 
apply to all loans in the sample, Michigan and Illinois, are dropped from the sample. 
The coefficient on the main effect of disclosure remains nonsignificant, and the effects 
of signed disclosures remain significant and of a similar magnitude. Second, the model 
is run excluding these 2 states and 6 additional states where counseling is required. 
Similar results are found. Finally, the sample is shifted to exclude HOEPA loans and 
to include loans with APR spreads between 300 and 700 basis points, excluding loans 
that are subject to other laws, and adding loans in Illinois not subject to disclosure 
laws. Loan applications from Michigan, where all applications require disclosures, are 
excluded. The effects of the Illinois signed disclosure remain positive and significant. 
As an additional sensitivity test, model 1 is shown in Appendix Table 2.A.7 with three 
variations in the covariates. First, a fixed effect of a state having any foreclosure risk-
warning disclosure law shows that, all else equal, states with disclosure laws have 
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lower rates of borrowers rejecting loan offers. The coefficient on loans requiring a 
signed disclosure remains positive, significant, and of a similar magnitude, however. 
Adding fixed effects for states with counseling requirements as well as a dummy for 
the state of New Jersey, which has signed disclosures and counseling requirements, 
shows that signed disclosures and counseling requirements are associated with higher 
rates of borrowers rejecting a loan offer. Models 3 and 4 include a covariate for a fixed 
effect for the 10 states with signed disclosure laws, showing that these states, all else 
equal, have lower rejection rates but that signed disclosures have a larger and 
significant effect. Model 4 suggests these effects are primarily in the HOEPA loan 
market. These tests suggest that the models presented in Appendix Table 2.A.5 should 
provide a general sense of the effects of the laws being examined. 
Appendix Table 2.A.8 presents the same 4 models of state laws and controls 
for the same data, except that only counties in the 49 border groupings are included. 
Controlling for border-group fixed effects, including weights for the distance of tract 
of the loan applicant from the border, further refines the prior estimates to account for 
heterogeneity within and across states. The results of these models are decidedly 
weaker. Model 2 shows a marginally significant positive effect of signed disclosures 
on HOEPA loans of 8.3 percentage points. Model 3 shows stronger effects for signed 
disclosures for HOEPA loans of 9.6 percentage points, and for the interaction with 
minority applicants of 7.4 points. There is no main effect of signed disclosures, 
however. Including counseling requirements weakens the results, but the effects of 
signed disclosures for HOEPA loans remains.  
Appendix Table 2.A.9 repeats the models of Appendix Table 2.A.8, excluding 
river-bounded contiguous counties. Arguably these models provide the strongest 
comparisons within heterogeneous markets. However, most of the results are 
nonsignificant. Model 3 shows positive coefficients for signed disclosures overall and 
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interacted with HOPEA applications, but only the interaction with a minority applicant 
is significant. The effect is strong, suggesting a 8.9 percentage-point increase in 
minority borrowers receiving a signed disclosure. The sample is reduced significantly, 
to less than 18,300 of the original 166,000 approved loan applications in the first set of 
specifications.  
6.2. Sequential Response Model 
The models examined in the previous section all estimate the probability of a 
loan applicant accepting an offer contingent on that offer being approved by a lender. 
This assumes that states passing laws requiring disclosure or counseling have no effect 
on the probability of a loan applicant applying for a high-cost loan or on the 
probability that a lender will approve the application. Ho and Pennington-Cross 
(2006a) suggest that states most likely to pass high-cost lending laws also are more 
likely to have subprime loan applications and increased subprime-loan application 
denials by lenders. Concern for this issue led the authors to determine outcomes by 
jointly estimating the probability of a loan application being in a state with a lending 
law, and then estimating outcomes of interest using that predicted value as an 
instrument. Ho and Pennington-Cross’s approach suggests caution in interpreting the 
results in the previous sections.  
Table 2.A.10 displays the results of all three stages. The model is run for loan 
applications covered by disclosure laws separately and then simultaneously. Marginal 
effects, based on a 16 percent average overall rate of borrowers rejecting loans, for the 
third-stage model suggest about a 6.6 percent increase in rejections of loan offers, 
even after modeling the application process and weighting this final outcome by these 
earlier stages. While stage three is the outcome of interest, there are no significant 
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effects of state laws in prior stages. Note that the test in these models is a general 
effect of the law, not a specific effect of the law for loans covered by the law. 
Appendix Table 2.A.11, Appendix Table 2.A.12, and Appendix Table 2.A.13 
provide the same model run on the data with differences from census-tract means for 
continuous variables, approximating tract fixed effects. The prior model county “de-
meaned” data may detect unobserved housing market characteristics, while the tract 
de-meaned data may detect unobserved neighborhood or applicant characteristics. 
Each stage is shown as a separate table because of space constraints, although each 
model is one estimation procedure across all three tables. At the initial stage of 
application, there is no effect of disclosure of signed disclosure laws, but there is a 
small reduction in the rate of borrowers applying for high-cost loans in states with 
counseling requirements. Based on a mean rate of application for high-cost loans of 3 
percent, the marginal effects of the logit model suggest about a 1.2 percent decrease in 
borrowers seeking high-cost loans in states with counseling laws. At the second stage, 
the lender’s decision to approve or deny the loan application, there is a marginally 
significant effect of a state having a disclosure law on lenders being less likely to deny 
a high-cost loan application. Based on an average denial rate among high-cost loans of 
40 percent, this results in about a 3.7 percent reduction in denial rates for high-cost 
loan applications in these states, and about a 4.0 percent reduction when a covariate 
for a state having a signed disclosure law is added. A state having a signed disclosure 
law does not have any significant effect in any of the models. In model 4 a state 
having a counseling requirement increases denials by about 6.5 percent, although this 
effect is marginally significant. The final stage, a borrower rejecting a high-cost loan 
offer, shows only positive and significant effects of states having a disclosure required 
for high-cost loans, but not for signature or counseling laws. The estimated magnitude 
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of a state having a disclosure law for high-cost loans is about 4.5 percent across all of 
the models (4.6, 4.7, and 4.2).  
These results are very different estimations than the prior estimations without 
sequential process modeling. The estimates in these models are of a state having a law, 
and the specification contains different variables without the fixed effects for border 
groupings. Yet these results suggest there is no reason to suspect that the findings of 
Appendix Table 2.A.5, Appendix Table 2.A.8, and Appendix Table 2.A.9 are 
significantly biased by application or lender behavior.  
6.3. Estimated Risk Reduction 
Given the results presented in the previous sections, there appears to be an 
association between state disclosure laws and borrowers rejecting high-cost refinance 
loan offers from lenders. This is suggestive of borrower behavior to take more caution 
in their use of credit. We do not observe in the data whether these applicants rejecting 
a loan offer are likely to exit the market altogether or whether they re-enter the market 
and seek a loan they perceive as less risky. One rough proxy for borrowers’ taking 
more or less risk is the ratio of their income to the amount of the mortgage. This 
measure will vary by regional housing costs and is not likely to be linear as income or 
housing values increase. But in general, the higher the ratio of income to debt, the 
more risk. For example, an applicant with $50,000 in income seeking a $100,000 
mortgage (1:2 ratio) takes less risk than an applicant with $50,000 in income taking a 
$300,000 mortgage (1:6 ratio). Appendix Table A.2.11 and Appendix Table A.2.12 
present some models that suggest the income-to-debt ratio is associated with loans 
being covered by state laws run on data for loans with APR spreads of 300 basis 
points or more. This is a larger sample than used in the estimations of borrowers 
rejecting loan offers because in theory borrowers may respond to the disclosures by 
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entering a lower-cost portion of the subprime market (a 300 basis-point spread in APR 
to Treasury is still considered subprime, but not entirely “high-cost”). Models 1, 2, and 
3 are run on all lender-approved loan applications with APR spreads of 300 basis 
points or more. Models 4, 5, and 6 are run only for originated loans in this APR range. 
Appendix Table 2.A.11 and Appendix Table 2.A.12 show in models 2 and 3, 
and 5 and 6, a modest 7- to 9-point increase in this ratio, given an average of 50 in this 
sample (ratios were multiplied by 100). Far from conclusive evidence, these results are 
suggestive that disclosures may serve to do more than increase the probability of 
rejecting a loan offer but encourage applicants for high-cost loans covered by signed 
disclosures to reduce the amount borrowed. An interaction of loans with signed 
disclosures and HOEPA status shows mixed effects. For all approved applications 
there is a positive effect using non-river-bounded county grouping fixed effects. Both 
border-grouping models for originated loans (models 4 and 5) show negative effects of 
HOEPA loans covered by signature laws. There were no effects of interactions of 
loans covered by signed disclosures and minority borrowers, however.  
These estimations are exploratory but suggestive that the effects of signed 
disclosure laws do result in changes in loan applicant behavior in the subprime market. 
The structure of the data do not allow us to observe whether borrowers are engaging in 
more search, exiting the market, or both. If a policy goal is to encourage borrowers to 
take (slightly) less debt for each dollar of income, signed disclosure may have some 
effects.  
7. Discussion 
Signed disclosure requirements appear to have a positive association with 
borrowers rejecting approved high-cost loan offers. Signed disclosure laws have an 
effect on the rate of borrowers rejecting loan offers of between 3 and 10 percentage 
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points, compared to an average rate of 16 percent overall. Applications covered by 
unsigned disclosures do not appear to have effects in OLS models of borrower 
rejections. States with disclosures laws, regardless of signature, appear to have effects 
in sequential logit models. There is also preliminary evidence that signed disclosure 
laws also have a modest effect on reducing the amount of mortgage debt that loan 
applicants seek relative to income in the subprime market. 
This study contributes to the literature by focusing on borrowers rejecting 
approved loan offers, a consumer choice not previously examined, and by studying the 
effects of consumer risk disclosures in the credit market, also a relatively unexamined 
topic. High-cost mortgage refinance applications are used as an applied example of 
borrower choice under various state laws. This study improves on the methodology 
used in past studies using HMDA data to examine state high-cost loan regulations in 
several ways. First, subprime lenders are identified by actual rate spreads and not 
reliant on a list compiled by a governmental agency. Second, this study improves on 
border fixed effects strategies used in other studies by adding distance weights and by 
excluding border areas with river boundaries to provide more robust comparisons 
within heterogeneous areas. Last, this study uses a sequential response model to 
account for effects of laws on applicant or lender behavior. 
8. Conclusions 
“YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME” is an important warning for consumers 
about to sign a mortgage contract. Based on this analysis of home refinance loans in 
2005, this warning may in fact be more effective than commonly presumed. 
The effects shown in this analysis are not large, especially given the relatively 
low occurrence of borrowers rejecting an approved loan offer overall, but nonetheless 
suggest that signed risk disclosure requirements have effects on loan applicants’ 
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review of loan offers. These results are based on high-cost refinance loans reported in 
HMDA data in 2005 and may not be generalized to purchase or home improvement 
loans, or even to subprime loans at lower rates. These results also rest on the 
assumption that the estimated interest rates of loans that were approved by lenders but 
not accepted by loan applicants share an interest rate distribution with similar loans 
that were originated by that lender and/or in the same census tract.  
If a goal of public policy is to encourage consumers to be less likely to take on 
high-cost refinance mortgages, or to reduce the amount consumers borrow relative to 
income, the implementation of warning-type disclosures with required borrower 
signatures may be one strategy. One concern may be that consumers overreact to these 
disclosures and will avoid credit unnecessarily, or that markets will respond by 
restricting credit. The sequential response model does not suggest such effects. 
Borrowers clearly remain active in this market despite the risk warnings. This may 
prove to be a valid example of asymmetric paternalist polices, wherein the uninformed 
consumer is protected from his or her naïveté or self-control problems, while the 
informed consumer is unaffected. If helping uninformed consumers without impeding 
informed consumers is a policy goal, the effects of signed disclosures on minority 
borrowers in particular may imply that risk warnings in the mortgage market may be 
one approach worthy of consideration. 
As federal regulators consider changes to mortgage and other credit regulations 
in 2008, these findings may be instructive. These findings also provide further 
evidence of the need for greater financial literacy among consumers if understanding 
the terms and disclosures provided in credit markets is a policy goal. 
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APPENDIX 2.A. DATA TABLES 
Table 2.A.1: Count of High-Cost (APR rate spread of 600 basis points or more 
over Treasury) Loan Applications by State in HMDA Data 
 All Applications Subject to Disclosure Signed Disclosure Require Counseling 
 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA 
AL  4,046 239 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AK  140 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AZ  4,255 539 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR  1,891 166 0 0 0 0 0 157 
CA  10,888 1,576 0 1,303 0 1,303 0 0 
CO  1,326 108 0 108 0 108 0 0 
CT  1,993 230 0 230 0 0 0 0 
DE  587 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DC  73 7 46 1 46 1 0 0 
FL  13,325 1,394 0 1,394 0 0 0 0 
GA  6,637 562 0 0 0 0 6,549 557 
HI  349 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ID  577 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IL  1,589 326 1,327 247 1,327 247 0 0 
IN  3,556 336 0 335 0 0 0 0 
IA  1,903 198 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KS  1,714 175 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KY  1,727 323 0 293 0 0 0 0 
LA  2,270 424 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ME  807 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MD  4,641 404 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MA  2,213 192 0 0 0 0 0 192 
MI  8,896 629 8,896 629 0 0 0 0 
MN  2,080 159 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MS  1,925 164 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MO  4,698 339 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MT  272 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NE  791 147 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NV  1,609 202 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NH  612 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NJ  4,909 543 0 495 0 495 0 495 
NM  724 121 178 120 178 120 0 0 
NY  5,851 842 116 711 116 711 0 0 
NC  5,040 320 0 0 0 0 0 311 
ND  161 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OH  6,330 580 0 580 0 580 0 0 
OK  1,981 436 0 436 0 436 0 0 
OR  1,060 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA  7,282 893 0 586 0 0 0 0 
RI  532 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SC  2,429 216 0 0 0 0 0 214 
SD  193 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TN  4,006 524 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TX  8,120 2,305 359 2,182 0 0 0 0 
UT  538 17 0 17 0 0 0 0 
VT  324 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VA  5,311 636 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WA  2,006 252 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WV  932 129 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WI  3,298 253 0 253 0 253 0 0 
WY  223 39 0 0 0 0 0 0 
US 148,640 17,715 10,922 9,920 1,667 4,254 6,549 1,926 
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Table 2.A.2: Count of High-Cost Loan Applications by Border Grouping, State 
Law, and HOEPA Status 
  All Applications 
Subject to 
Disclosure 
Signed 
Disclosure 
Require 
Counseling 
R
iv
er
 
Area 
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0 
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0 Allentown NJ-PA 236 32 1 29 1 15 0 0 
0 Augusta SC-GA 366 44 0 0 0 0 0 25 
0 Chattanooga TN-GA 347 75 23 74 16 24 0 0 
0 Cheyenne Laramie CO-WY 135 17 0 10 0 10 0 0 
0 Chicago Kankakee IN-IL 1,075 73 0 0 0 0 0 1 
0 Duluth MN-WI 154 39 2 18 0 0 0 0 
0 
Erie-Ashtabula-Chautauqua 
PA-NY 233 48 0 11 0 0 0 0 
0 
Fairfield-Putnam-Dutchess 
CT-NY 531 50 0 30 0 24 0 24 
0 
Gaston-Mecklenburg-York 
NC-SC 655 47 0 0 0 0 0 46 
0 
Hillsborough-Middlesex-
Worcester NH-MA 823 82 0 7 0 0 0 36 
0 Lancaster Baltimore PA-MD 1,297 64 94 6 94 6 0 0 
0 McHenry Kenosha WI-IL 158 19 0 14 0 6 0 0 
0 Muscogee-Russell GA-AL 288 52 0 6 0 6 0 0 
0 New London Fall River CT-RI 185 28 0 26 0 0 0 0 
0 Philadelphia PA-MD-NJ 3,696 404 0 268 0 159 0 159 
0 Port Arthur TX-LA 260 18 0 0 0 0 179 17 
0 Portland NH-ME 137 9 0 9 0 0 0 0 
0 Providence CT-MA-RI 828 71 0 0 0 0 0 49 
0 Reno Washoe-Placer NV-CA 285 33 2 28 2 28 0 9 
0 Rockford WI-IL 229 11 0 2 0 2 0 0 
0 Rockingham-Essex NH-MA 323 25 0 19 0 0 0 0 
0 
Sequoyah-Crawford-
Sebastian OK-AR 170 15 50 15 50 15 0 0 
0 Sherveport LA-TX 160 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
South Bend Benton Harbor 
MI-IN 348 18 0 0 0 0 286 18 
0 Sussex-Orange NJ-NY 255 29 0 13 0 8 0 8 
0 
Texarkana Bowie-Miller TX-
AR 77 12 2 7 0 0 0 4 
0 Toldeo MI-OH 584 48 173 48 0 28 0 0 
0 
Tolland-Hartford-Hampden 
CT-MA 912 83 0 83 0 68 0 0 
0 Trenton PA-NJ 559 73 2 67 2 20 0 0 
0 
Wilmington Horry-Brunswick 
SC-NC 174 30 0 14 0 14 0 16 
0 Youngstown OH-PA 488 40 0 38 0 32 0 0 
0 Cincinnati OH-IN-KY 967 87 0 62 0 0 0 25 
1 Clarksville IN-KY 104 10 0 5 0 0 0 0 
1 Davenport IA-IL 146 14 0 8 0 8 0 0 
1 El Paso Las Cruces TX-NM 350 32 0 25 0 5 0 0 
1 Evansville KY-IN 143 16 38 10 38 10 0 0 
1 Fargo MN-ND 52 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Grand Forks ND-MN 37 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Huntington KY-OH-WV 169 15 0 0 0 0 0 14 
1 Louisville KY-IN 447 85 0 81 0 0 0 0 
1 Memphis AR-TN-MS 1,077 218 581 160 581 127 0 0 
75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.A.2 (Continued) 
  All Applications 
Subject to 
Disclosure 
Signed 
Disclosure 
Require 
Counseling 
R
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S
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 New York NY-NJ 1,750 170 8 133 8 133 0 79 
1 Parkersburg WV-OH 69 12 0 7 0 7 0 0 
1 
Pensacola Baldwin-Escambia 
AL-FL 333 23 166 23 0 0 0 0 
0 Pittsburgh PA-OH-WV 349 48 0 0 0 0 108 27 
1 St Louis MO-IL 1,335 107 0 15 0 0 0 0 
1 Twin Cities MN-WI 221 17 32 15 32 15 0 0 
0 Washington DC VA-DC-MD 1,962 208 46 1 46 1 0 0 
1 Wheeling WV-OH 85 20 0 16 0 16 0 0 
 All Areas 25,564 2,700 1,220 1,403 870 787 573 557 
 Non-river bounded 19,246 1,947 395 905 211 466 573 464 
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Table 2.A.3: Mean Rates of Borrowers Rejecting Approved Loan Offers By 
State, Border Grouping and HOEPA Status 
State 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA  Border Grouping 
600-800 
BPS HOEPA 
AL  37.5% 23.0%  Texarkana Bowie-Miller TX-AR 15.8% 24.0% 
AK  7.9% 52.9%  Sherveport LA-TX 36.5% 0.0% 
AZ  12.7% 9.5%  Parkersburg WV-OH 19.1% 24.7% 
AR  35.2% 20.5%  Cheyenne Laramie CO-WY 29.9% 0.0% 
CA  7.6% 15.0%  Port Arthur TX-LA 33.9% 3.3% 
CO  10.0% 20.4%  Sussex-Orange NJ-NY 9.4% 1.9% 
CT  12.4% 10.4%  Erie-Ashtabula-Chautauqua PA-NY 13.3% 23.5% 
DE  17.9% 8.8%  Wilmington Horry-Brunswick SC-NC 18.9% 6.3% 
DC  5.5% 85.7%  Reno Washoe-Placer NV-CA 6.1% 27.3% 
FL  14.1% 12.9%  Tolland-Hartford-Hampden CT-MA 19.0% 2.7% 
GA  28.6% 12.8%  New London Fall River CT-RI 15.4% 13.3% 
HI  2.3% 75.0%  Grand Forks ND-MN 17.1% 12.8% 
ID  19.8% 25.6%  Rockingham-Essex NH-MA 15.7% 18.8% 
IL  16.8% 27.9%  Chicago Kankakee IN-IL 16.5% 20.0% 
IN  14.3% 17.6%  Youngstown OH-PA 14.6% 6.3% 
IA  16.6% 11.6%  Davenport IA-IL 19.9% 35.0% 
KS  18.2% 11.4%  Chattanooga TN-GA 30.4% 25.0% 
KY  14.8% 11.5%  Pensacola Baldwin-Escambia AL-FL 15.9% 28.0% 
LA  21.7% 15.1%  Trenton PA-NJ 42.5% 16.7% 
ME  12.5% 17.8%  Pittsburgh PA-OH-WV 21.0% 12.5% 
MD  11.9% 8.4%  Gaston-Mecklenburg-York NC-SC 8.4% 6.3% 
MA  8.0% 25.5%  Providence CT-MA-RI 11.8% 23.5% 
MI  16.6% 21.5%  Philadelphia PA-MD-NJ 12.4% 13.3% 
MN  9.8% 28.3%  Clarksville IN-KY 10.7% 8.2% 
MS  33.0% 36.0%  Fairfield-Putnam-Dutchess CT-NY 13.1% 22.2% 
MO  17.3% 15.0%  Duluth MN-WI 12.5% 10.0% 
MT  13.6% 22.2%  Rockford WI-IL 27.9% 10.4% 
NE  11.9% 20.4%  Lancaster Baltimore PA-MD 24.0% 7.7% 
NV  12.7% 12.4%  St Louis MO-IL 9.7% 10.3% 
NH  13.6% 25.8%  New York NY-NJ 12.9% 16.1% 
NJ  12.0% 13.3%  Evansville KY-IN 11.6% 15.1% 
NM  8.3% 21.5%  Cincinnati OH-IN-KY 10.4% 40.9% 
NY  14.0% 31.5%  Louisville KY-IN 9.2% 21.1% 
NC  25.4% 16.9%  Huntington KY-OH-WV 8.6% 25.6% 
ND  14.9% 23.3%  Portland NH-ME 9.7% 0.0% 
OH  17.3% 26.0%  Wheeling WV-OH 18.8% 16.1% 
OK  16.7% 8.7%  Memphis AR-TN-MS 15.4% 14.5% 
OR  10.1% 20.8%  McHenry Kenosha WI-IL 24.1% 10.5% 
PA  14.8% 20.5%  Fargo MN-ND 12.8% 31.3% 
RI  10.9% 22.6%  Augusta SC-GA 11.5% 8.3% 
SC  18.0% 25.9%  Toldeo MI-OH 17.7% 30.4% 
SD  13.5% 7.1%  Allentown NJ-PA 10.8% 10.0% 
TN  18.1% 16.6%  Muscogee-Russell GA-AL 13.8% 13.3% 
TX  13.8% 6.1%  Twin Cities MN-WI 7.0% 31.8% 
UT  10.2% 47.1%  South Bend Benton Harbor MI-IN 10.2% 15.2% 
VT  9.3% 23.1%  El Paso Las Cruces TX-NM 11.9% 22.0% 
VA  17.3% 7.4%  Sequoyah-Crawford-Sebastian OK-AR 14.9% 10.3% 
WA  8.0% 17.5%  Washington DC VA-DC-MD 10.7% 13.5% 
WV  34.2% 14.7%  
Hillsborough-Middlesex-Worcester NH-
MA 12.3% 21.4% 
WI  10.8% 21.3%     
WY  16.1% 25.6%     
US 16.2% 15.9%     
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Table 2.A.4: Descriptive Statistics for 2005 HMDA data on High-Cost Loan 
Applications 
 
  
HOEPA Estimated 
Loan Applications 
n= 17,715 
600–800 APR Spread  
Loan Applications  
n= 141,783 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
Lending law index 3.197 2.354 3.187 2.668 
Log Income Applicant 3.649 1.162 3.830 3.840 
Ratio Income: Loan Amount 75.087 332.813 54.959 54.851 
Tract application denial rate  28.360 10.049 29.444 29.569 
Ratio Tract Income: MSA income 91.107 28.375 87.807 87.519 
County Housing Vacancy rate % 9.650 6.563 9.133 9.048 
Minority Applicant Dummy 0.151 0.355 0.241 0.238 
Single Applicant Dummy 0.535 0.498 0.653 0.662 
Lender regulated by OCC Dummy 0.079 0.266 0.122 0.106 
Lender regulated by OTS Dummy 0.050 0.219 0.079 0.075 
Tract backout % for APR 300-600 BPS 12.514 10.577 13.940 13.771 
Lender % subprime APR in state 13.993 16.616 32.493 31.753 
Gov't insured loan Dummy 0.114 0.326 0.001 0.001 
Loan >$360 conforming limit Dummy 0.035 0.197 0.038 0.045 
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Table 2.A.5: Borrower Rejection of Approved Loan Offer for Subprime Loan 
Applications in 2005 HMDA by Type of State Disclosure Law with Interactions 
of Law and HOEPA Applications and Law and Minority Loan Applicant with 
Census-Tract Fixed Effects and State-level Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
 1  2  3  4  
Loan requires disclosure dummy -0.039        
 (1.29)        
Loan disclosure requires signature 
dummy 0.064 * 0.053  0.032 * 0.043  
 (2.45)  (1.49)  (2.05)  (1.15)  
Loan disclosure requires signature 
* HOEPA application   0.107 * 0.107 * 0.097 + 
   (2.23)  (2.22)  (1.91)  
Loan disclosure requires signature 
* minority applicant     0.028    
     (0.83)    
Loan requires counseling dummy       0.047 * 
       (2.09)  
HOEPA Application dummy -0.024 + -0.042 ** -0.037 ** -0.045 ** 
 (1.72)  (3.24)  (2.74)  (3.42)  
Lending law index 0.003  0.004  0.003  0.001  
 (0.93)  (1.24)  (0.94)  (0.44)  
Log Income Applicant -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** -0.033 ** 
 (3.05)  (3.07)  (3.07)  (3.06)  
Ratio Income: Loan Amount 0.012 ** .004 ** .004 ** .002 ** 
 (3.74)  (3.73)  (3.73)  (3.73)  
Minority Applicant dummy 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 
 (4.58)  (4.53)  (4.28)  (4.42)  
Lender regulated by OCC dummy 0.292 ** 0.292 ** 0.293 ** 0.292 ** 
 (10.41)  (10.50)  (10.50)  (10.47)  
Lender regulated by OTS dummy 0.085 ** 0.084 ** 0.085 ** 0.084 ** 
 (9.45)  (9.42)  (9.44)  (9.40)  
Lender % subprime APR in state -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** 
 (7.92)  (7.95)  (7.97)  (7.98)  
Loan >$360 conforming limit  0.052 ** 0.053 ** 0.053 ** 0.055 ** 
 (3.06)  (3.20)  (3.13)  (3.22)  
Constant 0.275 ** 0.271 ** 0.272 ** 0.275 ** 
 (5.68)  (5.71)  (5.72)  (5.82)  
R-squared 0.116  0.116  0.115  0.116  
N 166355  166355  166355  166355  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01         
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Table 2.A.6: Sensitivity to Variations in Sample for Borrower Rejection of 
Approved Loan Offer for Subprime Loan Applications in 2005 HMDA by Type 
of State Disclosure Law with Interactions of Law and HOEPA Applications and 
Law and Minority Loan Applicant with Census-Tract Fixed Effects and State-
level Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
 
Exclude MI & IL 
(states covering 
all high-cost 
loans) 
Exclude MI, IL & States 
with Counseling 
Requirements (NJ, NC, 
SC, GA, AR, MA) 
300-700 APR 
Spread Loans 
Only (Test of IL), 
Exclude MI 
Loan requires disclosure dummy -0.036  -0.03    
 (1.03)  (0.80)    
Loan disclosure requires signature 
dummy 0.071 * 0.068 * 0.111 ** 
 (2.16)  (2.03)  (3.02)  
R-squared 0.122  0.094  0.076  
N 154915  129797  372877  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A.7: Sensitivity to Variations in State Law Fixed Effects for Borrower 
Rejection of Approved Loan Offer for Subprime Loan Applications in 2005 
HMDA by Type of State Disclosure Law with Interactions of Law and HOEPA 
Applications and Law and Minority Loan Applicant with Census-Tract Fixed 
Effects and State-level Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
 1 2 3 4 
State has any disclosure law (18 
states) -0.047 ** -0.023      
 (3.90)  (1.40)      
State has signed disclosure law (10 
states)     -0.044 ** -0.042 ** 
     (3.63)  (3.48)  
Loan requires disclosure  -0.021  -0.024      
 (0.80)  (0.93)      
Loan disclosure requires signature  0.058 * 0.062 * 0.047 * -0.036  
 (2.07)  (2.33)  (2.66)  (0.94)  
State has counseling requirement 
(6 states)   0.053 **     
   (3.41)      
Loan requires counseling   0.019      
   (1.15)      
Loan in New Jersey (signed 
disclosure and counseling required)   -0.112 **     
   (5.53)      
Loan requires signed disclosure * 
HOEPA        0.101 + 
       (1.99)  
R-squared 0.116  0.117  0.116  0.116  
N 166355  166355  166355  166355  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01         
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Table 2.A.8: Borrower Rejection of Approved Loan Offer for Subprime Loan 
Applications in 2005 HMDA by Type of State Disclosure Law with Interactions 
of Law and HOEPA Applications and Law and Minority Loan Applicant with 
Border-Grouping Fixed Effects Weighted by Distance to Border and State-level 
Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
 1  2  3  4  
Loan requires disclosure dummy -0.008        
 (0.26)        
Loan disclosure requires signature dummy 0.066  0.014  0.012  0.011  
 (1.44)  (0.85)  (0.67)  (0.70)  
Loan disclosure requires signature * HOEPA 
application   0.083 + 0.096 * 0.090 + 
   (1.86)  (2.18)  (2.00)  
Loan disclosure requires signature * minority 
applicant     0.074 **   
     (3.57)    
Loan requires counseling dummy       0.037  
       (0.79)  
HOEPA Application dummy -0.016  -0.03  -0.03  -0.027  
 (0.62)  (1.47)  (1.47)  (1.21)  
Lending law index -0.006 + -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  
 (1.78)  (1.26)  (1.16)  (0.77)  
Log Income Applicant -0.058 ** -0.058 ** -0.058 ** -0.058 ** 
 (13.65)  (13.70)  (13.67)  (13.56)  
Ratio Income: Loan Amount 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 0.002 ** 
 (4.44)  (4.47)  (4.47)  (4.45)  
Minority Applicant dummy 0.039 ** 0.039 ** 0.036 ** 0.039 ** 
 (3.55)  (3.57)  (3.30)  (3.56)  
Lender regulated by OCC dummy 0.316 ** 0.316 ** 0.316 ** 0.315 ** 
 (10.31)  (10.28)  (10.29)  (10.25)  
Lender regulated by OTS dummy 0.092 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 
 (6.13)  (5.67)  (5.77)  (5.67)  
Lender % subprime APR in state -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** 
 (8.30)  (8.27)  (8.25)  (8.28)  
Loan >$360 conforming limit  0.061 ** 0.061 ** 0.061 ** 0.06 ** 
 (4.13)  (4.13)  (4.16)  (3.96)  
Constant 0.376 ** 0.375 ** 0.375 ** 0.373 ** 
 (16.17)  (16.05)  (16.09)  (15.67)  
R-squared 0.169  0.169  0.169  0.169  
N 28050  28050  28050  28050  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01         
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Table 2.A.9: Borrower Rejection of Approved Loan Offer for Subprime Loan 
Applications in 2005 HMDA by Type of State Disclosure Law with Interactions 
of Law and HOEPA Applications and Law and Minority Loan Applicant with 
non-River-Boundary Border-Grouping Fixed Effects Weighted by Distance to 
Border and State-level Robust Clustered Standard Errors 
 1  2  3  4  
Loan requires disclosure dummy 0.023        
 (1.13)        
Loan disclosure requires signature 
dummy 0.026  0.011  0.018  0.01  
 (0.83)  (0.43)  (0.70)  (0.42)  
Loan disclosure requires signature * 
HOEPA application   0.064  0.079  0.069  
   (1.26)  (1.66)  (1.44)  
Loan disclosure requires signature * 
minority applicant     0.089 **   
     (9.14)    
Loan requires counseling dummy       0.024  
       (0.52)  
HOEPA Application dummy -0.03  -0.032  -0.031  -0.028  
 (1.18)  (1.48)  (1.47)  (1.36)  
Lending law index -0.006 + -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  
 (1.79)  (1.53)  (1.51)  (0.87)  
Log Income Applicant -0.059 ** -0.059 ** -0.059 ** -0.059 ** 
 (15.15)  (14.84)  (14.65)  (14.75)  
Ratio Income: Loan Amount 0.018 ** 0.001 ** 0.002 ** 0.001 ** 
 (3.11)  (3.11)  (3.10)  (3.04)  
Minority Applicant dummy 0.053 ** 0.054 ** 0.049 ** 0.053 ** 
 (5.15)  (5.17)  (5.32)  (5.19)  
Lender regulated by OCC dummy 0.347 ** 0.346 ** 0.346 ** 0.346 ** 
 (11.82)  (11.69)  (11.68)  (11.62)  
Lender regulated by OTS dummy 0.108 ** 0.106 ** 0.107 ** 0.106 ** 
 (6.09)  (5.35)  (5.54)  (5.31)  
Lender % subprime APR in state -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** -0.002 ** 
 (6.54)  (6.51)  (6.49)  (6.51)  
Loan >$360 conforming limit  0.062 ** 0.061 * 0.061 * 0.059 * 
 (2.85)  (2.64)  (2.66)  (2.53)  
Constant 0.377 ** 0.38 ** 0.38 ** 0.378 ** 
 (16.53)  (16.43)  (16.33)  (16.89)  
R-squared 0.199  0.199  0.199  0.199  
N 18289  18289  18289  18289  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01         
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Table 2.A.10: Sequential Logit Model: County Mean Differenced Data 
  
Stage 1: Apply for High-cost 
Loan 
Stage 2: Lender Approve 
High-cost Loan 
Stage 3: Applicant Rejects 
Approved High-cost Loan 
State Disclosure 
Law 0.054    (0.02)    0.41  
*
*   
 (0.35)    (0.24)    (2.89)    
State Signed 
Disclosure   0.34     -0.026    0.066  
   (1.48)    (0.26)    (0.45)  
Lending law index 0.014  0.00   0.03  * 0.025 * 0.01   0.011  
 (0.37)  (0.04)  (2.45)  (2.36)  (0.21)  (0.27)  
Log Income 
Applicant 
(difference from 
county mean) 0.033  0.03   (0.05)  -0.054  0.18  
*
* 0.186 
*
* 
 (0.74)  (0.74)  (1.26)  (1.26)  (3.42)  (3.17)  
Log Loan Amount 
(difference from 
county mean) -0.318 
*
* (0.32) 
*
* 0.22  
*
* 0.223 ** (0.73) 
*
* -0.738 
*
* 
 (6.63)  (6.72)  (6.57)  (6.43)  (11.65)  (11.27)  
Ratio Income: 
Loan Amount  
(difference from 
county mean) -0.001 
*
* (0.00) 
*
* 0.00   0  0.00  + 0  
 (3.38)  (3.45)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (1.67)  (1.59)  
Ratio Tract 
Income: MSA 
income -1.125 
*
* (1.13) 
*
* 0.27  
*
* 0.263 ** 0.08   0.114  
 (19.51)  (18.27)  (5.64)  (5.64)  (0.82)  (1.17)  
County hsg 
vacancy rate -0.019 
*
* (0.02) 
*
* 0.00   0.001  (0.01)  -0.004  
 (5.34)  (4.13)  (0.40)  (0.33)  (1.48)  (1.29)  
Minority Applicant 
Dummy 0.194 
*
* 0.20  
*
* (0.05) * -0.053 * 0.55  
*
* 0.564 
*
* 
 (4.23)  (4.27)  (2.28)  (2.31)  (12.11)  (12.65)  
Single Applicant 
Dummy -2.748 
*
* (2.33) 
*
* 0.75  * 0.727 * (1.48) * -1.442 * 
 (5.20)  (4.01)  (2.37)  (2.44)  (2.42)  (2.25)  
Lender regulated 
by OCC 5.669 
*
* 4.64  
*
* (2.99) 
*
* -2.975 ** 5.41  
*
* 6.193 
*
* 
 (6.62)  (3.41)  (6.10)  (4.70)  (8.31)  (5.99)  
Lender regulated 
by OTS -4.081 
*
* (3.48) 
*
* 2.57  
*
* 2.576 ** (3.29) 
*
* -4.096 
*
* 
 (5.41)  (3.16)  (5.85)  (4.32)  (6.59)  (5.64)  
Constant  4.924 
*
* 4.68  
*
* (1.38) 
*
* -1.377 ** 3.15  
*
* 3.344 
*
* 
 (20.23)  (14.88)  (8.74)  (9.51)  (13.93)  (10.94)  
R-squared             
N = 12,971,610                         
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A.11: Sequential Logit Model: First Stage (Application for High-cost 
Loan) using Census-Tract Mean Differenced Data 
 1  2  3  4  5  
State has any disclosure 
law (18 states) 0.087  0.016      -0.131  
 (0.76)  (0.12)      (0.88)  
State has signed 
disclosure law (10 
states)   0.174  0.183    0.193  
   (0.94)  (1.21)    (1.12)  
State has counseling 
requirement (6 states)       -0.41 * -0.457 ** 
       (2.50)  (2.90)  
Lending law index -0.005  -0.009  -0.009  0.02  0.021  
 (0.14)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.52)  (0.60)  
Log Income Applicant 
(difference from tract 
mean) 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001  
 (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  
Log Loan Amount  
(difference from tract 
mean) 1.513 ** 1.447 ** 1.443 ** 1.525 ** 1.452 ** 
 (6.12)  (7.36)  (6.57)  (5.67)  (6.78)  
Ratio Income: Loan 
Amount  
(difference from tract 
mean) 0  0  0  0  0  
 (0.61)  (0.61)  (0.61)  (0.61)  (0.61)  
Ratio Tract Income: 
MSA income -0.156  -0.101  -0.097  -0.136  -0.072  
 (0.53)  (0.41)  (0.36)  (0.42)  (0.27)  
County hsg vacancy 
rate -0.007 * -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.006 * -0.005 * 
 (2.53)  (2.41)  (2.45)  (2.33)  (2.10)  
Minority Applicant 
Dummy -0.285 ** -0.284 ** -0.285 ** -0.275 ** -0.276 ** 
 (6.69)  (6.62)  (5.95)  (5.92)  (6.21)  
Single Applicant Dummy -0.261 ** -0.258 ** -0.257 ** -0.257 ** -0.252 ** 
 (14.69)  (14.25)  (14.20)  (14.81)  (14.51)  
Lender regulated by 
OTS 1.409 ** 1.405 ** 1.405 ** 1.404 ** 1.399 ** 
 (9.63)  (9.65)  (9.72)  (9.67)  (9.57)  
Lender regulated by 
OCC 1.158 ** 1.155 ** 1.154 ** 1.16 ** 1.156 ** 
 (6.71)  (6.76)  (6.70)  (6.73)  (6.79)  
Constant -12.722 ** -12.56 ** -12.56 ** -13.021 ** -12.87 ** 
 (15.13)  (14.64)  (14.93)  (16.57)  (16.65)  
N = 12,971,610           
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A.12: Sequential Logit Model: Second Stage (Lender Denial of High-cost 
Loan Application) using Census-Tract Mean Differenced Data 
 1  2  3  4  5  
State has any 
disclosure law (18 
states) -0.094 + -0.13 *     -0.091  
 (1.74)  (1.98)      (1.31)  
State has signed 
disclosure law (10 
states)   0.09  0.012    0.077  
   (1.23)  (0.19)    (1.02)  
State has counseling 
requirement(6 states)       0.162 + 0.11  
       (1.83)  (1.11)  
Lending law index 0.028 ** 0.028 ** 0.027 ** 0.015  0.019 + 
 (4.42)  (4.45)  (2.98)  (1.43)  (1.78)  
Log Income Applicant 
(difference from tract 
mean) -0.014  -0.012  -0.014  -0.013  -0.012  
 (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.32)  
Log Loan Amount  
(difference from tract 
mean) -0.661 ** -0.697 ** -0.647 ** -0.663 ** -0.699 ** 
 (12.16)  (10.64)  (8.57)  (11.36)  (10.66)  
Ratio Income: Loan 
Amount 
(difference from tract 
mean) 0 ** 0 ** 0 ** 0 ** 0 ** 
 (2.61)  (2.67)  (2.59)  (2.58)  (2.65)  
Ratio Tract Income: 
MSA income 0.103  0.133 + 0.079  0.088  0.127 + 
 (1.53)  (1.82)  (1.06)  (1.21)  (1.68)  
County hsg vacancy 
rate -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  
 (1.35)  (1.43)  (1.29)  (1.31)  (1.41)  
Minority Applicant 
Dummy 0.072 ** 0.075 ** 0.082 ** 0.075 ** 0.074 ** 
 (2.58)  (2.93)  (3.16)  (2.73)  (2.86)  
Single Applicant 
Dummy 0.04 * 0.042 ** 0.037 * 0.037 * 0.04 * 
 (2.41)  (2.63)  (2.24)  (2.19)  (2.53)  
Lender regulated by 
OTS -0.39 ** -0.391 ** -0.388 ** -0.385 ** -0.389 ** 
 (7.06)  (7.03)  (6.94)  (7.06)  (7.13)  
Lender regulated by 
OCC 0.097  0.091  0.116  0.098  0.086  
 (1.25)  (1.16)  (1.46)  (1.25)  (1.11)  
Constant 5.716 ** 5.807 ** 5.773 ** 5.862 ** 5.878 ** 
 (11.75)  (10.73)  (11.14)  (10.53)  (10.16)  
N = 12,971,610           
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A.13: Sequential Logit Model: Third Stage (Borrower Rejects Approved 
Loan Offer) using Census-Tract Mean Differenced Data 
 1  2  3  4  5  
State has any 
disclosure law (18 
states) 0.289 ** 0.298 *     0.263 + 
 (2.76)  (1.99)      (1.67)  
State has signed 
disclosure law (10 
states)   -0.022  0.169    -0.006  
   (0.13)  (1.43)    (0.04)  
State has counseling 
requirement (6 states)       -0.261  -0.107  
       (1.36)  (0.66)  
Lending law index -0.003  -0.003  0  0.022  0.006  
 (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.72)  (0.25)  
Log Income Applicant 
(difference from tract 
mean) 0.059  0.059  0.062  0.057  0.057  
 (1.24)  (1.20)  (1.24)  (1.13)  (1.17)  
Log Loan Amount  
(difference from tract 
mean) 0.129  0.136  0.051  0.121  0.136  
 (0.75)  (0.85)  (0.23)  (0.62)  (0.86)  
Ratio Income: Loan 
Amount 
(difference from tract 
mean) 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
 (4.26)  (4.23)  (4.18)  (4.22)  (4.22)  
Ratio Tract Income: 
MSA income 0.51 * 0.505 * 0.59 * 0.564 * 0.514 * 
 (2.23)  (2.38)  (1.98)  (2.08)  (2.43)  
County hsg vacancy 
rate -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  
 (1.07)  (1.07)  (1.08)  (1.17)  (1.08)  
Minority Applicant 
Dummy -0.425 ** -0.425 ** -0.44 ** -0.442 ** -0.424 ** 
 (9.33)  (9.86)  (11.30)  (11.21)  (10.04)  
Single Applicant 
Dummy -0.127 ** -0.128 ** -0.119 ** -0.12 ** -0.127 ** 
 (2.81)  (2.95)  (2.63)  (2.61)  (2.89)  
Lender regulated by 
OTS -1.114 ** -1.113 ** -1.124 ** -1.128 ** -1.117 ** 
 (11.59)  (11.67)  (11.03)  (11.38)  (11.88)  
Lender regulated by 
OCC -2.735 ** -2.733 ** -2.777 ** -2.748 ** -2.727 ** 
 (21.65)  (21.74)  (19.47)  (20.30)  (21.56)  
Constant -4.157 ** -4.182 ** -4.024 ** -4.511 ** -4.267 ** 
 (4.69)  (4.21)  (4.00)  (4.19)  (4.26)  
N = 12,971,610           
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 2.A.14: Income to Loan Amount Ratio (Income/Loan Amount * 100) for Subprime Loan Applications in 2005 HMDA 
by Type of State Disclosure Law with Interactions of Law and HOEPA Applications and Law and Minority Loan Applicant 
 
All Lender Approved Applications  
(Rejected and Accepted by Borrower) 
Borrower Accepted Applications Only  
(Originated Loans) 
  - 1-   - 2-   - 3-  4  5  6  
Application w/ Signed Disclosure 5.841  6.657 ** 6.669 * 2.356  7.476 ** 9.056 ** 
 -1.35  -3.21  -2.66  (0.55)  (3.99)  (4.83)  
Signed Disclosure * HOEPA 
Application 3.239  30.299 + 22.499  -0.487  -8.205 * -10.145 + 
 -0.5  -1.93  -1.6  (0.08)  (2.14)  (1.88)  
Signed Disclosure * Minority 
Applicant 2.612  1.354  -0.968  2.822  -3.114  -3.995  
 -0.42  -0.37  -0.38  (0.77)  (1.31)  (1.68)  
HOEPA Application 10.353 ** 30.234  22.083  6.244 * 4.584 * 5.531 + 
 -2.87  -1.63  -1.25  (2.65)  (2.10)  (2.01)  
600-800 APR Spread Application -4.008 * -2.358  -2.716  -5.509 ** -3.105 * -4.093 + 
 -2.22  -1.35  -1.12  (3.13)  (2.08)  (1.92)  
Lending Law Index -29.644 * 0.32  0.7  -30.357 + 0.075  0.246  
 -2.19  -0.91  -1.27  (1.93)  (0.22)  (0.46)  
Tract mean loan amount -0.202 ** -0.222 ** -0.282 * -0.184 ** -0.152 ** -0.149 ** 
 -3.84  -3.51  -2.29  (3.63)  (4.91)  (2.94)  
Tract mean income 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 * 0 ** 0 ** 0 ** 
 -4.53  -3.48  -2.27  (4.10)  (8.69)  (7.14)  
Tract denial rate (credit proxy) 0.38 ** 0.574 ** 0.628 ** 0.375 ** 0.597 ** 0.686 ** 
 -6.14  -6.06  -4.56  (6.66)  (5.85)  (4.91)  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01     
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Table 2.A.14 (Continued) 
 
All Lender Approved Applications  
(Rejected and Accepted by Borrower) 
Borrower Accepted Applications Only  
(Originated Loans) 
  - 1-   - 2-   - 3-  4  5  6  
Minority applicant  -1.489 ** -2.651  -1.525  -1.141 * -1.966 ** -2.323 ** 
 -2.79  -1.64  -1.49  (2.42)  (4.67)  (3.21)  
Single applicant  -10.809 ** -11.406 ** -10.675 ** -10.516 ** -9.304 ** -9.368 ** 
 -6.52  -6.32  -6.97  (6.91)  (7.85)  (5.78)  
Lender regulated by OCC  1.309  0.89  1.394  2.898 * 2.282  3.238  
 -0.93  -0.56  -0.69  (2.08)  (1.38)  (1.60)  
Lender regulated by OTS  -0.318  2.349  3.463  -1.391  2.459  2.961  
 -0.25  -0.88  -0.9  (1.33)  (1.03)  (0.86)  
Lender's share of subprime in state  -0.003  -0.102 * -0.124 ** 0.011  -0.108 ** -0.105 * 
 -0.09  -2.3  -3.36  (0.43)  (3.79)  (2.67)  
Govt insured loan application -6.908 + -11.043  -6.295  3.654  1.65  6.137  
 -1.81  -0.83  -0.48  (0.99)  (0.17)  (0.43)  
Loan >$360 conforming limit  -8.105 ** -9.498 ** -10.069 + -7.337 ** -7.811 ** -6.011 * 
 -11.48  -3.97  -2.03  (9.74)  (4.96)  (2.11)  
Constant 104.69  42.137 ** 35.086 ** 112.883 ** 40.009 ** 36.482 ** 
 0  -7.48  -3.38  (3.39)  (8.69)  (4.71)  
R-squared 0.066  0.034  0.045  0.118  0.077  0.087  
N 443666  80852  53350  416751  76555  50427  
 County FE  Border Group FE 
Border FE, No 
River Bounded County FE 
Border Group 
FE 
Border FE, No 
River Bounded 
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Figure 2.A.1: National HOEPA Disclosure 
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Figure 2.A.2: California Disclosure 
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APPENDIX 2.B. ESTIMATING HOEPA LOANS 
The APR spread for loan applications was estimated using 6 million approved 
and originated loans that do report an APR spread to construct tract-lender-loan type 
means. The APR spread is estimated using 66,000 census tracts, 2 loan types including 
FHA/VA insured vs. conventional and by 7,750 lending institutions. This resulted in 
approximately 3.5 million cell means, which were then merged back into each tract-
lender-loan type combination. In cases where no other loans of the same type and 
lender were originated in the census tract, the overall tract mean was used in place of 
the missing rate spreads. Through this procedure the APR spread of loans that were 
approved but rejected by the borrower were estimated for all refinance loan 
application records lacking an APR spread in the HMDA dataset. 
The HOEPA status was estimated using an OLS linear probability model using 
6 million approved and originated loan applications with lender fixed effects and tract-
lender-type mean APR spreads based on the following specification: 
HOEPAi = β1 Log incomei + β2 Log loan amounti + β4 County mean incomec + 
β5 Gov’t dummyi + β6 Jumbo loan dummyi + β7 Minority dummyi + β8 
Single dummyi + β9 Log incomei + β10 Income/loani+ β11 Tract 
Denial ratet + β12 Tract Income:MSA Incomet + β13 income:loan 
amti + β14 Tract-Lender Mean APRt,l + β15 Log tract mean loan 
amountt + β16 Mean Tract Incomet + β17 Mean origination ratet + 
[7,749] Lender Fixed Effects + εi  
Appendix Table 2.B.1 summarizes the results of this model. A dummy variable 
for tract-lender-loan-type APRs greater than the HOEPA threshold had the strongest 
effects. 
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Table 2.B.1: HOEPA Status Prediction Probit Model 
DV: HOEPA status    
Variable Beta Sig 
Log Loan Application Amount (0.00072) ** 
Log Income in Application (0.00002) * 
Gov't insured loan Application (0.00608) ** 
Minority Applicant Dummy (0.00022) ** 
Ratio Income to Loan Amount 0.00000 ** 
Loan >$360 conforming limit Dummy 0.00074 ** 
Single Applicant Dummy (0.00024) ** 
Tract-Lender Mean APR Spread 0.00163 ** 
Lender mean % loans with APR >300BPS (0.00429) ** 
Tract log mean loan amount  0.00000 ** 
Tract log mean income (0.00000) ** 
Tract backout rate | APR 300-600 BPS (0.00056) ** 
Tract application denial rate (0.00313) ** 
Tract-Lender-Type Mean APR>8 pts 0.44489 ** 
Tract % Loans Sold to GSE 0.00123 ** 
Ratio Tract Income to MSA income 0.00000 ** 
County Housing vacancy rate 0.00000 * 
Constant 0.00352  
n 6587357  
Adj R-squared = 0.5153  
Lender FE(7749 categories) F=211.167 
* = 5% level; ** 1% level  
 
This produces an estimate of 17,715 HOEPA loan applications, including 
14,903 originated loans and 2,812 loans approved by lenders but rejected by 
applicants. As a check, this estimation procedure correctly identified 84 percent, or 
12,596, of actual HOEPA-originated loans as being estimated for HOEPA status. The 
R-squared of this specification was 0.52, and a joint F-test of coefficients was strongly 
significant. The underestimate of HOEPA loans is not correlated across states; any 
 93 
bias introduced will not vary systematically with the laws being analyzed. Other 
specifications for estimating HOEPA were attempted, but lender fixed effects 
combined with a set of loan and tract characteristics generated the strongest 
predictions relative to actual HOEPA loans.  
Appendix Table 2.B.2 summarizes HOEPA-estimated loans compared to 
actual HOEPA loans for each state. A t-test of the average difference between actual 
and predicted HOEPA applications was not significant.  
Table 2.B.2: HOEPA Status Prediction Versus Actual for Approved Loans 
State 
Predicted 
- Actual % Actual 
State w/ 
law?  State 
Predicted 
- Actual % Actual 
State w/ 
law? 
AL 55 30% 0  NE 30 26% 0 
AK 9 113% 0  NV 24 13% 0 
AZ 51 10% 0  NH 23 35% 0 
AR 34 26% 0  NJ 72 15% 1 
CA 235 17% 1  NM 26 26% 1 
CO 22 25% 1  NY 268 46% 1 
CT 24 11% 1  NC 54 20% 1 
DE 8 10% 0  ND 7 30% 0 
DC 6 600% 1  OH 151 35% 1 
FL 181 15% 1  OK 38 9% 1 
GA 73 15% 1  OR 27 26% 0 
HI 6 300% 0  PA 183 26% 1 
ID 20 34% 0  RI 14 29% 0 
IL 91 38% 1  SC 55 33% 1 
IN 59 21% 1  SD 7 8% 0 
IA 23 13% 0  TN 87 20% 1 
KS 20 13% 0  TX 142 6% 1 
KY 37 13% 1  UT 8 89% 1 
LA 64 17% 0  VT 9 28% 0 
ME 13 21% 0  VA 49 8% 0 
MD 34 9% 1  WA 44 21% 0 
MA 48 33% 1  WV 19 17% 0 
MI 135 27% 1  WI 53 26% 1 
MN 45 39% 1  WY 10 34% 0 
MS 59 56% 0  US 2816 19%  
MO 52 18% 0  States without Law 37% 0 
MT 12 29% 0  States with Law 48% 1 
     
 
t-test 0.37 vs. 0.48 = -0.44 (1-tail)  
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APPENDIX 2.C. PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING MODEL 
A propensity score matching routine can pair loan applications by observable 
characteristics such that lender-approved offers are similar in as many respects as 
possible with the exception of being covered by a state law requiring counseling. A 
quasi-experimental design can be introduced by using a matching estimator to pair 
applications by propensity score across states with and without laws (Morgan & 
Winship, 2007). 
A matching model uses observable characteristics for loan applications 
covered by state laws and loan offers not covered by state laws to pair each 
“treatment” case with a “control” case that is as similar as possible using observed 
data. Comparing applications matched along key characteristics, with the exception of 
being covered by a state law, provides an additional methodology as a check of the 
findings in the previous regression specifications. Propensity score matching estimates 
the “treatment” status of each record (where 1 equals covered by a law and 0 not 
covered) using a probit model. The predicted probabilities of treatment derived from 
this model for all observations in the dataset becomes the propensity score (Morgan & 
Winship, 2007). Using refinance applications reported in HMDA, this approach can be 
used to predict loan applications that are approved and covered by state disclosure or 
counseling laws. The Stata routine psmatch implements propensity score matching 
using common support to estimate average treatment effects on the treated (Sianesi, 
2001). The probit model to estimate the propensity of a loan being covered by 
disclosure or counseling laws is predicted using the following specification: 
Eq. 5: Pr(Coveredi ) = β1 Hoepa_hati+ β2 log incomei + β3 income:loan 
amti + β4 Tract denial ratet + β5 OCC dummyl + β6 OTS dummyl + β7 
Gov’t dummyi + β8 County Housing Vacancyc+ β9 Jumbo loan dummyi 
+ β10 Minority dummyi + β11 Single dummyi + β12 Lender’s state 
subprime %i + β13 Law Indexs + β13 Tract-lender-type mean APRs + 
εi  
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Generally Eq 5 uses the same variables used in previous models. However, to 
better predict coverage under state laws, the predicted estimates from the specification 
used to identify applications as being covered under HOEPA are included (β1) as well 
as tract-lender APR spread means (β13). Designed primarily as a check on previous 
models, the matching specification does not include fixed effects for counties or 
cluster standard errors. Once the propensity scores are estimated, loan applications 
covered by state laws are paired with applications that have similar scores and 
observed application characteristics but are located in a state without disclosure or 
counseling laws. Stata matches each application with replacement—meaning the same 
control might serve more than one treatment case. Because some cases had identical 
propensity scores, the data were randomly sorted before running the matching routine 
to randomize the assignment of cases with identical propensity scores. The model is 
run on all 6 million approved loan applications. Unlike previous models, this approach 
combines all high-cost loan applications predicted to be covered by state laws, 
including state laws applying to HOEPA loans and laws applying to non-HOEPA 
loans. 
The matching estimator suggests that applicants reject approved loan offers at 
a 6.3 percentage point greater rate for applications covered by disclosure laws and 9.4 
percentage points for applications covered by counseling laws. Both are strongly 
significant. Overall, this method provides another indication of the effects of 
disclosure and counseling laws, even though fixed effects for county or border 
groupings are not included in the matching. 
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Table 2.C.1: Estimated Rate of Loan Applicant Rejecting Lender Approved 
Refinance Loan Offer 
ATT Treated Controls Diff SE t 
Loans Covered by Disclosure Laws 0.119 0.102 0.018 0.004 4.75 
Loans Covered by Counseling 
Requirements 0.102 0.068 0.034 0.006 5.75 
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Table 2.C.2: Summary of Laws Regarding First-Lien Refinance Mortgage Applications 
State (FIPS code) APR Trigger Disclosure 
Form 
Signed 
Disclosure 
Counseling 
Required 
Disclosure Form 
Title 
Number Words 
in Disclosure 
Timing prior to 
closing 
Exemptions 
Federal HOEPA 
Law 8% YCLH   
Truth in Lending (for 
Section 32 
Mortgages) 
93 3 days  
Arkansas (5) 
8%   Yes    
Loan >150k; 
FHA/VA, Freddie 
Mac & Fannie 
Mae loans 
California (6) 8% YCLH; FSFR Yes  Consumer Caution 362 3 days Loan >360k 
Colorado (8) 8% YCLH; FSFR Yes  Cautionary Notice 254 3 days  
Connecticut (9) 8% YCLH    Warning Statement 58 3 days  
Florida (12) 8% YCLH   Notice to borrower 289 3 days Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae loans 
Georgia (13) Prime+4%   Yes    Loan >360k 
Illinois (17) 6% YCLH Yes  Notice to borrower 220 3 days  
Indiana (18) 8% YCLH   Notice to borrower 234 3 days Loan >360k 
Kentucky (21) 
8% YCLH   Notice to borrower 222 3 days 
Loan <15k or 
>200k; Freddie 
Mac & Fannie 
Mae loans 
Maryland (24) 7%    Counseling Notice 301 At application Applicant Income >87,000 
Key to Disclosure Language: YCLH = “YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME”; FSFR = “YOU MAY FACE SERIOUS FINANCIAL RISKS” 
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Table 2.C.2 (Continued) 
State (FIPS code) APR Trigger Disclosure 
Form 
Signed 
Disclosure 
Counseling 
Required 
Disclosure Form 
Title 
Number Words 
in Disclosure 
Timing prior to closing Exemptions 
Massachusetts (25) 8%   Yes     
Michigan (26) All APRs YCLH; FSFR   
Borrowers Bill of 
Rights & Caution 217 At application 
All refinance 
loans covered 
Minnesota (27) * 
All APRs    This is Very Important 33 
3 days; Read aloud at 
application  
Prepay 
penalties less 
than 2 
months 
interest or 2% 
of loan 
balance 
New Jersey (34) 8% YCLH Yes Yes Notice to Borrower 240 3 days Loan >360k 
New Mexico (35) 7% YCLH Yes  Notice to Borrower 239 3 days Loan >360k 
New York (36) 8% YCLH; FSFR Yes  
‘Shop Around’ 
Notice 339 10 days Loan >300k 
North Carolina (37) 8%   Yes    Loan >300k 
Ohio (39) 8% YMYH Yes  Warning Statement 59 3 days  
Oklahoma (40) 8% YMYH Yes  ‘Shop Around’ Notice 250 3 days  
Pennsylvania (42) 8% YMYH   Notice to Borrower 217 3 days Loan >100k 
South Carolina (45) 8%   Yes    Loan >360k 
Texas (48) APR of 12% YMYH   Important Notice 336 At application Loan <20k or >192k 
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Table 2.C.2 (Continued) 
State (FIPS code) APR Trigger Disclosure 
Form 
Signed 
Disclosure 
Counseling 
Required 
Disclosure Form 
Title 
Number Words 
in Disclosure 
Timing prior to closing Exemptions 
Utah (49) 8% YMYH; FSFR   Notice to Borrower 160 3 days  
Vermont (50) APR of 9% 
(3% over 
declared 
rate: 6%) 
 Yes, but not a warning  
‘Shop Around’ 
Notice 20 
3 days of application 
 
 
Washington, DC 
(11) 
6% YMYH Yes  Red Flag Warning 1407 3 days 
Applicant 
income 
>107k, loan 
>360k or 
FHA loan 
Wisconsin (55) 8% YMYH; FSFR Yes  
Caution & 
Counseling Notice 307 3 days  
  18 10 w/ warning 6     
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CHAPTER 3: 
EXTRANEOUS AFFECT AND CREDIT CARD OFFERS 
Credit cards are one of the most common forms of credit offered to consumers 
and one in which information is highly standardized through mandated disclosures. 
Three experiments examine the effects of affect inductions (mild positive or anxious 
affect) on the use of credit card disclosure information by college undergraduates. 
Overall, these consumers made use of federally mandated disclosures but also show 
evidence that their affect or mood influences the process. Participants in whom 
positive affect was induced were more likely to notice omitted or missing information 
in the disclosure as well as to seek more items of information than controls. This is 
consistent with positive affect being associated with broader and also more flexible 
thinking. These results suggest that credit disclosure policies should include all 
relevant information if a goal is more complete use of information by consumers 
across various moods. 
1. Introduction 
Consumers make product and service choices on a daily basis. Most of these 
choices are based on some combination of price, product attributes, perceived utility, 
and the consumer’s willingness to pay. In most markets consumers are able to make 
decisions among products with minimal regulation of information by government. For 
a subset of products and services, information is not as transparent, even for well-
informed consumers. Credit cards are one example of a product for which public 
policies mandate a specific set of information to be displayed in a standardized format. 
In light of an increase in consumer defaults in credit markets in the last several years, 
regulators have discussed changes to mandated disclosures for credit cards and other 
forms of consumer borrowing, with the goal of improving consumer decision making. 
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One factor that may alter how a consumer uses mandated product disclosures is the 
consumer’s mood or affect. Affect typically is involved when consumers evaluate 
products (Gorn, Goldberg, & Basu, 1993). For example, when a consumer is offered a 
credit card he or she may also receive a “gift” or a discount on purchases made with 
the card. Gifts are likely to induce positive affect for the consumer (e.g., Isen & 
Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Other consumers may feel stress 
or anxiety about taking on a credit card because of financial problems or increasing 
debts (Drentea, 2000). In either situation the consumer’s affect may result in different 
processing of disclosure information. 
The use of credit cards is widespread among consumers, but the costs of cards 
can vary significantly. Card issuers aggressively seek new accounts and frequently 
target college students with credit offers. Although regulations have recently required 
clearer disclosures of balance payment options for consumers, the emphasis of credit 
card disclosure policies is on the application process. The initial decision to apply for a 
new card is a critical point for consumers and is the time when terms, conditions, and 
pricing are most relevant. It is also a time when credit card issuers intentionally seek 
to induce consumers into positive affect through gifts, discounts, and rewards. 
Applying for a card may also be associated with consumers feeling anxious about their 
financial position and ability to manage credit. This paper examines the roles of 
positive and anxious affect in consumer processing of information about credit card 
offers. The results have implications for policymakers designing disclosures and for 
marketers promoting products with detailed terms and conditions to be considered 
before making a purchase.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Positive Affect and Cognition 
Many studies demonstrate that a person’s mood, even mild transient moods, 
can have a significant impact on how he or she thinks and processes information. Isen 
and Daubman (1984) suggest that positive affect aids cognition because people are 
better able to group information and then broaden or narrow their analysis as needed. 
In part this is related to the fact that positive material is more accessible and 
encompasses a greater proportion of an individual’s memory than neutral or negative 
material (Cramer, 1968). People in positive affect can therefore cue and connect to a 
more diverse set of cognitive material compared to when in a neutral mood (Isen, 
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). More than offering access to more information, 
positive affect also helps people to analyze information by increasing their flexibility 
to connect and relate positive or neutral ideas to one another (Isen, Niedenthal, & 
Cantor, 1992). By aiding the categorization of information, positive affect leads to the 
creation of broader classes of information and therefore improves flexibility in 
thinking (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Kahn & 
Isen, 1993). The neurological basis of the effects of positive affect on thinking and 
decision making is theorized to be related to the release of dopamine in the brain, 
activating brain regions responsible for thinking, attention control, and planning 
(Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). 
Estrada and colleagues provide one keen example of how positive affect is 
associated with more-flexible thinking, as well as seeking and using more information 
in making a decision (Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1997). The authors provided 
experienced physicians with a packet of information, as would be typical for a medical 
case consultation, in order to diagnose a patient. Half of the physicians received a 
small bag of candy in their case consultation package and half did not. Those 
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physicians receiving candy, in whom positive affect was induced, more carefully 
reviewed patient information, more quickly and accurately diagnosed symptoms, and 
expressed more openness to alternative diagnoses. These results suggest that people, 
even experts working in their domain of expertise, will use information differently and 
more effectively when in a positive mood. 
An alternative theory to the idea that affect facilitates cognition is that affect is 
an input to cognition, the so-called mood as information hypothesis. This theory 
suggests that choices are made by using “how do I feel about it?” as a heuristic (Clore, 
1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). According to this theory, affect itself has 
informational value that individuals use to make a decision, supposedly leading to 
superficial thinking. The theory is premised on the idea that positive affect is a signal 
for people that all is well, and this feeling of relative security leads people to engage in 
sloppy processing of information and inattention to details. Support for the mood as 
information theory, however, is weak. One study (Bless, Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, 
Rabe, & Wolk, 1996) found no impairment of cognitive processing for participants in 
whom positive affect was induced when asked to perform two information-intensive 
tasks simultaneously. A similar study found little support for the hypothesis that 
participants in whom positive affect is induced will be more superficial in their 
thinking (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991). 
Supporters of the mood-as-information theory explain these results by suggesting that 
subjects in whom positive affect has been induced use general knowledge structures or 
heuristics, although the nature and form of such heuristics in information processing 
remains unclear. 
Other studies suggest that positive affect results in more abstract cognition 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). This may be true but does not necessarily imply 
inattention to details or sloppy thinking processes. The release of dopamine in the 
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regions of the brain related to thinking, planning, and attention control can enable 
people to both think more broadly and pay more attention to details as needed (for a 
discussion, see Isen, 2001, 2008).  
Another view suggests that the valence of information and the affect of the 
consumer interact such that consumers will process positive information when in a 
positive mood and negative information when in a negative mood. One study of 
product warning labels found that people in whom positive affect was induced were 
less likely to process information presented in a format that could ruin their positive 
mood (Zuckerman & Chaiken, 1998). The authors conclude that labels for subjects in 
positive affect are better worded “for your safety” as opposed to “danger.” Another 
study finds that people in whom positive affect was induced recall more positive traits 
of the product being evaluated than do controls (Yeung & Wyer Jr, 2004). The idea 
that people pay attention only to information that is congruent to their affect is 
tempered by the findings of other studies. For example, Reed and Aspinwall (1998) 
found that participants in a self-affirming (positive) condition attended to negative 
information from a warning about health risks and even demonstrated an enhanced 
ability to process that negative information. 
2.2. Anxious Affect and Cognition 
There are several categories of research related to anxious affect applicable to 
consumers evaluating product information, although in general they are not as well 
developed as the literature studying consumers in positive affect. One set of studies is 
focused on arousal, typically related to heightened motivation to successfully perform 
a task (for example, Easterbrook, 1959). This form of arousal can be viewed as stress 
or a form of anxiety. Generally, mild arousal has been shown to improve performance 
on tasks, while more extreme anxiety impairs performance and reduces people’s 
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ability to use informational cues (for a discussion, see Isen, 2008). One recent study by 
Reich and Zautra (2002) suggests that mild stress or anxiety may enhance 
information-processing capacity, “with the person able to draw fine distinctions and 
able to process many dimensions of judgment simultaneously” (p. 210). Higher levels 
of stress will reduce a person’s ability to process information, resulting in greater use 
of simplified judgments and poorer discrimination of information.  
Another branch of research focuses on anxiety as a form of negative affect. 
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) induce anxiety using empathetic stories and conclude 
that subjects in whom anxiety is induced are biased toward selecting low-risk and low-
reward options. They find that anxiety heightens a focus on risk and primes people to 
attempt to reduce uncertainty. The authors also suggest that anxiety will cue negative 
material in memory, which leads to a narrower range of material, less systematic 
processing, and even interference as people try to work to overcome negative feelings. 
Lerner and Ketlner (2001) examined fear, which could be viewed as related to anxiety 
in some ways, although fear generally is associated with a strong flight response. The 
authors found that fear impedes consumers’ processing and understanding of 
information, increases expected probabilities for negative events, and increases the 
weight consumers place on negative outcomes. Aylesworth and MacKensie (1998) 
found that negative affect in general decreases information processing and that thus 
may be related to people being more cognitively depleted because they have to spend 
more resources on their perceived problems.  
Derryberry (1993) examined stress or anxiety as a form of negative affect, 
finding that although subjects in whom positive affect was induced could notice a 
wider range of primary information while also completing secondary tasks, subjects in 
whom anxiety was induced could not perform as well, demonstrated no improvement 
in concentration, and were more likely to miss peripheral information. Fredrickson and 
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colleagues report consistent findings regarding positive and negative affect and the 
processing of global and local information. Subjects in whom negative affect related to 
anxiety was induced demonstrated less ability to make connections to global 
information (Fredrickson, 1998; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). In one study of 
anxiety as a personality trait, as opposed to a mild transient mood, anxious subjects 
focus on local details if threatened (Derryberry & Reed, 2002).  
These studies do not suggest a particular hypothesis for the effects of a mild 
anxious affect on consumer processing of product disclosure information. While some 
studies suggest that a mild level of anxiety or stress may enhance performance on 
tasks, other evidence shows that anxiety may weaken information processing. These 
studies do not suggest that anxious affect has similar effects on flexible thinking as has 
been shown for positive affect. 
2.3. Relevance of Credit Card Application Process for College Students 
A nationally representative survey of college undergraduates found that credit 
card holding among college students increased from 48 percent to 92 percent of 
undergraduate students from 1998 to 2003, with the average balance outstanding 
doubling to $2,400 over the same period (NellieMae, 2005). This same survey found 
that the majority of college students with credit cards obtain their first card during 
their freshman year and that direct mail solicitation is the primary source for students 
selecting a credit card vendor. Much of the literature analyzing the use of credit cards 
by college students and young adults focuses on restricting access to credit (Manning, 
2000). No articles examining the use of credit card disclosure information by this 
population of consumers were located. The decision to apply for a credit card is highly 
relevant for this population of consumers. In particular, credit cards are likely to be a 
new product for this group of consumers and one with which prior experiences are 
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minimal. In a review of the literature related to consumer experience, Alba and 
Hutchinson (1987) conclude that experience with a product helps consumers to make 
more efficient use of available product data and to better use inferences to elaborate on 
available information. Lacking experience, college students may be a group of 
consumers for whom the design and use of mandated disclosures is particularly 
important. 
3. Procedures and Methods 
Pretest: Forty participants (21 females and 19 males) were recruited from the 
same subject pool of college undergraduates from which the main sample was drawn 
to pretest photos and words intended to induce affect. Each subject viewed 30 photos 
and 30 words of a neutral valence at a computer in a laboratory with individual 
cubicles. After viewing the neutral words and photos, half were randomly assigned to 
view 30 words and 30 photos of either a positive valence or of an anxious valence. 
Words and photos were drawn from those used in prior studies as well as from the 
International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) and the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) (Bradley & Lang, 1999). After viewing 
each word or photo, participants indicated their feelings along 7-point scales, 
including positive affect measures (good-bad, happy-sad, pleasant-unpleasant), 
anxious affect measures (calm-afraid, relaxed-tense, peaceful-nervous), and three 
neutral scales (refreshed-tired, proud-ashamed, curious-bored). All participants in the 
pretest study viewed neutral words or images first, then completed a filler task, and 
then were assigned to view either positive images and words or anxious images and 
words. The filler task was intended to give participants a break from a repetitive task. 
Although neutral prompts were not expected to induce affect, the filler task allowed 
any unintended induction from the neutral photos and words to dissipate before the 
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anxious images and words or positive images and words were evaluated. Images or 
words scoring as positive, anxious, and neutral were selected for use in the following 
studies, after excluding those with high variances. 
3.1. Study 1: Hypothetical Intent to Apply Before and After Receipt of Credit Card 
Disclosures by Consumers in Positive, Neutral, or Anxious Affect 
The first study was designed to test whether disclosures have any effects at all 
on this group of consumers. If consumer judgments about a credit card offer are made 
solely on marketing materials, and mandated disclosures are ignored, intent to apply 
for the card would be similar regardless of the terms and conditions in the disclosure. 
If these consumers do appear to ignore the disclosure in general, there is the potential 
that positive affect could stimulate dually broad and focused thinking such that 
participants in whom positive affect was induced would be more likely to incorporate 
the terms and conditions from the disclosure when evaluating their intent to apply. In 
addition, this study was designed to examine whether affect results in differential 
assessments of the card offer. If participants in whom positive affect is induced view 
all card offers more favorably and subjects in whom anxious affect is induced view all 
cards more negatively, this would support the notion of consumers using their mood as 
information.  
This study used a 3x2 within-subjects design with 93 college undergraduates 
(43 females) in a consumer simulation lab on computers. As in all of the studies 
presented in this chapter, participants received course credit and not cash payments, in 
part to avoid the potential of payments inducing positive affect in the group intended 
to serve as controls. Each participant first viewed 10 words demonstrated from the 
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pretest to be of a positive, anxious, or neutral valence.1 Participants were told they 
were being asked questions about these words as part of a “pre-test for a future 
marketing experiment because today’s study would take less time than the minimum 
required by the lab.” Participants viewed each word on the computer screen and were 
then asked to think about how it made them feel. Below the word was a prompt to type 
the first associate (“type the first word that comes to mind”). Next they were asked to 
rate how that word made them feel along a set of nine 7-point mood scales, as was 
employed in the pretest. 
After the induction, participants viewed a brief marketing letter offering a 
“college student credit card” on the computer screen. The first display was viewed by 
all subjects and contained only nonspecific, general information such as that the card 
was “pre-approved” and offered “free online account management” (see Appendix 
3.A). None of the card’s terms, conditions, or pricing were included. This is consistent 
with the approach card marketers often employ, where an initial ad or letter provides 
only general information. All participants were then asked to answer the question “If 
you were in the market for a credit card today, how likely would you be to apply for 
this card?” using a 7-point scale ranging from “very unlikely” to “very likely.” 
On the next screen, a standard credit card disclosure matrix in a 10-point 
typeface with a high level of detail was displayed (see Appendix 3.A). Half of the 
participants were randomly assigned to a card with good terms and conditions, the 
other half to a card with poor terms and conditions, as summarized in Table 3.1. These 
terms and conditions were determined by comparing offers included in the New York 
State Banking Department Credit Card Survey conducted the month the experiment 
began. After viewing the onscreen disclosure, participants were then asked the same 
                                                 
1 Positive words: smile, blossom, joy, music, holiday, beautiful, cozy, fun, soft, puppy. Anxious: exam, 
interview, panic, risk, crisis, intense, cancer, failure, presentation, perform. Control: verb, door, hand, 
chair, clock, branch, month, street, number, window.  
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question regarding their hypothetical intent to apply after reviewing the detailed 
disclosures, with no opportunity to go back and reexamine the initial advertisement or 
the disclosure matrix. 
Table 3.1: Terms and Conditions of Good and Bad Credit Card Offers Viewed 
 
APR 6 
months 
APR post-
promotional 
period 
APR if 
missed 
payment 
Annual 
fee 
Grace 
period 
Late 
fee 
Account 
setup 
fee 
Poor card 9.0% 18.24% 32.24% $48 15 days $39 $29 
Good card 0.0% 9.24% 16.24% $0 30 days $19 $10 
 
Of the 29 participants in the positive condition, 14 viewed the good card and 
15 viewed the poor card offer. Of the 32 participants in the control condition, 15 
viewed the good card offer and 17 viewed the poor card offer. In the anxiety 
condition, the 32 participants were evenly split, with 16 each viewing the good or bad 
card offer. 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation check involved participants answering the same nine 7-point 
mood rating scales used in the pretest. Each 3-question scale was combined into a 
composite score, reported in Table 3.2. The positive and anxiety mood scales were 
generally reliable; using a Chronbach’s alpha the coefficient was 0.878 for the three 
positive mood scale items, and 0.828 for the three anxious mood scale items. As might 
be expected, the composite neutral mood scale was less reliable ("=0.484).  
A mixed two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mood scale ratings 
with three between (positive, anxiety, and neutral mood scales) and three within 
(positive words, anxious words, and neutral words) conditions revealed a significant 
main effect of scale type (F=41.68, p<.001) but not of affect manipulation condition. 
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A comparison of the mood scale scores reveals that participants in the anxious words 
condition rated their mood as significantly more anxious on the anxiety scale than 
participants in the neutral words condition (M=2.4, M=2.9, t=1.95, p=0.03). There 
were not significant differences between participants in the anxious words condition 
and participants in the neutral words condition in responses on the positive or neutral 
mood scales, however. 
Table 3.2: Manipulation Check Study 1, Mood Scale Ratings (Mean, Variance, 
and Number of Observations) 
 
Positive words 
(n=29) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Control words 
(n=32) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Anxious words 
(n=32) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Positive scale (1=happy) 
2.71 
(1.00) 
2.89 
(1.50) 
3.25 
(1.55) 
Anxiety scale (7=anxious) 
2.66 
(0.98) 
2.37 * 
(1.32) 
2.92 * 
(1.16) 
Neutral scale  
3.34 
(0.87) 
3.67 
(1.41) 
3.98 
(0.79) 
*  t=-1.95; p=0.03 
Results 
All participants began with the same overview of a credit card offer with no 
terms and conditions provided. They answered an initial intent to apply for the card, 
then received disclosures with terms and conditions, and then again indicated their 
intent to apply. Treating intent to apply before and after receiving the disclosure as a 
repeated measure, a mixed two-way ANOVA on the hypothetical intent-to-apply 
ratings with six between- (positive, anxiety, and neutral mood affect manipulations x 
good and poor card offers) and two within-subject (pre and post receipt of disclosure 
periods) conditions revealed no significant main effect of affect manipulation 
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(F=0.56, p=0.572) or of card type (F=3.37, p=0.069). An affect manipulation by type 
of card interaction was also not significant (F=0.45, p=0.638). An interaction of card 
type by the post-disclosure period yields a significant effect on intent to apply ratings 
after viewing a good or poor card (F=5.36, p=.023). These results suggest that the 
quality of the offer had an effect on post-disclosure scores, but affect condition had no 
effects pre- or post-disclosure as a main effect or interaction. 
A planned between-subjects ANOVA on intent to apply in the pre-disclosure 
period showed no significant differences between card types, affect condition, or of an 
affect-condition-by-card-type interaction. This was expected, as no details were yet 
revealed to create any differences. An ANOVA on hypothetical intent to apply after 
being provided with detailed mandated disclosures resulted in a main effect of the 
quality of the card, as would be expected if participants incorporated the disclosure 
information into their post-disclosure intent-to-apply ratings (F=13.48, p<.001). An 
interaction of card quality and affect was not significant. A summary of the mean 
hypothetical intent to apply ratings from Study 1 is provided in Table 3.3. 
Discussion 
One potential outcome was that college students, who may be unfamiliar with 
credit disclosures, would bypass that information and rely instead on the marketing 
information to evaluate the card. The significant differences in post-disclosure intent 
to apply between good and poor card offers suggest that participants did read the 
disclosure information and incorporated this information into their evaluation of the 
credit card offer.  
There is no evidence that participants in whom anxiety was induced did not use 
the disclosure information, as might be predicted based on past studies showing that 
anxiety leads to narrow or expedited thinking. There is also no evidence that 
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participants in whom anxiety was induced were more negative regarding the card offer 
either pre- or post-disclosure. This study provides evidence that consumers do use the 
information contained in disclosures, as shown in Figure 3.1, but is inconclusive 
regarding the role of affect for consumer processing of disclosure information. 
Table 3.3: Study 1 Intent to Apply for Card (1=very unlikely; 7=very likely) for 
Credit Card Pre- and Post-Disclosure (Means, Variances, and Number of 
Observations)  
Poor card offer Good card offer Mean 
(Var) 
n Pre Post Pre Post 
Positive 4.00 3.43 3.67 4.13 
 (2.46) (1.80) (2.52) (1.84) 
 14 14 15 15 
Control 3.94 3.24 3.53 4.27 
 (1.68) (1.69) (3.27) (0.92) 
 17 17 15 15 
Anxiety 3.19 3.25 3.63 4.13 
 (3.50) (1.53) (2.78) (0.52) 
 16 16 16 16 
All conditions 3.70 3.30 3.61 4.17 
 (2.56) (1.60) (2.73) (1.04) 
  47 47 46 46 
 
3.2. Study 2: Positive, Neutral, and Anxious Affect and Intent to Apply for a Single 
“Average” Card with Controls for Past Credit Card Experiences 
The second study employed a 3x1 between-subjects design using word 
inductions with positive, anxiety, and control conditions with 65 undergraduates (25 
female) participating for course credit. The induction procedure was identical to that 
of Study 1, with the exception that several words were replaced with other words from 
the original pretest.2 Participants answered the same set of nine 7-point mood scales 
                                                 
2 Positive: smile, blossom, joy, happy, gentle, sweet, pretty, bright, lovely. Anxious: cancer, exam, 
interview, panic, risky, evaluation, deadline, failure, perform. Control: building, paper, front, month, 
door, station, floor, sign, page (words not used in Study 1 in italics). 
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used in Study 1. Of the 65 participants, 22 viewed words of a positive valence, 20 
viewed neutral words as a control, and 23 viewed words of an anxious valence. 
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Figure 3.1: Intent to Apply Ratings Pre and Post Disclosure by Quality of Offer 
At the start of the main task, all participants received the same two-page credit 
card offer, which was a photocopy of an actual credit card offer received by the author 
(see Appendix 3.A). The first page was a cover letter with information about the card, 
highlighting 10,000 bonus points that could be used to order a $100 gift card that 
could be used at a leading retail chain. The offer letter also included benefits such as 
the ability to earn airline miles and a limited-time 0% interest rate on balance 
transfers. The second page included a standard credit card disclosure with more details 
on the offer. Participants rated their hypothetical intent to apply after first receiving 
the information about the card, although they had as much time to review the materials 
as they wanted before answering. After indicating intent to apply for the card and 
confidence in that intent-to-apply rating, participants then listed positive and negative 
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features of the card. After listing positive and negative attributes, participants were 
again asked to rate their intent to apply and their confidence in that rating. The number 
of positive and negative items listed was counted for each participant. Although 
participants could choose to list no items, all participants listed at least one item. No 
time limits were imposed, and participants could refer to the printed information 
throughout the study. At the end of the study, participants were asked to indicate the 
number of cards they owned as a measure of past experiences in the credit card 
market. 
Manipulation Check 
The manipulation check involved participants answering the same nine 7-point 
mood rating scales used in the pretest and Study 1. Each 3-question scale was 
combined into a composite score, reported in Table 3.4. The positive and anxiety 
scales were generally reliable; using a Chronbach’s alpha the coefficient was 0.95 for 
the three positive mood items, and 0.94 for the three anxious mood items. As in Study 
1, the neutral scale was less reliable ("=0.51). A mixed two-way ANOVA on the 
mood scale ratings with three between (positive, anxiety, and neutral mood scales) and 
three within (positive words, anxious words, and neutral words) conditions revealed a 
significant main effect of scale type (F=45.48, p<.001), but an affect manipulation 
condition by scale type interaction was not significant at standard levels (F=2.18, 
p=.075). 
Results 
Participants received the card offer on paper at the start of the experiment with 
all information provided and available to answer all questions, much like what 
consumers would actually experience when receiving a card offer in the mail. After an 
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initial evaluation, having participants list positive and negative items of information 
from the offer serves to focus attention on the offer’s terms and conditions.  
Table 3.4: Manipulation Check Study 1, Mood Scale Ratings (Mean, Variance, 
and Number of Observations) 
 
Positive words 
(n=22) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Control words 
(n=20) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Anxious words 
(n=23) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Positive scale (1=happy) 5.16 * 
(0.44) 
4.70 * 
(0.95) 
4.60 
(2.04) 
Anxiety scale (7=anxious) 4.62 
(2.88) 
4.45^ 
(0.89) 
4.98^ 
(0.83) 
Neutral scale  3.56 
(0.16) 
3.56 
(0.12) 
3.64 
(0.05) 
* t=1.8, p=0.04; ^ t=1.9, p=0.04 
Table 3.5 provides a summary of intent to apply, confidence in intent to apply, 
the number of items participants wrote as being liked and disliked about the card, a 
relative rating of this card offer compared to other offers, and the number of credit 
cards participants report owning at the time of the experiment. An two-way mixed 
ANOVA on intent-to-apply rating before and after the focusing activity as a repeated 
measure reveals a significant main effect of the focusing activity (F=4.1, p=.05), but 
an interaction between period and affect condition was not significant (F=2.36, 
p=.10).  
Participants in whom positive affect was induced provided a higher 
hypothetical intent to apply at the initial stage (M=2.6) than controls (M=2.0, t=1.94, 
p=.03). A comparison of intent to apply for the card after the focusing activity 
between subjects in whom positive affect was induced and controls was not 
significant, however. Subjects in whom anxiety was induced exhibited greater intent to 
apply after the focusing activity than before the focus activity (M=2.0, M=2.5, t=2.2, 
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p=.02). Subjects in the neutral condition exhibited a tendency for greater intent-to-
apply ratings after the focusing activity, but not at significant levels (M=2.0, M=2.45, 
t=1.6, p=.07). Subjects in the positive condition did not exhibit significant changes in 
intent to apply before and after the focusing activity (M=2.6, M=2.5, t=.78, p=.77). 
An ANOVA on intent to apply revealed no significant effects involving the number of 
credit cards the participant owned, a measure of his or her experience level in this 
market. Similar ANOVAs on confidence in intent to apply, number of like or disliked 
items listed, and ratings of this card compared to others all yielded no significant 
effects of affect condition or number of cards owned as main effects or interactions. 
Discussion 
The use of a credit card offer letter and attached disclosure provided on paper 
at the outset and retained throughout the experiment is a more realistic consumer 
credit card offer experience than was provided in Study 1. Each participant answered 
an intent to apply for the card based on his or her initial use of the information, and 
then updated his or her opinion after reviewing the information in the offer and listing 
positive and negative attributes of the card offer. The process of listing information 
serves as a focusing activity guiding the participant to review the materials. The card 
itself was an average offer, designed not to provoke strong positive or negative 
reactions (unlike the more extreme offers in Study 1). 
Participants in whom positive affect was induced rated the card more favorably 
from the outset. However, since controls and participants in whom anxiety was 
induced rated the card at similarly high levels at the end of the study, positive affect 
may be viewed as facilitating a more accurate initial review, whereas other conditions 
required focusing efforts to recalibrate their evaluation, as shown in Figure 3.2. It 
cannot be concluded that anxiety is related to focusing on negative aspects, since 
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participants in whom anxious affect was induced did not list fewer items as being 
liked or more items as disliked compared to controls. Likewise, participants in whom 
positive affect was induced did not list fewer negative or more positive items than 
controls. 
Table 3.5: Study 2 Intent to Apply, Confidence in Intent, Number of Items 
Listed, Relative Rating of Card, and Number of Credit Cards Owned (Means, 
Variances, and Number of Observations) 
 
Positive words 
(n=22) 
Control words 
(n=20) 
Anxious words 
(n=23) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Mean 
(Var) 
Mean 
(Var) 
Hypothetical Intent to 
Apply 1 (0-6 scale) 
2.64 
(0.91) 
2.00 
(1.37) 
2.04| 
(1.13) 
Hypothetical Intent to 
Apply 2 (0-6 scale) 
2.50 
(0.45) 
2.45 
(0.37) 
2.52 
(0.26) 
Confidence in Intent 
Rating 1 (0-6 scale) 
1.95 
(0.71) 
2.00 
(0.84) 
2.09 
(0.81) 
Confidence in Intent 
Rating 2 (0-6 scale) 
1.77 
(0.28) 
2.00 
(0.63) 
2.13 
(0.66) 
Number of items 
participant listed as liked 
about the card 
2.64 
(2.24) 
3.35 
(3.82) 
3.48 
(8.44) 
Number of items 
participant listed as 
disliked about the card 
1.91 
(1.80) 
2.50 
(1.42) 
2.91 
(7.90) 
Rating of this card offer 
compared other card 
offers (0-6 scale) 
2.23 
(0.28) 
2.21 
(0.18) 
2.26 
(0.29) 
Number of credit cards 
participant reports owning 
2.00 
(0.38) 
2.35 
(0.98) 
2.04 
(0.95) 
 
Based on prior literature, it might be predicted that participants with more 
experience with credit cards would have greater confidence in intent to apply, would 
list more items as liked or disliked, and would be less likely to change intent-to-apply 
ratings after the focusing activity. In this study, number of credit cards owned was not 
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significant as a main effect or as an interaction with affect in terms of intent to apply, 
confidence in intent to apply, relative rating of the card, or number of liked and 
disliked items listed about the card.3 
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Figure 3.2: Rating of Intent to Apply Pre and Post Activity Focusing on 
Disclosure Information by Affect Condition 
3.3. Study 3: Requests for Information, Detection of Missing Information, and 
Hypothetical Intent to Apply 
The third study was designed to more precisely evaluate how consumers use 
information and whether they detect missing information in a credit card offer. Like 
Study 2 participants, all received an identical two-page offer consisting of an offer 
letter and standard disclosure matrix as might be received in the mail (see Appendix 
3.A). Unlike the procedure in Study 2, however, all subjects received a disclosure that 
                                                 
3 A Sobel test of mediation also revealed no significant results. 
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omitted all information on annual fees. After receiving the offer letter and disclosure, 
study participants were first asked what more information they would want, if any, 
about this offer. They could list as many items as they wished, or none at all. Then 
participants rated their hypothetical intent to apply and confidence in that intent to 
apply, as in Study 2. Unlike Study 2, participants then answered 13 factual multiple-
choice questions about the card. As in Study 2, participants then listed positive and 
negative attributes of the card and were given a second opportunity to rate their 
hypothetical intent to apply as well as their confidence in that rating. Each participant 
reported the number of credit cards he or she owned, as well as providing a self-
reported assessment of how easy or hard it would be to obtain a card, and how many 
times he or she has applied for a card before. 
Eighty-eight participants (41 females) were assigned to one of five conditions: 
positive affect induced with images (n=18), positive affect induced with a bag of 
candy (n=17), anxious affect induced with images (n=19), a control condition with 
neutral images (n=16), and a no-manipulation condition (n=17). Participants assigned 
to conditions using images viewed a slide show of 15 photos selected from the pretest 
as being of positive, anxious, or neutral valence. Each slide was shown for 6 seconds, 
and the slides advanced automatically. Participants were told to view the entire 90-
second slide show and then to “think about the images you just viewed and indicate 
how these images made you feel, on the scales below.” Participants then completed 
the same set of nine 7-point mood scales as in Study 2. As part of the study check-in 
and consent process, participants in the candy-induction condition were given a clear 
plastic bag tied with a red ribbon containing 10 wrapped hard candies. These 
participants received a note explaining that this was a “token of appreciation for 
participating today for you to take home and enjoy later.” These participants and 
participants in the no-manipulation condition began the study directly without viewing 
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any images. After completing the main portion of the study, all participants were 
asked to solve a word jumble (RGNDEA), which could be solved for several different 
words (garden, ranged, danger). The valence of the word each participant entered was 
taken as an implicit measure of mood (for a discussion of the use of implicit measures 
in affect research, see: Estrada, Isen, & Young, 1994; Isen & Erez, 2007).  
Manipulation Check 
Of the five condition groups, three completed the same set of 7-point mood 
scales used in the previous studies after viewing the assigned set of images, which 
were described as being part of a pretest for another experiment. The no-manipulation 
condition and candy condition groups did not view the images; therefore, there was no 
plausible reason to have participants complete the mood scales, which might increase 
suspicions about the study. All condition groups did receive the word-jumble anagram, 
however. The jumble is then the primary manipulation check used to confirm the 
induction and to explore whether the two positive affect conditions (images and 
candy) could be combined into one group, and whether the two neutral affect 
conditions (no manipulation and neutral images) could be combined into one group. 
Table 3.6 displays the scale responses for the three image inductions. The 
scales again proved reliable using Cronbach’s alpha for the positive scale ("=.94) and 
the anxiety scale ("=.96). As in previous studies, the neutral scale had a lower 
coefficient ("=.51).  
A mixed two-way ANOVA with 3 between (positive, anxious, and neutral 
images) and 3 within (positive, anxiety, and neutral mood scales) revealed a 
significant main effect of affect (F=30.0, p<.001) and type of scale (F=5.0, p=.009), 
as well as a significant affect condition by scale type interaction (F=43.0, p<.001). 
Planned comparisons of the positive image condition with the neutral image condition 
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demonstrate that the positive image condition was significantly more positive on the 
positive scale (M=4.9, M=3.9, t=3.0, p=.003) but that differences on the neutral and 
anxiety scales were not significant. Likewise, comparisons of the anxious image 
condition with the neutral image condition demonstrate that the anxious image 
condition was significantly more anxious on the anxiety scale (M=5.0, M=2.6, t=8.0, 
p<.001) but that differences on the positive and neutral scales were not significant. 
Table 3.6: Manipulation Check Study 3, Mood Scale Ratings (Mean, Variance, 
and Number of Observations) 
 
 
Positive images 
(n=18) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Neutral images 
(n=16) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Anxious images 
(n=19) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Positive scale (1=happy) 4.85* 
(0.81) 
3.88* 
(1.02) 
1.90 
(0.72) 
Anxiety scale 
(7=anxious) 
2.06 
(0.96) 
2.58^ 
(0.73) 
4.97^ 
(0.81) 
Neutral scale  4.36 
(0.97) 
3.53 
(1.35) 
3.29 
(1.15) 
* t=3.0, p=0.003; ^ t=8.0, p=0.000 
As a check of the word jumble as an implicit mood measure, responses to the 
mood scale for the three image conditions can be compared to the solutions for the 
jumble, as displayed in Table 3.7. Solutions to the word jumble were coded as “no 
solution,” “garden,” “danger,” and “ranged.” We conceptualized the solution of 
“garden” as being reflective of positive affect, “danger” related to anxiety, and 
“ranged” as neutral. A mixed two-way ANOVA on the mood scales as repeated 
measures with 4 between (garden, danger, ranged, no solution) and 3 within (positive, 
anxious, or neutral mood scales) revealed a strongly significant scale type by jumble-
solution interaction (F=4.43, p<.001), suggesting that the jumble solutions are 
consistent with mood scale responses.  
128
Table 3.7: Verification of Implicit Measure of Affect Induction, Mood Rating 
Scales (Mean, Variance, and Number of Observations) 
 
No solution 
(n=20) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
“Garden” 
(n=16) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
“Danger” 
(n=9) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
“Ranged” 
(n=8) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Positive scale 
(1=happy) 
3.77 
(1.65) 
4.23 
(2.40) 
1.82 
(1.06) 
3.25 
(2.06) 
Anxiety scale 
(7=anxious) 
2.80 
(1.50) 
2.71 
(2.10) 
5.15 
(1.36) 
3.38 
(2.62) 
Neutral scale  3.60 
(1.02) 
4.25 
(1.40) 
2.83 
(0.69) 
4.00 
(1.50) 
 
Table 3.8 presents a count of participants’ coded responses to the word jumble 
task. An overall chi-squared of the four jumble solutions (3 correct solutions as well as 
no correct solution) by affect condition was significant (χ2=26.9, p=.008). A 
comparison between the neutral images and no-manipulation conditions was not 
significant (χ2=.02, p=.87) for participants solving the jumble for “garden.” Likewise, 
there was no significant difference in the solution for “danger” (χ2=.25, p=.62), nor 
for “ranged” (χ2=1.65, p=.2). Chi-squared comparisons between these two conditions 
and participants being unable to solve the jumble were not significant (χ2=1.8, p=.18). 
Similarly, chi-squared comparisons of the candy and positive image conditions were 
not statistically significant for the solution of “garden” (χ2=1.5, p=.2), “danger” 
(χ2=1.1, p=.3), or “ranged” (χ2=.95, p=.3). Chi-squared tests reveal no significant 
differences between the positive-image and the candy-manipulation conditions for 
participants being unable to solve the jumble (χ2=.02, p=.89). The lack of significant 
differences between the neutral-image and no-manipulation conditions suggests these 
participants can be combined into one control group. Likewise, the lack of significant 
differences between the positive image and candy conditions suggests these two 
conditions can be combined into one positive affect group. This results in three 
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comparison groups for this study: positive (n=35), anxious (n=19), and controls 
(n=34). 
Table 3.8: Count of Solutions to Word Jumble “RGNDEA” by Condition 
 No solution Garden Danger Ranged n 
Positive images 7 9 0 2 18 
Neutral images 9 3 1 3 16 
Anxious images 4 4 8 3 19 
No-manipulation 6 3 2 7 18 
Positive candy 7 5 1 4 17 
 
Table 3.9 presents the word jumble as a manipulation check for the three 
combined groups. An overall chi-squared between affect condition and jumble 
solution is significant (χ2=21.8, p<.001). A comparison for the solution of “garden” 
between participants in whom positive affect was induced and controls is also 
significant (χ2=4.2, p=.04) but not significant for other solutions, including no 
solution. In the same way, a comparison for the solution of “danger” between 
participants in whom anxiety was induced and controls was also significant (χ2=2.8, 
p=.004) but not significant for other solutions, including no solution. 
Table 3.9: Combined Conditions, Count of Solutions to Word Jumble: 
“RGNDEA” 
 No solution Garden Danger Ranged n 
Positive 14 14 1 6 35 
Controls 15 6 3 10 34 
Anxiety 4 4 8 3 19 
Total 33 24 12 19 88 
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Results 
Table 3.10 presents the dependent variables for Study 3. After being handed 
the offer for a credit card, participants were asked to list any additional information 
they would like to have and were instructed to type “none” if they would not like to 
see any more information.  
Table 3.10: Study 3, Listing of Additional Items Wanted, Intent to Apply, 
Confidence in Intent, Correct Answers about Card, and Listing of Positive and 
Negative Attributes (Means, Variances, and Number of Observations) 
 
 
Positive (n=35) 
 
Mean/Count 
(Var) 
Control (n=34) 
 
Mean/Count 
(Var) 
Anxiety (n=19) 
 
Mean/Count 
(Var) 
Number of subjects wanting 
no more information (count) 
10 18 9 
Number of items of 
information wanted 
(including 0) 
1.57 
(2.84) 
0.74 
(1.05) 
1.00 
(1.78 
Number of of subjects 
listing “annual fee” 
information as wanted 
(count) 
10 3 4 
Intent 1 (0-6 scale) 2.91 
(1.20) 
3.09 
(1.23) 
2.37 
(1.02) 
Intent 2 (0-6 scale) 2.69 
(0.81) 
2.62 
(0.79) 
2.16 
(0.81) 
Confidence Intent 1 (0-6 
scale) 
2.97 
(0.56) 
3.06 
(0.54) 
3.16 
(0.59) 
Confidence Intent 2 (0-6 
scale) 
3.09 
(0.49) 
3.21 
(0.53) 
3.16 
(0.36) 
Number of correct answers 
on factual questions (0-13) 
9.57 
(2.55) 
8.97 
(3.61) 
9.79 
(4.18) 
Number of items liked 3.11 
(3.28) 
3.09 
(1.84) 
2.47 
(3.82) 
Number of items disliked 2.80 
(1.81) 
2.59 
(1.89) 
2.84 
(1.92) 
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An ANOVA on the number of items listed reveals a significant main effect of 
affect condition (F=3.2, p=.04). A comparison of the number of items listed between 
participants in whom positive affect was induced and controls reveals that positive-
affect participants listed more items than controls did (M=1.60, M=0.74, t=2.5, 
p=.008, 1-tailed). The number of items listed by participants in whom anxious affect 
was induced was not significant in comparison to controls. Chi-squared comparisons 
of participants writing down that no additional items of information were wanted was 
not significant by affect condition. A comparison of participants in whom positive 
affect was induced reveals they were less likely to type “none” than controls were 
(χ2=4.3, p=.04). An overall chi-squared on affect condition by a coded variable for 
participants typing “annual fees” as wanted information was not significant, but a 
planned comparison between participants in whom positive affect was induced and 
controls shows the former were more likely to list annual fees as desired information 
(χ2=4.4, p=.04). 
A mixed two-way ANOVA on intent to apply before and after the focusing 
activity as a repeated measure did not yield a significant effect of affect condition at 
standard significance levels (F=2.7, p=.07) but did reveal a significant main effect of 
period (F=16.8, p<.001). An interaction of period and the affect condition was not 
significant (F=1.45, p=.24).  
Comparisons between intent to apply before and after the focusing activity 
were not significant for participants in whom anxious affect was induced nor for 
participants in whom positive affect was induced. A comparison of intent to apply 
before (M=3.1) and after (M=2.6) the focusing activity reveals that controls did 
exhibit lower intent-to-apply ratings after answering factual questions and listing 
positive and negative attributes (t=1.9, p=.03, 1-tailed). Comparisons of participants 
in whom anxious affect was induced and controls yield a significantly lower intent to 
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apply at both the initial review (M=2.4, M=3.1, t=2.3, p=.01, 1-tailed) and after the 
focusing activity (M=2.2, M=2.6, t=1.8, p=.04, 1-tailed).  
An ANOVA on confidence in intent to apply as a repeated measure before and 
after the focusing activity did not yield a significant effect by affect condition. 
Interactions between affect condition and period were also not significant. As in Study 
2, there were no significant differences in participants listing negative or positive 
attributes by affect condition. 
An ANOVA on the number of multiple-choice questions the participant 
answered correctly (out of 13) was not significant by affect condition. A comparison 
of means in Table 3.10 shows that participants in whom positive affect was induced 
and participants in whom anxious affect was induced showed a tendency to answer 
more of the 13 factual questions about the card correctly than controls, although these 
results did not achieve the customarily accepted 5% significance level for a 1-tailed 
test (both t=1.4, p=.08, 1-tailed).  
Table 3.11 summarizes past experiences with credit card offers, including the 
number of cards the participant reported owning, the number of times he or she 
previously applied for a credit card, and his or her perceived difficulty in obtaining a 
credit card. ANOVAs on the variables in Table 3.11 are not significant as dependent 
variables by affect, as expected in a randomized setting. An ANOVA on the number 
of correct answers to the 13 multiple-choice questions participants answered about the 
card yields a main effect of number of cards owned (F=2.37, p=.04) but not the other 
measures of experience. An ANOVA on number of correct answers reveals a main 
effect of number of cards (F=2.79, p=.02) and significant interaction between number 
of cards and affect condition (F=2.21, p=.04), but no main effect of affect (F=.33, 
p=.72). A Sobel test of mediation on number of cards and affect was not significant.  
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Table 3.11: Past Experience with Credit Cards, Number of Cards Owned, Self-
reported Difficulty in Obtaining a Card, Number of Previous Applications, and 
Self-reported Likelihood of Being Approved for a Credit Card (Means, 
Variances, and Number of Observations) 
 
Positive (n=35) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Control (n=34) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Anxiety (n=19) 
 
Mean 
(Var) 
Number of cards owned 1.14 
(0.83) 
1.53 
(1.35) 
2.00 
(4.44) 
Number of times applied for 
credit card before 
1.97 
(0.91) 
2.47 
(1.65) 
2.58 
(2.04) 
How likely to be approved 
(0-6 scale) 
3.61 
(0.43) 
3.33 
(0.98) 
3.78 
(0.30) 
Discussion 
Consistent with past studies showing that positive affect contributes to broad 
yet flexible thinking, participants in whom positive affect was induced were more 
likely to list more information as being needed than were controls (Isen, Daubman, & 
Nowicki, 1987). Participants in whom positive affect was induced were also more 
likely than controls to write down that information on annual fees was desired, 
information that was omitted from the disclosure form. Participants in whom anxious 
affect was induced also did not list more items than controls did, and were not 
significantly more likely to list annual fee as desired information. This suggests that 
anxiety is not related to broader thinking, a finding reported previously in the 
literature. 
As in Study 2, participants in whom positive affect was induced tended to 
maintain a consistent intent to apply before and after a focusing activity, while the 
mean intent to apply for the control group was significantly different after the focusing 
activity. This again may show participants in whom positive affect was induced more 
fully using the information at the outset. Figure 3.3 shows that participants in whom 
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anxiety was induced rated their intent to apply lower both before and after the 
focusing activity and did not demonstrate a significant change in intent to apply, 
unlike Study 2. This may be evidence that these participants could sense information 
was missing and were more conservative when assessing intent to apply in general, 
even though they failed to specifically list annual fee information as an additional 
piece of information they would like to have at statistically significant levels. About 
21 percent of participants in whom anxiety was induced wrote down that information 
about annual fee was desired, compared to 9 percent of controls (and 29 percent of the 
positive affect group).   
While participants in whom positive or anxious affect was induced did not 
change intent to apply for the card after the focusing activity, controls did express 
lower intent to apply after the focusing activity, as shown in Figure 3.3. This could 
suggest a need for recalibration from the initial assessment after being guided through 
the disclosure information. 
Overall, these findings suggest that affect does play a role in how consumers 
use mandated disclosure information for credit card offers. Positive affect is most 
strongly distinguished by the demand for more items of information as well as the 
ability to detect missing information, as compared to a neutral affect. 
It is notable that the manipulation check shows that participants viewing the 
neutral images are not significantly different from the no-manipulation group. There is 
therefore no evidence of the images having a particular effect or causing arousal. 
Similarly, participants receiving candy and participants viewing positive images were 
not significantly different from each other. There is no evidence that handing 
participants a bag of candy created an experimenter effect compared to having 
participants view positive images. The converging operations of these affect 
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inductions build on previous studies to support robust mechanisms of inducing affect 
in a lab setting. 
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Figure 3.3: Intent to Apply Rating Pre and Post Activity Focusing on Disclosure 
Information by Affect Condition 
4. Implications 
Economic models typically predict that households will search for and process 
information up to the point at which the marginal benefits of more information equal 
the marginal benefit of that information for making a decision. While disclosures can 
standardize and expand available information, there is a trend in the design of 
disclosures to simplify and limit the information provided. This study suggests that 
consumers who are not in a positive mood are less likely to seek additional 
information outside of the disclosure and are less likely to make connections to 
existing knowledge. While simplified formats and user-friendly disclosure designs 
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should not harm consumers, even simplified formats must include all important 
information and not expect consumers to search for additional information outside the 
disclosure form. Meanwhile, the efforts of credit card issuers to induce positive affect 
through gifts and rewards may result in consumers more carefully using disclosure 
information—although this is not less likely to result in a decreased intent to apply 
based on these studies. 
More generally, these studies help better define the role of affect and the use of 
information by consumers. Contrary to the mood-as-information hypothesis (e.g., 
Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2003), which holds that positive affect leads to 
careless thinking and only application of routine existing knowledge structures, this 
study shows that participants in whom positive affect was induced demonstrate careful 
and flexible (both broad and focused) thinking. In recent writings (e.g., Schwarz, 
2002) the proponents of the mood-as-information view have proposed an exception to 
the case of material that is “fun” or playful. However, this study shows careful 
thinking among participants in whom positive affect was induced, even with material 
that is likely be dry and technical for a typical college student. Positive affect appears 
to facilitate sufficient attention to the information provided to prompt participants to 
notice when needed information has been omitted, one of the most difficult of all 
logical problems. There is no evidence that participants in whom positive affect was 
induced viewed the credit card offer information through rose-colored glasses; nor did 
they focus only on items congruent with their mood. Participants in whom positive 
affect was induced also do not appear to take their positive mood as a signal to “coast” 
through the materials without paying attention, as some authors have discussed (see 
Carver, 2003). Instead, these participants listed more items about the card than 
controls, and showed a tendency to answer more factual questions accurately.  
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This study also provides little support to mild anxiety as a performance 
enhancement. Like subjects in whom positive affect was induced, subjects in the 
anxiety condition in this experiment showed a tendency to answer more factual 
questions accurately. But participants in whom anxiety was induced did not notice 
missing information at the rate of those in positive affect, nor did they seek more items 
of information than controls. It is unclear whether the lower ratings of intent to apply 
among participants in whom an anxious affect was induced were attributable to their 
mood or to their sense that information was missing. Although they did not list annual 
fees as missing, they appear to have reviewed the card information at least as well as 
did the controls. There is no evidence that participants in whom anxious affect was 
induced focused more on negative attributes of the card. It may be that anxiety serves 
to stimulate focusing of attention, somewhat like positive affect. But whereas positive 
affect is associated with dually broad and flexible thinking, anxious affect does not 
facilitate connections to material beyond that which is provided. 
Study 3 had a larger number of subjects in the control and positive conditions 
than in the anxiety condition since the latter only used one affect-manipulation 
method. It is possible that had the anxious affect group been larger, participants in 
whom anxious affect had been induced might have demonstrated superior 
performance on the factual questions about the card than controls. A future study 
could attempt to replicate these results with a larger sample. 
A future study could also explore differences in how participants actually 
search for additional information by affect condition rather than list items they may 
desire. Positive affect may result in consumers using more information about a product 
even if searching for information takes some effort. 
These findings reinforce affect as a factor that is relevant to the consumer’s use 
of information and provides insights into how consumers evaluate financial products, 
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using credit cards as an example for a population of likely new entrants to the credit 
card market. 
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APPENDIX 3.A. CREDIT CARD INFORMATION 
Experiment 1: Initial Credit Card Information Provided 
A student card for campus and beyond!  
• As an enrolled student you are pre-approved 
• Low introductory interest rates. 
• Acceptance at millions of locations 
• No minimum income or cosigner required 
• Receive big discounts at some of your favorite stores for students only when you use 
this card 
• Free credit education tips and tools from UseCreditWisely.com 
• Protect your account with identity theft solutions, Photocard option, and the Lost 
Wallet Service 
• Free Online Account Management 
• Personal information protected by VISA Privacy Policy 
• $0 liability on unauthorized charges 
 
Experiment 1: Disclosures   Please read these Terms and Conditions.  
 
DISCLOSURES  
Annual percentage rate 
(APR) for purchases  0.00% for 6 months from date of account opening. After that, 18.24% variable.  
Other APRs  Balance Transfer APR: 0.00% for 6 months from date of account opening. After that, 18.24% variable. 
Cash advance APR: 0.00% for 6 months from account opening. After that, 23.24% variable. 
Default APR: 32.24% variable. See explanation below.*  
Variable rate 
information  
Your APRs may vary each billing period. 
The Platinum Select® Visa® Card purchase and balance transfer rate equals the U.S. Prime Rate** 
plus 9.99%. 
The cash advance rate equals the U.S. Prime Rate plus 14.99%, with a minimum cash advance rate of 
19.99%. The default rate equals the U.S. Prime Rate plus up to 23.99%, or up to 28.99%, whichever is 
greater.*** 
Grace period for 
repayment of balances 
for purchases  
Not less than 20 days if you pay your total new balance in full each billing period by the due date.  
Method of computing 
the balance for 
purchases  
Average daily balance (including new purchases).  
Annual fees  None.  
Minimum finance 
charge  
$0.50  
Transaction Fee for 
purchases made in a 
Foreign Currency  
3% of the amount of each foreign currency purchase after its conversion into U.S. dollars.  
Transaction fee for 
cash advances:  
3% of the amount of each cash advance, $5 minimum.  
Transaction fee for 
balance transfers:  
3% of the amount of each balance transfer, $5 minimum, $75 maximum. However, there is no fee with 
the 0.00% APR balance transfer offer described above. 
Late fee:  $15 . 
Over the credit-line fee: $39.   
* All your APRs may automatically increase up to the Default APR if you default under any card member agreement that you have 
with us because you fail to make a payment to us when due, you exceed your credit line, or you make a payment to us that is not 
honored.  
** For each billing period we use the U.S. Prime Rate published in The Wall Street Journal two business days prior to the 
Statement/Closing Date for that billing period.  
*** Factors considered in determining your default rate may include how long your account has been open, the timing or seriousness 
of a default, or other indications of account performance.  
  We apply your payments to low APR balances before higher APR balances. That means your savings will be reduced if you make transactions that are subject to higher APRs.  
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Rates, fees, and terms may change: We have the right to change the rates, fees, and terms at any time, for any reason, in 
accordance with the card member agreement and applicable law. These reasons may be based on information in your credit 
report, such as your failure to make payments to another creditor when due, amounts owed to other creditors, the number of credit 
accounts outstanding, or the number of credit inquiries. These reasons may also include competitive or market-related factors. If 
we make a change for any of these reasons, you will receive advance notice and a right to opt out in accordance with applicable 
law. 
   
 
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF OFFER 
• This offer is only valid for new accounts. You must be at least 18 years of age and a currently enrolled college student.  
• Please allow one week from date of submission to process a completed application. 
• We may gather information about you, including from your employer, your bank, credit bureaus, and others, to verify your identity 
and determine your eligibility for credit, renewal of credit, and future extensions of credit. If you ask us, we will tell you whether or 
not we requested a credit bureau report and the names and addresses of any credit bureaus that provided us with such reports. 
• To receive a Platinum Select® Visa® Card, you must meet our credit qualification criteria. Your credit limit will be determined by a 
review of your credit report. You will be informed of the amount of your credit line when you receive your card. Some credit lines 
may be as low as $500. Please note that cash advances may be limited to a portion of your credit line. 
• If you are approved for credit, you will receive a card member agreement (“Card Agreement”) with your card. Read it carefully for 
important information regarding your account. The Card Agreement will be binding on you unless you cancel your account within 
30 days after receiving your card and you have not used or authorized use of your account. 
 
Highlighted items are varied by card 1 versus card 2. 
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Study 2 Credit Card Offer 
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Study 2 Credit Card Offer 
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Study 3 Credit Card Offer 
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CHAPTER 4: 
THE IMPACTS OF MANDATORY FINANCIAL EDUCATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD STUDY 
This chapter evaluates the impact of a field study in which very-low-income 
families in a subsidized housing program were randomly assigned to a five-course 
financial skills training program. Credit reports, bank accounts, and a survey of 
financial attitudes and behavior were collected at baseline and again 12 months later 
for 127 clients. Based on difference-in-differences comparisons of 60 clients receiving 
financial literacy education and 67 in a wait-list control group who did not, financial 
literacy education stimulates $450 in additional savings over the savings account 
balances clients reported at baseline. Clients assigned to receive financial literacy 
education also exhibit improved self-reported financial knowledge by 25 percent over 
baseline, self-reported behavior by 45 percent, and a 21-point increase in (FICO) 
credit score. Clients in the treatment group also were more likely to credit a course 
outside of school as a source of their financial knowledge. The clients in this study 
were mostly single mothers with incomes under $20,000 at the start of the study, and 
were nearly all of subprime credit quality. While this population represents a unique 
research pool, it is a highly relevant group to explore the effects of financial literacy 
education. Education in this format has a positive effect on the financial status of 
clients within one year, even among a highly distressed population. 
1. Introduction 
Public policies mandate financial education for consumers with credit 
problems such as bankruptcy or foreclosure, as well for consumers with impending 
financial decisions, such as before buying a home or graduating from high school. 
Financial education and counseling are provided in the workplace, in schools, by 
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community programs, and as part of public programs. Despite a growing interest in 
and support of financial education, the effects of financial education on credit behavior 
are relatively untested. This study provides a unique opportunity to test the effects of a 
highly targeted mandatory financial education curriculum among very-low-income 
clients in a field study. 
2. Literature Review 
Several studies have documented the extent to which consumers in the U.S. 
and other countries fail to demonstrate financial literacy, numeracy, or both (for a 
review, see Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). Financial knowledge measures tend to be 
highest for more-educated consumers, and lower for lower-income consumers (Agnew 
& Szykman, 2005; Bernheim, 1998; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2006; Mandell, 2004). 
Understanding interest and interest rates tends to be a particular area of weakness 
(Moore, 2003). 
Bucks and Pence (2006) show that low-income mortgage borrowers are most 
likely to underestimate how much the interest rate on their loan could change relative 
to their actual contract. Minority borrowers are 30 percent more likely and low-income 
borrowers are 28 percent more likely to not know their interest rate. Similar effects are 
shown for less-educated borrowers. Low-income consumers with less than a college 
degree are among the least accurate or informed about the terms of their mortgage. 
Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly (2003) present data to suggest that knowledge 
and behavior are closely linked. By comparing data on 18 financial behaviors with 
scores on a 28-question financial knowledge questionnaire, they find that lower-
scoring respondents engage in less savings and are less likely to pay bills on time or 
maintain a budget. The authors point out that engaging in regular savings or budgeting 
behaviors might be the source of the knowledge, however, rather than a result of the 
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knowledge. Further analysis by Hogarth and colleagues strengthens the linkages 
between levels of financial knowledge and financial behavior (Hogarth, Beverly, & 
Hilgert, 2003; Hogarth & Hilgert, 2002). Courchane and Zorn (2005) provide data 
from a separate survey linked to credit data. They conclude that levels of objective and 
subjective knowledge about financial issues influence savings and credit behavior and 
are reflected in events in consumer credit records. 
Hogarth (2006) provides a review of financial education efforts, noting a rapid 
increase in financial education efforts at the state, federal, and local levels in recent 
years. A study of state mandates for financial education in high schools by Tennyson 
and Nguyen finds an impact of state mandates on financial knowledge levels among 
high school students using a survey of financial knowledge (Tennyson & Nguyen, 
2001). A separate study helps make the link between increased financial knowledge 
and improved financial behavior in states with school-based financial education. 
Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001) studied the relationship between state mandates 
for high school curriculum and adult savings patterns and net worth. The authors find 
that students in states with mandates were more likely to be exposed to financial 
education and had higher savings rates and a larger net worth than students exposed to 
less (or no) mandated financial education. 
Research on the effects of financial education have included school-based 
financial education and workplace-based retirement planning seminars (Martin, 2007). 
Studies of workplace-based education seminars, typically focused on retirement 
choices, show modest effects. Duflo and Saez (2003) conducted an innovative 
randomized experiment including a course on how to save, showing small 
improvements in savings levels. Other studies show mixed effects. Many studies of 
retirement plans are hard to interpret, since firms often simultaneously promote 
retirement planning seminars and introduce new retirement savings programs (Bayer, 
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Bernheim & Scholz, 1996, 2003; Bernheim, 1998; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Muller, 
2003). 
Another set of studies examine education specific to consumers in a particular 
market. Elliehausen, Lundquist, and Staten (2007) evaluated credit counseling 
provided to consumers facing certain credit problems. The authors compared clients 
who received counseling to a general population control group over a 3-year period. 
Consumers who received counseling reduced total debt, showed evidence of improved 
credit card management, and had lower credit card delinquency rates. The authors also 
found the strongest effects among clients who started the study with the lowest credit 
scores. Hirad and Zorn (2001) evaluated the loan performance of mortgages on which 
financial counseling was required before purchase, finding that improved loan 
performance was better among borrowers receiving education. Borrowers receiving 
pre-purchase homeownership counseling had a 19 percent lower rate of 90-day loan 
payment delinquencies than those without counseling, using a quasi-experimental 
control group of another pool of similar loans. Other studies suggested that credit 
education or counseling has positive effects, although generally small in terms of 
magnitude (Collins, 2007; Hartarska & Gonzalez-Vega, 2005). 
One problem in financial literacy research is determining a measure of 
knowledge. Many studies rely on self-reported knowledge scales (“how confident are 
in your knowledge of…”). At least one study shows that most people overestimate 
their knowledge relative to what they actually know. Based on a comparison of 
answers to a self-reported scale and scores on an actual test of investment knowledge, 
Agnew and Szykman (2005) find low correlations, especially for people without a 
college education. Studies relying on self-reported data can lead to ambiguous results. 
A more significant problem with existing studies of financial literacy programs 
are selection effects (Meier & Sprenger, 2007). Unobserved characteristics drive 
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more-motivated clients or more-patient individuals to seek out financial education or 
counseling and also to succeed financially. Hogarth (2006 ) summarizes 25 papers that 
evaluate financial education. Only two studies use forms of a quasi-experimental 
technique to evaluate financial education, both in the workplace setting. Bernheim, 
Garrett, and Maki (2001) make use of changes in state high school curricula to predict 
retirement savings, finding a positive effect of states with increasing mandates. Duflo 
and Saez (2003) implemented a randomized experiment for a retirement planning 
seminar, finding marginally positive results of the offer of education on enrollment in 
a savings plan. A series of studies with college students randomly assigning an offer of 
credit card education and credit management training was hampered by low response 
rates and strong selection effects among responders (Gartner & Todd, 2005). One 
study used length of exposure to education as an evaluation technique for examining 
low-income clients in a matched savings program, a portion of whom also received 
financial education. The study found that each additional hour of education improved 
savings behavior up to about 8 hours of coursework (Schreiner, Clancy, & Sherraden, 
2002). Other studies use nonrandomized control groups or self-reported knowledge 
and behaviors (or both). There currently are no field experiments of financial 
education among low-income consumers that use random assignment and behavioral 
measure of outcomes. 
The types of services included in previous studies range from short courses 
delivered in the context of a decision, to one-to-one counseling, to longer-term formal 
education programs. The clients targeted are often moderate-income individuals facing 
impending financial decisions, such as a mortgage, retirement investment, or the need 
to correct credit problems. Few programs are targeted to very-low-income families, 
few include mandated education delivered over several weeks, and none include 
random assignment of clients to education and noneducation groups. 
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Overall, the evaluation literature suggests that financial education can help 
individuals gain additional financial knowledge and that knowledge is linked to 
financial behavior. Evidence of the impact of financial literacy is suggestive of greater 
levels of savings, usage of bank accounts, and improved credit behavior. Because of 
problems with selection effects, however, further studies are needed to better 
understand the causal effects of financial literacy education. 
3. Model of the Impact of Financial Education 
The model of the potential impact of financial literacy education in a 
controlled longitudinal study is illustrated in Figure 4.1. It is expected that clients 
completing financial literacy education will show positive changes in follow-up 
measures compared to baseline measures in three areas. First, consumers assigned to 
financial literacy will exhibit greater positive changes at follow-up in their perceived 
level of understanding of personal finance topics than consumers not completing 
financial education. Second, consumers assigned to financial literacy education will 
show greater positive changes in objective measures of financial behavior, such as 
credit reports and bank statements, than a control group not receiving financial literacy 
education. Third, consumers assigned to financial education will show greater positive 
changes in confidence about savings and budgeting in surveys as compared to 
consumers not completing financial literacy. Figure 4.1 also illustrates that while the 
effects of financial literacy education are focused on financial knowledge and 
attitudes, knowledge and behavior may interact through an unobserved feedback 
mechanism. 
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Figure 4.1: Model of the Impact of Financial Education 
4. Procedures 
Data for this study were provided by the Community Development 
Corporation of Long Island, New York (CDCLI). This nonprofit agency is the 
regional administrator for federal rental housing vouchers. Low-income families 
receive a voucher to subsidize rental payments made to private landlords. 
Qualification for a voucher is based on income and family size and is adjusted each 
year. As administrator, CDCLI recertifies that families in the program are in 
compliance with income limits and other conditions of the program. As a result, the 
agency maintains a database of income, assets, and other characteristics for all clients 
over time. Most nonelderly or disabled voucher recipients at CDCLI are also enrolled 
in the federal family self-sufficiency (FSS) program. This allows families to earn more 
income without losing their housing subsidy. All housing voucher clients in the FSS 
program are required to receive financial literacy education, although clients have up 
to 5 years to complete the education. CDCLI created a financial literacy course called 
“Financial Fitness” for these clients, delivered over five sessions and covering topics 
such as credit, savings, and budgeting (see “Financial Literacy Course Topics,” 
Appendix 4.A). In 2005, CDCLI identified clients who would be required to complete 
the Financial Fitness course by the end of 2007. 
Out of the initial pool of 181 clients identified as being required to take the 
financial literacy course, 144 clients consented to participate in a study of “how people 
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like you can improve their financial credit and savings.” According to case notes 
provided by CDCLI, of the 37 nonconsenting clients, 22 were in the process of leaving 
the voucher program or being terminated for noncompliance. Six cited personal or 
family health issues that prevented them from potentially taking the education course, 
and 5 simply refused without any reason provided. Only 4 refused to consent because 
they wanted to take the course immediately and were not willing to be on a waiting list 
if they took part in the study. 
The remaining 144 clients were divided such that odd-identification-number 
clients were assigned to receive financial education in 2006, while even-numbered 
clients were assigned to take the course in 2007. This process resulted in 73 clients 
being assigned to the “treatment” group, which meant they were required to take the 
financial literacy education course in the next year, and 71 being assigned to the 
“control” group, which meant they were prohibited from completing the course for 
one year.1 All five courses in the “Financial Fitness” series were provided at the 
CDCLI offices every month from September 2005 to September 2006 for treatment 
group clients and after this date for control group clients. Treatment group clients 
completed their baseline data collection the month before they began taking financial 
literacy courses and their follow-up data collection 12 months later. The majority of 
treatment group clients completed the five financial education courses in one month or 
less, although 4 clients took more than 6 months. Completing the course was 
mandatory, and failure to comply would jeopardize the client’s eligibility to receive a 
housing voucher. Neither group of clients received any other special education or 
financial services other than financial education. The consent form included an 
                                                 
1 In this study, “treatment” is defined as a client being assigned to attend Financial Fitness, while 
“control” is defined as a client being deferred from attending Financial Fitness until after the study 
period.   
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agreement to fill out the baseline and follow-up 50-item surveys.2 Like treatment 
group clients, control group clients received a follow-up survey and completed other 
data collection 12 months after the date of their baseline data collection. The sample 
was completed in September 2007. Clients received $30 as an incentive to complete 
the baseline survey at the beginning of the study and an additional $30 to complete a 
follow-up survey. All data were stripped of any personal or identifying information. 
A chi-squared test of the planned assignment of each client to treatment or 
control group (based on an even or odd client identification number) by consent status 
yields a nonsignificant difference (77% vs 82%, χ2 =0.907 p =0.341). Poststudy, 17 
clients failed to complete a second survey because they were uncooperative or no 
longer in the program, including 13 in the treatment group and 4 in the control group, 
resulting in 127 clients with complete data in both periods. Unlike consent, attrition 
between the two groups does not appear to be random (82% vs 94%, χ2 =5.124 p 
=0.024). The final sample consisted of 60 clients in the treatment group and 67 in the 
control group, with data in both the pre- and posttreatment periods. 
Different experimental and quasi-experimental designs provide different types 
of estimates of impacts, each with tradeoffs. The design of this study is such that 
measurable outcomes are observed only for clients completing the study. This 
represents an estimate of treatment on the treated (TOT). Although intention to treat is 
used in many studies, this study observes assignment, completion, and compliance. 
Those clients not completing the follow-up data collection are not observed, but 
clients completing treatment and all controls still in the program are observed. In 
general this is a preferred design, although the effects of attrition are important to 
consider. The design of this study also estimates an average treatment effect of 
                                                 
2 While a 24-month duration was considered, with a longer time period more clients would progress out 
of the program, moving out of subsidized housing or otherwise being lost from the sample. Any 
measured effects could be stronger or weaker over a longer period. 
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treatment on the treated. Treatment effects in this study may be heterogeneous, but 
treatment itself is homogenous and is randomly assigned. Given the small sample size, 
exploring treatment effects for subgroups within the treated and control groups is not 
feasible. 
4.1. Study Attrition 
Ideally, a randomized design overcomes selection bias and yields a valid 
comparison group for estimating the effects of an intervention, in this case the effects 
of financial education. However, it takes time for the effects of a financial education 
course to be exhibited in the behavior of clients. A study of this nature not only must 
track data over a sufficiently long time period to be able to detect any changes but 
must also be aware that as the time between baseline and follow-up lengthens, more 
clients will be lost from the sample because of moving, changes in circumstance, 
withdrawal from the program, or even death. The problem of attrition is common in 
longitudinal evaluations, and when attrition does occur the nature of any bias 
introduced can be difficult to estimate (Orr, 1999). In this study 5.6 percent of the 
control group was lost to attrition by the time of the follow-up data collection. Notes 
in the administrative data provided for this study suggest that 8 of the 13 treatment 
group clients failing to complete follow-up data were terminated or withdrew from the 
housing program, compared to 1 of the 4 control group clients. Termination could 
occur as a result of noncompliance with the terms of the program, or because the client 
increased income beyond program limits. Of the remaining clients not available for the 
follow-up data, 2 were deceased, both in the control group. The other control group 
client and 5 treatment group clients simply refused to complete a final survey or to 
complete education classes. The effects of attrition bias are difficult to diagnose. It is 
possible that financial literacy education influenced behavior leading to withdrawal, 
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such as spurring motivation to obtain a higher-paying job. Completing the second 
round of data collection might also be a signal of more motivation compared to those 
clients who were noncompliant, who withdrew, or who were terminated. The direction 
of bias remains unclear and suggests the need for a quasi-experimental design to 
supplement the estimates derived from the simple randomized comparisons (LaLonde, 
1986; Orr, 1999). 
5. Baseline Characteristics 
Table 4.1 shows that overall the clients in this study had little savings, with 
treatment clients holding $1,186 across checking, savings, and other accounts, and 
control group clients owning $1,776. The mean FICO scores for treatment and control 
groups were 577 and 566, respectively, and signal poor credit ratings (scores below 
580 to 620 are solidly in the subprime credit range). Debt levels were higher on 
average for the control group ($14,520) than the treatment group ($11,520), but not at 
statistically significant levels (t=.75). Income for the treatment group was significantly 
higher at baseline than for controls ($23,239 vs. $19,382, t=1.9). By comparison, 
federal guidelines define very-low-income, which is 30 percent of the area median 
income, as income below $24,000 for a family of 4 in this area. In both the treatment 
and control groups, about 16 to 17 percent of clients received income support through 
a welfare program (in addition to housing assistance). Of the treatment group, 16 
percent has less than a high school education, compared to 21 percent of those in the 
control group (a nonsignificant difference). Household sizes were similar for both 
groups, nearly 4 persons per household. Over 90 percent of clients in both groups were 
female. Seventy-three percent of the treatment group and 68 percent of the control 
group were single parents (a nonsignificant difference). Although not reported in 
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Table 4.1, about half of the clients in both groups were African American, one in ten 
were Latino or Hispanic, and the remaining one-third were White. 
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations for Treatment and Control Groups at 
Baseline: Administrative and Credit Data  
 Treatment Control 
Total Savings ($) 1,186 1,776 
 (3,130) (7,492) 
Credit Score (FICO) (300-800) 577 566 
 (70) (70) 
Total Debt ($) 11,520 14,520 
 (12,805) (12,730) 
Total Income *  ($) 23,239 19,382 
 (12,147) (11,284) 
Welfare Receipt (%) 0.16 0.17 
 (0.37) (0.38) 
Less than High School Education (%) 0.16 0.21 
 (0.37) (0.41) 
Household Size 3.92 3.94 
 (1.88) (1.87) 
Female client (%) 0.96 0.93 
 (0.20) (0.26) 
Single headed household (%) 0.73 0.68 
 (0.45) (0.47) 
Age (years) 39.30 39.06 
 (7.82) (7.17) 
Employed full time ^ (%) 0.52 0.39 
 (0.50) (0.49) 
Years in FSS program 3.71 3.64 
 (1.46) (1.50) 
* t=1.9  ^ t=1.6; n=144   
 
The baseline survey included 12 questions designed to provide a self-
assessment of financial literacy. As might be expected from a relatively disadvantaged 
population, self-reported scores for financial behavior and knowledge tended to be low 
in baseline survey responses. Table 4.2 illustrates how clients at the start of the study 
graded themselves by each category of financial issue. In general, clients give 
themselves high marks for providing for their family but low ratings for staying 
abreast of interest rates, saving, or investing. Controls scored higher on several items 
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including controlling spending and following a budget. With 12 measures, chance 
suggests it is likely one will be significantly different using a 5 percent level of 
statistical significance. An overall index comprising all 12 survey items proved 
reliable (Cronbach’s alpha=.87), and the average of the index was not significantly 
different between the two groups. 
Table 4.2: Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Reported Financial Literacy 
Measures on a 5-point scale (Grade yourself in the following areas in the last 12 
months [0=poor; 4=excellent]) 
 Treatment Control 
Controlling my spending * 1.60 1.97 
 (1.16) (1.13) 
Paying my bills on time ^ 1.44 1.75 
 (1.38) (1.08) 
Planning for my financial future      1.04 1.15 
 (1.31) (1.28) 
Providing for my family      2.49 2.71 
 (1.25) (1.01) 
Saving money      0.58 0.71 
 (0.93) (0.99) 
Knowledge of current interest rates      0.51 0.68 
 (0.87) (1.03) 
Knowledge of my current credit rating      0.99 0.83 
 (1.26) (1.13) 
Managing my finances      1.15 1.44 
 (1.17) (1.17) 
Investing money      0.32 0.27 
 (0.80) (0.76) 
Following a budget # 0.97 1.56 
 (1.14) (1.26) 
Composite Index ** 1.11 1.31 
 (0.74) (0.79) 
*t=1.9 ^t=1.5 #t=2.9 **t=1.6; n =144  
6. Evaluation Approach 
The average treatment effects (of financial education) on the treated (those 
completing the 5-course sequence) are estimated using three difference-in-differences 
specifications across 35 measures derived from administrative data, credit reports, and 
a survey. The first specification is a traditional difference-in-difference experimental 
 161
estimator. This approach estimates the difference in changes between treatment and 
control groups changes each measure from the baseline to follow-up, using an 
indicator for a client being in the treatment group. The second specification uses 
propensity score matching to weight the traditional difference-in-difference 
experimental estimator. This specification attempts to balance the treatment and 
control groups due to the differential level of attrition. The third specification includes 
control variables to account for differences in the baseline values for each group that 
may be associated with the intensity of other services received. All three estimates are 
presented in Appendix 4.A and discussed in the following sections. The methodology 
used is discussed below. 
6.1. Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
Each outcome can be tested using a conventional regression-adjusted impact 
estimate (Orr, 1999) of the form: 
Eq. 1 Yfollow-up=β1Ybaseline+ β2XTreatment. + ε 
The model tests whether the outcome, Yfollow-up, is impacted by the treatment, 
X, where the treatment is a client being assigned to financial literacy education. When 
the β2 coefficient on XTreatment is statistically significant, this suggests the program has 
an effect.3 This approach controls for each client’s baseline state, so that each outcome 
is relative to the client’s status at the start of the study (Ybaseline). The standard errors in 
these and all other models in this study are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
This approach produces consistent and unbiased estimators in an experimental 
setting. This study is based on a relatively small sample and also is challenged by 
clients refusing to consent, by attrition, and by refusal to complete the follow-up data 
                                                 
3 Because of the small sample size, significance is reported at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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collection. The sample was winnowed from 181 at the initial phase to the 126 
observed in the data. Some differences between clients in each group are unobservable 
and remain a potential source of bias in the estimates. Other aspects of the clients lost 
from the sample are observable and can be used in part to develop a quasi-
experimental estimator, as described in the following section. 
6.2. Propensity Score Matching Differences Estimation 
One way to balance the treatment and control groups based on observable 
factors is to use a propensity score. The propensity score is the predicted probability 
that a client in the control group would have been assigned to the treatment group 
given pretreatment characteristics. The propensity score can then be used as a weight 
to increase the influence of control group clients who are more similar to the average 
treatment group client, controlling for a range of client characteristics (Heckman, 
Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 2001; Smith & Todd, 2005). 
The propensity score is the probability of being assigned to and completing 
financial literacy education as well as all follow-up data collection. This was estimated 
using the following probit specification of baseline data: 
Eq. 2  Prob(completed) = β1 age + β2 age2 + β3 financial knowledge index + β4 debt + β5 
bankruptcy + β6 savings + β7 household size + β8 rent subsidy+ β9 income + β10 white 
+ β11 welfare + β12 #delinquencies + β13 Length of time in program+ ε 
The propensity score was then used to create quintiles of about 25 clients each 
based on the relative probabilities predicted by this model. Within each quintile, each 
control borrower was assigned a weight relative to his or her probability of actually 
being in the control group (number of treatment subjects in the quintile divided by the 
number of control subjects in the quintile). Weights ranged from 0.23 to 2.57. 
Weighted t-tests of the baseline variables show that the propensity score weights 
effectively balance the treatment and control groups (Morgan & Harding, 2006). 
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The specification for the weighted difference-in-difference estimator is shown 
in Eq 3. This model is similar to Eq 1, with the exception of the addition of weights 
(w=1 for all treatment cases). Again, robust standard errors are used to address 
heteroskedastic standard error terms. The coefficient on β2 provides a propensity score 
weighted estimate of the impact of the program, controlling for baseline levels. 
Eq. 3 Yfollow-up={ β2Ybaseline + β2XTreatment. + ε } * [w] 
6.3. Weighted Differences Estimator with Covariates for Other Services Received 
All treatment and control clients in this study receive housing vouchers to help 
pay their rent and are part of the family self-sufficiency program (FSS). However, the 
benefits of these programs are provided at different levels. The voucher has more 
value for low-income clients with more family members and high rent amounts. The 
longer clients are in FSS, the more opportunities they have had to earn more income 
without losing voucher benefits. A client with larger benefits from the FSS voucher 
might also show stronger impacts for the outcomes of interest in this study.  
The third difference-in-difference specification includes covariates of baseline 
data to model the extent to which clients are exposed to these services. The covariates 
used in these models are displayed in Table 4.3 and include how long the client was 
enrolled in the FSS program prior to the experiment and the factors that help 
determine the amount of the voucher subsidy, including household size, rent amount, 
total debt, and total income.  
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Table 4.3: Means and Standard Deviations of Program Exposure Used in 
Regression Models 
 Unweighted Weighted 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Year in FSS Program 3.67 1.45 3.63 1.50 
Household size 3.93 1.87 3.78 1.89 
Rent Subsidy Amount 1,589 291 1,518 303 
Total Debt 11,852 12,773 11,907 12,511 
Total Income 19,938 12,680 21,615 12,926 
 
The specification used in these models is shown in Eq. 4 below, where w is the 
weight derived from the quintiles of propensity scores: 
Eq. 4 [Yfollow-up]*[w]=[β1Ybaseline+ β2xTreatment  + β3 Months in FSS + β4 Household size  
+ β5 Rent level  + β6 Amount of total debt + β7 Total income + ε ] * [w] 
7. Estimated Impacts 
The impact model described in Section 3 suggests that financial literacy 
education influences knowledge and perceptions and ultimately results in evidence of 
changed financial behaviors. Using the three difference-in-difference estimation 
procedures described in Section 5, the effect of financial literacy education is 
developed for 20 measures of financial behavior, 7 measures of self-reported financial 
literacy, and 7 measures of financial attitudes or perceptions. Including such a large 
number of dependent variables of interest presents a potential multiple measures 
problem; by chance several of these measures will show statistically significant 
differences. To counter this problem, key dependent variables were designated for 
each of the predicted outcome categories, and when possible indices or scores are used 
to aggregate similar measures into a composite score. 
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The impacts of financial literacy education are presented using the simple 
difference-in-differences estimator, the weighted difference-in-differences estimator, 
and the weighted difference-in-differences estimator with covariates. In most cases the 
results become more robust using the weighted estimator with controls, as might be 
expected. Given the small sample size, results are reported if the 10 percent statistical 
significance level is achieved. 
All measures are repeated for each subject at follow-up and compared to the 
baseline measure. Impacts are estimated using difference-in-differences regressions 
showing the average change in each measure within treatment group subjects relative 
to control group subjects. These estimates of impacts are then compared to the mean 
baseline levels of each measure for both groups combined (measures used in the 
impact models were not statistically different across the treatment and control groups 
at baseline). 
7.1. Financial Behavior Estimates 
Based on the prior literature, it is predicted that financial literacy education 
would have a positive effect on savings levels and credit scores and a negative effect 
on debt levels and credit card use. All clients in the study regularly provide bank 
account information as part of the process to remain eligible for housing vouchers. 
These data were extracted at the baseline and again 12 months later. In addition, 
clients in the study had their credit reports pulled and analyzed at baseline and follow-
up. These represent objective indicators of financial behavior for clients in the 
treatment and control groups. 
At baseline the weighted mean account balance in a savings account for clients 
was $517 (including $0 for clients with no savings accounts). The estimated average 
effect of financial literacy education on savings account balances was positive, with an 
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additional $489 saved using the conventional experimental difference-in-differences 
estimator, an additional $454 saved using the matching difference-in-differences 
estimator without covariates, and $474 saved using the weighted difference-in-
differences estimator with covariates. These results are strongly significant at the 1 
percent level. Figure 4.2 illustrates the estimated marginal increase in savings account 
balances at follow-up compared to baseline using the weighted difference-in-
differences estimator with covariates. 
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Impact of Financial Literacy Education on Amount in 
Savings Account from Administrative Data Using Weighted Difference-in-
Differences Estimator and Covariates (n=127) 
Credit report data include a FICO score—named for the Fair Isaac 
Corporation, which developed the score. FICO scores range from 300 to 800 and are 
based on a proprietary formula using multiple variables contained in the credit report, 
including the number of accounts, amount and age of debt, and share of available 
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credit in use by the individual. Scores are used by creditors, insurance companies, and 
even employers to assess the behavior of an individual. Because financial literacy 
education focuses on the topic of credit and credit reports, it was expected that clients 
would make an effort to at least check their report for errors and engage in activities 
that might improve their credit rating, such as paying past due accounts or using less 
of available credit lines.  
A comparison of FICO scores collected for this study showed no significant 
changes at follow-up using the simple difference-in-differences experimental method 
nor the matching estimator without covariates. However, the matching difference-in-
differences estimator with covariates did yield results that are significant at the 10 
percent level, which is a reasonable standard given the small number of observations 
in this study. The weighted estimator with covariates suggests a 20.8 point increase in 
scores, compared to a baseline score for both groups combined of 570. This result is 
shown in Figure 4.3.  
According to one analysis provided by Fair Isaac Corporation, the difference 
between a FICO score of 570 and 590 can result in a decrease in interest rate on a 48-
month automobile loan of 2.5 percentage points.4 This would reduce the borrowing 
cost of a $10,000 loan by $618 over the four-year life of the loan. Borrowers remain 
“subprime” credit risks but have reduced borrowing costs.  
Financial literacy education for low-income families typically focuses on 
topics of budgeting and managing debt. Indeed, over one-third of the curriculum used 
in this study focused on managing credit and debt. Although it was predicted that 
financial literacy education would be associated with clients paying down debt and 
reducing the use of credit cards, there were no negative associations significant at 
standard levels. Using the simple, unweighted differences estimator, but not the 
                                                 
4 14.45% APR vs. 16.97% APR. See: 
http://www.myfico.com/Products/ScoreWatch/Sample/Sample_Means.aspx  
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weighted estimators, clients completing financial literacy education hold more credit 
cards at follow-up (the mean was 2.8 cards at follow-up, an increase of 0.7 over 
baseline, t=1.96) based on credit report data. Although not significant, total debt levels 
for the treatment group also show a tendency to increase after financial literacy 
education. This suggests that financial literacy education may be associated with 
greater use of credit during the time period of this study. An analysis of other credit 
report measures, such as the number of reported delinquencies, deficiencies, 
discharges, share of credit limit borrowed, and number of credit cards resulted in no 
significantly different changes between treatment and control groups using any of the 
three estimators. The lack of difference between treatment and control groups in these 
areas could be attributed to the fact that credit report data are additive. Past problems 
remain on the report for up to 7 years. Clients with improvements in items on their 
credit reports in the last 12 months would only slowly counteract those historic 
problems.  
In addition to the data collected from bank account statements and credit 
reports, clients answered a series of questions at baseline and then at follow-up in 
which they provided self-reported measures of financial behaviors. One problem with 
self-reported data on financial topics is that people tend to exhibit a positive or upward 
bias in their responses (Agnew & Szykman, 2005). At least in this study, the baseline 
and follow-up surveys were filled out by the same person, so that bias should be more 
systematic by respondent than in a cross-sectional study. Question 3 of the survey 
includes eight types of behavior, each scored on a 0-to-4 scale, which provides an 
array of behaviors summarized in this analysis as a single index (see Appendix 4.A for 
survey instrument).5 This index is reliable using Cronbach’s reliability statistic 
("=.87). Clients scoring themselves as “poor” received a 0, and clients grading 
                                                 
5 An index is used in part to overcome the statistical problem of using multiple measures to test a 
hypothesis. Condensing measures into an index reduces the number of tests conducted. 
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themselves as “excellent” received a 4. Most clients graded themselves as poor in 
most areas at baseline (index mean 1.22 using weights). Using a simple estimator, the 
index mean increased 0.53, and using the weighted estimator either with or without 
covariates, the index increased by 0.55. All of these results are significant at the 1 
percent level. Examining the questions that make up the index, the items related to 
budgeting and financial planning showed significant and positive results, while the 
other items were not significant. This is consistent with the focus of this financial 
literacy program on budgeting and financial planning skills. 
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Impact of Financial Literacy Education on FICO Credit 
Score from Credit Record Using Weighted Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
and Covariates (n=127) 
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7.2. Financial Knowledge Estimates 
Based on prior studies, financial knowledge has a strong association with 
financial behavior. It is expected that clients who completed the financial literacy 
education course would exhibit greater increases in self-reported understanding of a 
variety of financial topics covered in the course. All clients completed a series of 
questions about how much they understood about 5 topics in survey Question 5. These 
questions provide a 0-to-4 assessment of the client’s self-assessment of her 
understanding of interest rates, credit ratings, managing finances, investing, and what 
is on her own credit report. Responses ranged from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (4). 
Similar to the behavioral measures drawn from the client survey, an index of self-
reported financial understanding was developed based on 5 items contained in survey 
Question 5. The index provides an aggregated measure of how well each client 
perceives his or her understanding or comfort level with various financial topics. This 
index was reliable at similar levels to the financial behavior index using Cronbach’s 
statistic ("=.82). The weighted mean index value at baseline was 1.96 for both groups 
combined. The average estimated impact of financial education on the financial 
knowledge index was 0.52 using a simple difference-in-differences estimator, 0.44 
using a weighted estimator, and 0.45 using a weighted estimator with covariates. The 
latter represents a 26 percent increase over the baseline index value, increasing from 
1.75 to 2.20. Decomposing the components of the weighted mean index values, nearly 
one-half of the gain was due to an increase in reported understanding of current 
interest rates, and the remainder primarily due to improvements in understanding of 
credit reports and how to manage personal finances (issues such as budgeting and 
expense tracking). Figure 4.4 displays the effects of financial literacy education on the 
financial knowledge index using a weighted difference-in-differences estimator with 
covariates for the index. The figure also presents the components of the index with 
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statistically significant impacts related to clients in the treatment group completing the 
financial literacy education program. 
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Figure 4.4: Estimated Impacts of Financial Literacy Education on Self-Reported 
Financial Literacy Using Weighted Difference-in-Differences Estimator with 
Covariates: 5-item Index and Significant Components of Index 
All clients completed a question at baseline and follow-up asking where they 
learned about financial issues. This survey item can provide a check of the extent to 
which the financial literacy education course was the source of the client’s self-
assessed gains in knowledge. Question 6 in the survey asks where the client learned 
about money management and credit issues, listing 8 sources including “training 
courses taught outside of school.” Estimates of the impacts of financial literacy 
education on changes in responses to this measure were statistically significant using 
all three estimators, including an increase of 1.1 using the simple difference-in-
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differences estimator, and 1.2 using either weighted estimator. This compares to a 
weighted baseline across both groups of 1.25, suggesting a near doubling of the 
attribution of non-school-based coursework to financial knowledge for the group 
receiving financial literacy education. Since the training course in this study matches 
this description, it is likely clients are attributing the source of the knowledge to the 
financial literacy education they received. This finding was significant at the 0.1 
percent level. 
7.3. Financial Attitude Estimates 
There is less literature on the connections between financial attitudes and 
financial literacy education. Changing preferences, attitudes, or values regarding 
financial issues is a different objective than imparting factual information and 
developing financial management skills. Nevertheless, staff of the program cited 
anecdotal evidence of clients for whom they believed financial literacy education 
triggered improvements in how clients viewed money and their personal financial 
situation overall. Measures of attitudes are more challenging to reliably implement 
than measures of behavior or knowledge. However, there were three categories of 
attitudes reflected in the client survey at baseline and follow-up that might be expected 
to be influenced by receiving financial literacy education. The first is a set of 4 items 
from survey Question 8 about how frequently clients feel worried or stressed about 
managing money. It was expected that the financial education course would reduce the 
level of stress clients felt about financial issues as they gained further knowledge and 
skills, although another alternative is that as clients gain knowledge about financial 
issues, they realize they should be more worried about their personal financial 
situation. As with other survey questions, the set of 4 responses was condensed into an 
index, which is shown to be reliable ("=.83) using Cronbach’s statistic at similar 
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levels. The second category of measures is related to self-esteem based on 7 items in 
survey Question 13. These are not directly related to financial literacy education but 
are expected to serve as a general measure of the clients’ perception of their ability to 
make changes in financial or other aspects of their lives. These measures are related to 
the concept of locus of control (internal versus external) rather than to self-esteem 
more broadly. It is expected that financial literacy education would result in an 
increase in clients viewing their level of control over their lives. This index of 7 items 
was also reliable at similar levels to the other indices ("=.81). The third category of 
measures is related to the frequency of symptoms of stress or anxiety based on 7 items 
in survey Question 4. Headaches, fatigue, insomnia, or other physical problems are 
listed, as well as feelings of inadequacy and fear of losing control. Taken together, 
these items may indicate greater levels of stress or anxiety. It might be expected that 
financial literacy education would reduce stress levels, although an alternative view is 
that more knowledge about the severity of financial problems could increase stress. 
This index was reliable at slightly higher levels than the other indices ("=.86). While 
again not a financial-specific outcome, symptoms of stress may be related to financial 
issues. 
In general these indices of client survey data regarding perceptions or attitudes 
did not yield significant estimates of the impact of financial literacy education. Two of 
the components of the index are worthy of note, however. The estimate of the impact 
of financial literacy on the index of financial worry was not significantly different at 
standard levels. One component of this index (item b) asks how frequently the client 
feels “worried about having enough money.” The coefficient on treatment was -0.34 
using the simple experimental difference-in-differences estimator. This is about an 11 
percent decrease relative to an unweighted baseline for both groups of 3.1. This was 
significant at the 10 percent level and only for the simple difference-in-differences 
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estimator. The weighted difference-in-differences estimators produced coefficients of 
similar magnitude and direction, but were not statistically significant. The self-esteem 
(or locus of control) index based on Question 13 was not significant. One component 
of this index (item a) asked whether the client felt “there is really no way I can solve 
some of my problems.” The estimated effect of financial education on this one 
question was significant and negative, showing a significant decrease between the 
baseline and follow-up survey relative to controls using all three estimators, with the 
largest effect derived from using the weighted estimator with covariates. The weighted 
mean for both groups was 1.6, where 4 equals the client “always” feels there is really 
no way to solve some of his or her problems, and 0 equals “never.” The simple 
difference-in-differences estimator predicts a -0.38 impact of financial education, 
while the weighted model and the weighted model with covariates suggest an effect of 
-0.51. The latter estimate is about a 30 percent decrease. This measure is not specific 
to financial issues or behavior, but might signal increased self-efficacy of clients 
related to completing the financial literacy education courses. Since most of the 
questions in the survey are related to financial topics, clients may have answered this 
question in the context of their financial problems. Figure 4.5 shows the result for 
Question 8b using the simple experimental estimator and for Question 13a using the 
weighted difference-in-differences estimator with covariates.  
In general, the sign on the coefficients for financial risk, attitude, and 
perception questions is consistent with improvements among clients in the financial 
literacy education program. Isolating individual questions is problematic in that by 
statistical chance some questions will be significant, particularly using the weaker 0.10 
level as a standard. Ideally, overall indices of questions would be significant in order 
to overcome this multiple measures problem. It is possible that a larger sample size 
would have yielded more robust results. Given the available data, there is not strong 
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support for the hypothesis that financial literacy changed client attitudes about 
financial issues. 
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Figure 4.5: Estimated Impact of Financial Education on Self-reported 
Perceptions Using Weighted Difference-in-Differences Estimator with Covariates 
(n=127) 
8. Discussion 
The financial literacy course in this study was designed to help families gain 
access to basic banking services, learn budgeting skills, boost savings, and repair 
credit problems. Based on a field study with a very-low-income population, this study 
shows that financial literacy education is related to improved financial behavior 
outcomes. The primary evidence of behavioral change is a significant increase in 
savings account balances, along with modest improvements in credit scores. Client 
perceptions of financial knowledge also show evidence of improvement, particularly 
around interest rates, credit, and budgeting. Responses to a survey question about how 
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clients learned about financial issues also suggests that the financial literacy classes in 
this program may have played an important role. The findings of this study are 
surprisingly robust in many cases, especially given the relatively small sample sizes 
and the weak impacts shown in past studies. 
This study has several advantages over previous studies. First, this study 
includes objective measures of behavior from bank accounts and credit reports, rather 
than replying on self-reported data. The second advantage of this study is that all 
clients in the study were mandated to receive financial literacy education, thereby 
reducing the effects of clients selecting into the program, effects that plague many 
studies of financial education. Clients were also randomly assigned to either receive 
the education course immediately or to defer receipt, thereby creating a randomized 
control group. A third advantage of this study is that the longitudinal design allows for 
an assessment of impact over a year-long period using a difference-in-differences 
specification. This allows the knowledge gained from the education course to be 
incorporated into behavior and for that behavior to be reflected in credit report and 
bank account data. A final advantage is that because all the clients in the study are 
enrolled in a housing voucher subsidy program, they are closely monitored and data 
are regularly available as part of the administrative process for the program. 
There are several caveats worthy of discussion. Generalizing these results to 
other programs requires caution. Clients are at a numerically lower starting point than 
other populations as measured by initial financial circumstances. This might result in 
these clients responding more strongly to financial education than consumers at a 
more moderate initial level. On the other hand, administrative notes included in the 
data suggest clients in this study experienced problems with domestic violence, 
unstable employment, drug and alcohol abuse, and problems finding and maintaining 
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adequate daycare. Given this array of problems, a training program on managing 
financial resources may be expected to have only a limited effect. 
This study is specific to low-income households that were part of a larger 
housing subsidy program that included a financial self-sufficiency component. 
Because these clients are enrolled in other programming, they may have differential 
responses to financial literacy education than clients enrolled in another housing 
subsidy program without a self-sufficiency component or clients not enrolled in any 
housing subsidy program. Housing vouchers are in short supply, and a family able to 
receive a voucher had to go through a sometimes-lengthy application process. Within 
the voucher program, clients had to enroll in the self-sufficiency program, which 
allows them to increase their income without losing subsidy. This does not create a 
problem for the internal validity of the results in this study, as all clients in this study 
were enrolled in both programs. However, the application of financial literacy 
education in another setting with clients who did not enroll in other programs related 
to their financial position may not have similar effects. Exposure to these is included 
in the covariate estimation models, however, which may help bolster these results. 
There are several problems related to the study design. First, the sample is 
small, as might be expected in a field study. But the size of the sample was reduced 
considerably by the consent process and attrition. The effects of consent and attrition 
are only partially observable. In general the assignment of treatment and control 
groups was not significantly distorted by the consent process—it appears that failure 
to consent was random. Attrition was not random; clients in the treatment group were 
more likely to leave the program. The propensity model addresses this issue based on 
observable characteristics, although it cannot account for unobserved characteristics of 
the decision to leave the program. The second problem with the design is the control 
group process. As in most operational programs, clients could not be blind to their 
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being in a study. The consent process alerted clients to their need to complete a 
financial education course. Clients who were subsequently told they were not 
permitted to complete the course for at least 12 months (or “wait listed”) may have 
reacted to this information in ways that could have impacted survey responses or even 
financial behavior. For example, they may have wanted to create a budget or savings 
plan but decided to wait until they took the course. Staff of the program suggest that 
while some clients were excited about the program, most viewed it as another 
obligation in order to remain in compliance for receipt of their housing voucher. 
Nonetheless, the design may have created some unobserved bias. 
9. Implications 
The implications of this study are threefold. First, mandating financial 
education, at least in the form of Financial Fitness with a similar population in a 
housing subsidy program, can have positive effects on savings and credit behavior. 
Financial education can also lead to improvements in self-reported understanding of 
financial issues. If increasing savings levels and improving credit status is a goal of 
other public programs, mandating similar financial education programs as part of other 
programs serving low-income people may be a successful public policy. 
Second, from a social welfare perspective, mandating financial education may 
also lead to improvements in savings levels and in credit quality, which are more 
valuable than the costs of delivering services. Savings levels for 100 clients are 
estimated to increase by nearly $50,000 in aggregate in one year. Additional gains will 
be obtained as clients with improved credit ratings benefit from lower borrowing costs 
and greater access to credit. To the extent that the delivery of education can be 
accomplished at or below the marginal benefit, public policies mandating financial 
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education may be a good investment of public and private resources if improving the 
financial status of low-income families is a policy goal. 
Third, this study suggests that if influencing clients’ attitudes and perceptions 
is deemed important—and the literature suggests beliefs are a precursor to behavior 
changes—then the content of financial literacy efforts should focus more on 
examining attitudes toward spending, saving, incurring debt, and taking financial 
risks. Providers of such courses should focus on the use of debt, planning for financial 
risks, and providing clients opportunities to weigh the costs and benefits of adding 
various types of debt versus paying off existing debt or saving. Teaching “values” 
becomes a challenging task, however, and may require innovative new approaches. 
One consideration may be to complement educational efforts with longer-term 
“coaching” services. Using regular check-ins, a coach can help a client implement the 
skills and knowledge learned in a formal education course. Coaches can help clients 
formulate and achieve their own financial goals, providing support to maintain 
behaviors and to form a persistent financial outlook over time (Grant, 2001; Minzner, 
Hebert, St. George, LoConte, 2006). Programs could also include the use of peer 
groups as a form of support structure to help clients adhere to financial goals and 
shape positive attitudes about money and savings. 
Methodologically this study demonstrates the use of a randomized design in a 
field-based setting. CDCLI was able to exploit an education requirement with an 
existing pool of clients during a 2-year window. The common barrier to random 
experiments among practitioners is that some clients are denied services. In this case 
all clients benefited from financial literacy education; all that was randomized was the 
timing of the service delivery. Practitioners may find that the survey questions and 
credit report data collected for this study are useful for tracking client outcomes over 
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time even in a nonexperimental context. This study also provides an applied example 
of how a propensity score estimator can be used to address problems of attrition bias. 
Future research on financial literacy education could augment the findings in 
this study by examining longer time periods. It is possible that as clients began 
practicing new behaviors, their knowledge and behavior continued to improve. It is 
also possible that following an initial burst of careful financial management after 
completing the financial education course, clients slid back into negative behaviors. A 
longer study period would allow confirmation that credit problems are not increasing 
for clients with newly learned financial skills and knowledge and also would 
potentially detect stronger changes in credit score data. Given the increased risk of 
attrition as the study period is lengthened, however, such an approach will require a 
substantially larger initial sample to allow for more extensive modeling. 
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APPENDIX 4.A. DATA TABLES 
Table 4.A.1: Behavioral Baselines: Bank Accounts, Credit Reports, Self-Reports 
 
Simple 
Baseline 
Mean 
All 
Clients 
Weighted 
(pscore) 
Mean 
All  
Clients 
Number 
Clients at 
Follow-Up 
Administrative Data:    
   Amount in Checking Account $229 $211 125 
   Amount in Savings Account $364 $517 126 
   Receive Welfare (TANF) 0.112 0.142 126 
Credit Report:    
   Delinquencies Reported 0.136 0.228 126 
   Discharges Reported 0.673 0.654 126 
   FICO Credit Score 573 570 103 
   Number of Credit Cards 1.7 2.1 126 
   Subprime (FICO<620) 0.813 0.811 127 
   Total Dollars in Debt  $11,199 $11,622 126 
Self Report:      
   Financial Behavior Index 0.39 0.34 115 
   Grade self at following budget (0-4) 0.38 0.40 103 
   Grade self at planning for financial future (0-4) 1.11 1.26 126 
   Grade self at providing for family (0-4) 1.08 1.11 127 
   Grade self at managing finances (0-4) 2.63 2.65 126 
 
 182
Table 4.A.2: Behavioral Difference-in-Differences: Bank Accounts, Credit Reports, Self-Reports 
 
Estimated 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated t 
Weighted 
Estimate t 
Weighted 
Estimate 
with 
Program 
Controls t 
Weighted 
Marginal 
Effect as % of 
Baseline 
Administrative Data:        
   Amount in Checking Account -$738 [0.94] -$351 [1.62] -$319 [1.61]  
   Amount in Savings Account $489 [2.17]* $454 [2.35]* $474 [2.41]* 92% 
   Receive Welfare (TANF) -0.057 [0.76] 0.064 [0.95] 0.071 [1.26]  
Credit Report:        
   Delinquencies Reported -0.131 [0.88] -0.224 [1.19] -0.222 [1.25]  
   Discharges Reported 0.354 [1.01] 0.309 [0.84] 0.336 [0.92]  
   FICO Credit Score 0.333 [0.03] 20.19 [1.43] 20.805 [1.73]+ 4% 
   Number of Credit Cards 0.695 [1.96]+ 0.424 [1.08] 0.464 [1.30]  
   Subprime (FICO<620) 0.035 [0.44] 0.016 [0.16] 0.02 [0.23]  
   Total Dollars in Debt  $2,533 [1.64] $2,241 [1.29] $2,276 [1.29]  
Self Report:          
   Financial Behavior Index 0.529 [4.54]** 0.548 [4.27]** 0.547 [4.17]** 45% 
   Grade self at following budget (0-4) 0.552 [2.91]** 0.492 [2.17]* 0.488 [2.13]* 39% 
   Grade self at planning for financial 
future (0-4) 0.765 [3.83]** 0.83 [3.40]** 0.858 [3.57]** 77% 
   Grade self at providing for family (0-4) 0.437 [2.23]* 0.469 [2.07]* 0.476 [2.04]* 18% 
   Grade self at managing finances (0-4) 0.621 [3.19]** 0.482 [2.16]* 0.488 [2.17]* 38% 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Controls: duration in FSS program, household size, rent subsidy, debt level, & income 
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Table 4.A.3: Baseline: Knowledge Self-Reports 
 
Simple 
Baseline 
Mean 
All Clients 
Weighted 
(pscore) 
Mean 
All 
Clients 
Number 
Clients at 
Follow-Up 
Self Report: Financial Knowledge Index 1.69 1.75 126 
Self Report: Grade self understanding of 
current interest rates (0-4) 0.51 0.58 126 
Self Report: Grade self understanding of own 
credit report (0-4) 0.97 0.94 127 
Self Report: Know a lot about credit (0-4) 1.56 1.63 126 
Self Report: Know a lot about investing money 
(0-4) 1.33 1.24 125 
Self Report: Know a lot about managing 
finances (0-4) 1.96 1.95 126 
Self Report: Learned a lot about managing 
money and using credit from training courses 
outside of school 
1.35 1.25 108 
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Table 4.A.4: Difference-in-Differences: Knowledge Self-Reports 
  
Estimated 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated t 
Weighted 
Estimate t 
Weighted 
Estimate with 
Program 
Controls t 
Self Report: Financial Knowledge Index 0.523 [3.19]** 0.441 [2.17]* 0.446 [2.18]* 
Self Report: Grade self understanding of 
current interest rates (0-4) 0.746 [3.63]** 0.854 [2.74]** 0.935 [3.59]** 
Self Report: Grade self understanding of 
own credit report (0-4) 0.519 [2.64]** 0.576 [2.21]* 0.627 [2.57]* 
Self Report: Know a lot about credit (0-4) 0.397 [1.97]* 0.239 [0.94] 0.269 [1.06] 
Self Report: Know a lot about investing 
money (0-4) 0.247 [1.23] 0.372 [1.57] 0.403 [1.67]+ 
Self Report: Know a lot about managing 
finances (0-4) 0.621 [3.19]** 0.482 [2.16]* 0.488 [2.17]* 
Self Report: Learned a lot about managing 
money and using credit from training 
courses outside of school 
1.06 [4.82]** 1.125 [4.92]** 1.185 [4.91]** 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Controls: duration in FSS program, household size, rent subsidy, debt level, & income 
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Table 4.A.5: Baseline: Attitudes and Beliefs Self-Reports 
  
Simple 
Baseline 
Mean 
All 
Clients 
Weighted 
(pscore) 
Mean 
All 
Clients 
Number 
Clients at 
Follow Up 
Self Report: Financial Worry Index 2.69 2.69 127 
Self Report: How frequently feel “I am worried 
about having enough money” (0-4, 4=always) 3.06 3.03 127 
Self Report: Self Esteem Index 1.30 1.30 127 
Self Report: How often feel “there is really no way I 
can solve some of my problems” (0-4, 4=always) 1.68 1.64 126 
Self Report: Stress Symptoms Index 2.69 2.69 126 
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Table 4.A.6: Difference-in-Differences: Attitudes and Beliefs Self-Reports 
  
Estimated 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated t 
Weighted 
Estimate t 
Weighted 
Estimate 
with 
Program 
Controls t 
Self Report: Financial 
Worry Index -0.184 [1.21] -0.214 [1.15] -0.218 [1.16] 
Self Report: How 
frequently feel “I am 
worried about having 
enough money” (0-4, 
4=always) 
-0.335 [1.72]+ -0.327 [1.44] -0.337 [1.47] 
Self Report: Self Esteem 
Index -0.133 [1.01] -0.152 [1.09] -0.149 [1.08] 
Self Report: How often 
feel “there is really no way 
I can solve some of my 
problems” (0-4, 4=always) 
-0.379 [1.96]+ -0.507 [2.30]* -0.513 [2.45]*
Self Report: Stress 
Symptoms Index -0.039 [0.32] -0.051 [0.35] -0.051 [0.35] 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Controls: duration in FSS program, household size, rent subsidy, debt level, & income 
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Client Survey 
1. Which of the statements comes closest to the amount of financial risk that you and your spouse/partner are 
willing to take when you save or make investments? 
     "Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns" 
     "Take above average financial risks expecting to earn above average returns" 
     "Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns" 
     "Not willing to take any financial risks" 
 
2. Over the past year, would you say that you and your spouse/partner combined: 
     Spent more than you made in income      
     Spent less than you made in income 
     Your spending equaled your income 
     Don’t know 
 
3. How do you grade yourself in the following areas in the last 12 months? 
    Poor Fair Okay Good Excellent 
a. Controlling my spending                     
b. Paying my bills on time                     
c. Planning for my financial future                    
d. Providing for my family                     
e. Saving money                     
f. Managing my finances                      
h. Investing money                     
h. Following a budget                    
i. Knowledge of current interest rates                    
j. Knowledge of my current credit rating                   
 
4. How often do you have the following symptoms? 
a. Nightmares, insomnia, or restless sleep   
b. Headaches/migraines     
c. Stomach or back pain     
d. Extreme tiredness or fatigue    
e. Feelings of embarrassment or inadequacy   
f. Loss of appetite     
g. Fear of losing control      
 
5. How much do you know about the following? 
a. Interest rates, finance charges, and credit terms .........................................   
b. Credit ratings and credit files .....................................................................     
c. Managing finances .....................................................................................     
d. Investing money  ......................................................................................   
e. What is on your credit report......................................................................     
 
6. How much have you learned about managing money and using credit from…? 
a.  High school and/or college courses .............................................   
b.  Training courses and/or seminars taught outside school ..............   
c.  Difficult financial experiences / “school of hard knocks” ............   
d.  Parents .........................................................................................   
e.  Spouse/domestic partner ..............................................................   
f.  Friends and peers .........................................................................   
g.  Work .........................................................................................   
h.  TV or radio...................................................................................   
 
7. How would you rate your current credit record? 
 
   Very bad…            Bad…         About average…          Good…          Very good…  
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8. How frequently do you feel this way? 
a. I am worried about controlling my spending ....................................   
b. I am worried about having enough money .........................................   
c. I am stressed about my financial situation .........................................   
d. I feel I cannot afford to go out ...........................................................   
 
9. Have you or your spouse/partner ever…? 
a.  Declared bankruptcy ..................................................................   
b.  Received consumer credit counseling ..........................................................   
c.  Paid a late fee for a bill ................................................................................   
d.  Reached the maximum on your credit card ..................................................   
e.  Received a phone call from a lender or creditor...........................................   
f.  Paid a utility bill late ....................................................................................   
g.  Took out a cash advance ..............................................................................   
h.  Bounced a check ..........................................................................................   
i.  Had items repossessed..................................................................................   
 
10. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
a. My parents/guardians were good at managing their finances.............     
b. I was aware of my parents’/guardians’ financial situation .................    
c. My parent/guardian talked to me about their finances .......................    
d. My parent/guardian talked to me about how to manage money.........      
 
11. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Today…. 
a. I regularly set aside money for savings ..............................................    
b. I am saving for my children’s future needs ........................................    
c. I think taking on more debt is good for my family.............................    
 
12. Do you use any of the following tobacco products? 
a. Cigarettes .........................................................................................................   
b. Cigars .........................................................................................................   
c. Pipes .........................................................................................................   
d. Chewing tobacco or snuff ....................................................................................   
 
13. How often do you feel…? 
a. There is really no way I can solve some of my problems ..................           
b. I am being pushed around in life........................................................           
c. There is little I can do to change things in my life .............................           
d. I can do anything I set my mind to.....................................................           
e. What happens to me in the future depends on me..............................           
f.  Helpless in dealing with the problems of life .............................           
g.  I have little control over the things that happen to me ...............           
 
14. Have you or your spouse/partner experienced any of the following in the last 12 months?      Yes        No 
a.  Major medical expenses.....................................................................       
b.  Theft or destruction of significant property........................................       
c.  Major legal or tax problem.................................................................       
d.  A significant involuntary reduction in income...................................       
e.  Loss of job .......................................................................................       
f.  An extended period when you couldn’t find a job .............................       
g.  Injury / health emergency ..................................................................       
h.  Excessive credit card or other loan burden.........................................       
i.  Problem paying taxes.........................................................................       
j.  Death in family ..................................................................................       
k.  Divorce / separation ...........................................................................       
l.  Disability or Long-term illness ..........................................................       
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15. Are you enrolled in the Family Self Sufficiency Program?           Yes          No                 Don’t know   
 
If yes, what was the main reason you enrolled?  (9 one answer only) 
It was required........................................................................    
Hoped to improve my financial condition..............................    
To build savings thru escrow account ....................................    
To achieve home ownership...................................................    
Childcare ................................................................................    
To obtain my GED ................................................................    
To receive tuition assistance for education.............................    
To access other financial assistance .......................................    
Other ......................................................................................    
Not Applicable .......................................................................    
 
 
 
16. Are you enrolled in the Financial Fitness?           Yes          No                 Don’t know   
 
If yes, what was the main reason you enrolled? (9 one answer only) 
It was required........................................................................    
Hoped to improve my financial condition..............................    
To fix credit problems............................................................    
To achieve home ownership...................................................    
To build a savings account ....................................................    
Other ......................................................................................    
Not applicable ........................................................................    
 
17. How far do you live from the CDCLI offices? (9 one answer) 
 Under 5 minutes away...............................     16-20 minutes................................................    
 6-10 minutes away ....................................    21-25 minutes................................................    
 11-15 minutes away ..................................    More than 25 minutes ...................................    
 
18. Do you have any of the following insurance coverage?........................... Yes  No 
a.  Health insurance (HMO, SCHIP, Medicaid, Medicare, etc) ..............      
b.  Life insurance (whole or term coverage) ...........................................      
c  Disability insurance ...........................................................................      
d.  Renter/property insurance ..................................................................      
e.  Auto insurance ...................................................................................      
 
19. What is the highest level of schooling you have completed? (9 one answer) 
 Some schooling.................................................    Graduated with 2-year associate’s degree .........  
 High school diploma or equivalent ..................    Graduated 4-year college bachelors degree.......  
 Some college.....................................................    Graduate or professional degree........................  
 
20. In what year were you born?   19___ 
 
21. What best describes your current work status? (9 one answer) 
 Full-time Student   Temporarily laid-off or on leave  
 Homemaker    Unemployed, looking for work  
 Retired/disabled   Unemployed, not looking for work  
 Self-employed    Employed full-time     
 Employed part-time     
 
22. What is your gender? Male .....................................   Female   
 
23. How many people are there in your household including yourself? 
a. Adults over 18 years old ...................................................................... _______ 
b. Children 12 to 18 years old .................................................................. _______ 
c. Children under 12 years old ................................................................. _______ 
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24. How much would you estimate you and your spouse/partner have in combined total savings and investments? 
(9 one) 
 No assets ......................................................    $10,000 to $14,999........................................   
 Less than $1,000 ...............................................    $15,000 to $19,999........................................   
 $1,000 to $4,999 ...............................................     $20,000 or more ...........................................   
 $5,000 to $9,999 ...............................................    
 
25. How much would you estimate you and your spouse/partner have in combined total debts? (9 one) 
 No debts ......................................................    $10,000 to $14,999 .......................................   
 Less than $1,000 ...............................................    $15,000 to $19,999........................................   
 $1,000 to $4,999 ...............................................     $20,000 or more ...........................................   
 $5,000 to $9,999 ...............................................    
Credit Report Measures 
Credit score    FICO score from single bureau credit report 
Total $ amount of all debt  Aggregate all existing debts from report. 
Number of active bank cards   Aggregate bank issued credit cards such as Visa, Mastercard, 
etc. 
Number of total credit cards   Aggregate the of any department store, retail store or other 
cards plus bank cards 
Average age of accounts Sum of the age of all of all open accounts divided by the total 
number of accounts rounded to the month 
Total $ of credit limits   Aggregate maximum limit for all open accounts, regardless of 
current status (even if nothing is borrowed). 
Total $ credit limit borrowed Aggregate open account total amount borrowed 
Number 60 day delinquencies Count of any 60 day or greater delinquencies in the last 12 
months based on the date of the credit report. 
Number Deficiencies   Count of any deficiency judgments listed in the report. 
Number Charge-offs  Count of any charge offs listed in the report. 
Number Bankruptcies   Count of any bankruptcy listed in the credit report. 
 
50058 Administrative Data Measures 
Any checking account   Yes or no. 
Amount in checking account Aggregated if multiple accounts. 
Any savings account   Yes or no 
Amount in savings account   Aggregated amounts if multiple accounts.  
Treatment/ Control  Treatment = assigned to take Financial Fitness class 
Census Tract   Of client’s home address 
# HH members   Size of household 
Gender    (M/F) 
Single parent    (Y/N) 
Citizen     (Y/N) 
Disabled    (Y/N) 
Total rent amount 
Tenant portion of rent  Net of subsidy from Housing Voucher Program 
Age 
Ethnicity    Hispanic/Latino or non- Hispanic/Latino 
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Race     White, African American, Asian, Native/Pacific Islander 
Welfare receipt   (Y/N) 
Wage income    (Y/N) 
Wage income $   Dollar amount per year 
Child support    (Y/N) 
Child support $    
Total income   All sources in total per year 
Medical expenses  Any reported per year 
Child care expenses  Any reported per year 
 
Financial Literacy Course Topics 
 
1. Banks and Financial 
Institutions 
a. Banking products 
and services 
b. Cautions about high-
cost services 
(payday loans, etc) 
c. Selecting a bank 
d. Opening a checking 
account 
e. Balancing a 
checkbook 
2. Money Management and 
Savings 
a. Tracking spending 
b. Reducing spending 
c. Setting goals 
d. Creating a budget 
e. Why save? 
f. Types of savings 
g. Developing a 
savings habit 
3. Credit 
a. Understanding credit 
records 
b. Establishing & maintaining 
good credit 
c. Shopping for a credit card 
d. Avoiding debt 
e. Credit repair 
f. Obtaining a credit report 
4. Consumer Finance Awareness 
a. How to avoid scams 
b. How to handle complaints 
c. Understanding how 
marketing works 
d. Shopping strategies 
5. Homeownership 
a. Overview of steps, risks and 
benefits 
b. Avoiding predatory lending 
c. Scheduling a one-on-one 
counseling session 
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Propensity Score Estimation Procedure 
A propensity score is the conditional probability of a client being assigned to 
the treatment group given pretreatment characteristics. Propensity score matching is a 
way to “correct” the estimation of treatment effects by controlling for the other factors 
that might create bias. A score is calculated for each client in order to better match 
control group subjects to treatment subjects. By using these scores as weights, the two 
groups will be more similarly paired along various baseline factors except for 
treatment (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 1997; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 2001; Smith & 
Todd, 2005). The probability of being assigned to treatment and then completing all 
surveys was estimated using the following probit specification of baseline data: 
Eq. A-1 Prob(treatment) = β1 age + β2 age2 + β3 financial knowledge index + β4 debt + β5  
bankruptcy + β6 savings + β7 household size + β8 rent + β9 income + β10 white + β11  
welfare + β12 #delinquencies + β13 Length of time in FSS+ ε 
The propensity score was then used to create quintiles of about 25 clients each 
based on the relative probability of completing education predicted by this model. 
Within each quintile, each control borrower was assigned a weight relative to his or 
her probability of actually being in the control group (number of treatment subjects in 
the quintile divided by the number of control subjects in quintile). Weights ranged 
from 0.23 to 2.57. The means of over 20 variables were tested between treatment and 
control groups using these weights. No comparison had statistically significant 
differences, and none had a weighted t-test statistic of more than 1.0. This suggests the 
propensity scores are an effective method (Morgan & Harding, 2006). More than 20 
different propensity scoring specifications were tested, including models with as many 
as 30 covariates. The significance and magnitude of the results of the t-tests and 
treatment estimates were stable across variations in the scoring model. The model 
produced quintiles with common support (all treatments and controls were matched) 
and was the most parsimonious of the variations tested. 
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Table 4.A.7: PROBIT Model for Propensity Score Estimation 
 Propensity Score 
 b/t 
Age  -0.08 
 (0.61) 
Age* Age 0.00 
 (0.63) 
Financial Literacy Index -0.18 
 (1.14) 
Total Debt 0.00 
 (0.82) 
Past Bankruptcy 0.000 
 (0.12) 
Total Savings 0.000 
 (0.26) 
Household size 0.07 
 (0.87) 
Rent Subsidy -0.00** 
 (2.86) 
Total Income 0.00** 
 (2.94) 
White race 0.08 
 (0.32) 
Welfare Receipt 0.14 
 (0.45) 
Number of delinquencies on Credit Report 0.56 
 (1.71) 
Months in Program 0.000 
 (0.98) 
Constant 2.16 
 (0.87) 
Observations 144 
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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